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Abstract 
This analysis intertwines two narratives: the impact of the Great War upon British 
public life, and the history of the Conservative Party. It shows how the memory of 
1914-18 influenced Westminster politics for decades after the conflict. Whereas 
previous accounts have placed the ex-serviceman at the periphery of events – in 
pressure groups like the British Legion or as single issue campaigners fighting for 
issues directly connected to soldierly causes (war pensions, memorials and such) – 
this analyses those soldiers who became Conservative MPs after 1918 as a distinct 
and philosophically inquisitive cohort, and places them within the key trends and 
issues of the day. 
 Using numerous archival sources, together with primary and secondary 
literature, it illustrates how the war formed a turning point in the lives of 
politicians later to assume prominence (including Harold Macmillan and Anthony 
Eden) together with lesser names. It places such figures within the Conservative 
Party structure – outlining bones of contention with the leadership, principally 
Stanley Baldwin, and at the same time shows where the ex-serviceman cohort was 
unable to reach consensus. 
 In its later sections, it shows why such a body did not rise up and rebel 
against parliamentary democracy in Great Britain, as they did in Germany and Italy. 
It also challenges popular perceptions of the political isolation of Oswald Mosley, 
the shape of anti-appeasement movements within Westminster, and the nature of 
the post-war consensus. Finally, it outlines how this cohort was eventually eclipsed 
by younger men, and how an understanding of this very eclipse can help explain 
the path British politics took in the second half of the twentieth century. 
  Partially jettisoned then, is the impression painted by literary works 
of a generation shell-shocked to the point of inertia, and condemned to wallow in 
despair. In its place emerges a tale of sustained political activism. 
Word Count 
This thesis comprises a total of 96,449 words. 
Thesis Content Statement 
The following represents only the candidate’s work (i.e. nothing by way of 
collaboration), and has not been previously submitted for any degree, at UEA or 
elsewhere. 
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Introduction 
.1 The Problem 
What follows is an attempt to reinterpret the meaning of the First World War in 
British public life by reference to what a sample of its survivors - those who 
became Tory Members of Parliament - did in its aftermath. It aims to reshape our 
views on a range of points, ranging from philosophical constructs such as 
conservatism (with small and large ‘c’) and the place of democracy in Great Britain, 
to more concrete matters of interwar politics, both domestic and foreign. Such 
claims, it is true, may elicit an initial scepticism from the reader. To begin with, 
what on earth can be added to a historiography that, through the work of Paul 
Fussell, Samuel Hynes and others, has itself spawned a historiography?1 Similarly, 
though the discovery of a trench in Northern France or Belgium occasionally belies 
such a notion, one might raise concerns that few new sources - of any kind - can be 
added to any Great War debate. To the curious researcher, some of the types of 
material that informs a study such as this - diaries, autobiographies, parliamentary 
debates - have long been available.2 Given this, what more is there possibly to say 
about the place of the war in the British national story? 
 Actually, it seems, a significant amount. The historiographical problem this 
account intends to remedy is neither one of insufficient sources, nor the 
uncovering of some hitherto completely untouched academic territory. Whilst, as 
we will see, there remains room to indeed achieve both these points to varying 
degrees, what our understanding of the Great War requires is not always new tools 
to tell the story more completely, but the refocusing of old approaches in new 
directions. The way we conceptualise the war is exceptionally British. For all the 
                                                           
1 P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, (London, 1975); S. Hynes, A War Imagined: 
The First World War and English Culture, (London, 1990) and M. Eksteins, Rites of Spring: 
The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, (London, 1989). 
2 Examples of the longevity of sources on the war include E. Hilton Young, By Sea and Land: 
Some Naval Doings, (London, 1920) and J.M. Kenworthy, Sailors, Statesmen - And Others: An 
Autobiography, (London, 1933). By 1933 Kenworthy had already conceded his generations 
defeat (3): ‘we allowed the old men to continue muddling along in the old ways in finance, 
industry, and politics and acquiesced in their hopeless and useless methods. Youth 
returning from the Wars should have taken control.’ 
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movements towards cross cultural and supra-national boundary ways of writing 
history in recent years, little of this has seemingly permeated our views on 1914-
18.3 To summarise, on the continent the war is seen as the great political dynamo, 
fuelling the fascism of Benito Mussolini, the National Socialism of Adolf Hitler, 
Italian irredenta and the mutilated victory, German anger at the Versailles diktat 
and a pervasive dolschstoβlegende.4 In Britain the war is not viewed in the same 
causative light which, as Deborah Cohen has shown with relevance to the state’s 
comparative (by the standards of the Weimar Republic) neglect of ex-servicemen, 
is somewhat surprising.5 To be sure, the conflict is often seen as the harbinger of 
great political upheaval - even the birth of a new form of capitalism.6 The 
enfranchising of women and impoverished men, the increasing socio-
parliamentary Impact of Labour, the ever more noticeable encroachment of state - 
begun in war but carried over into the peace – apparatus were all tangible.7 
Unfortunately however the driving forces behind such trends are often 
insufficiently understood. Concurrent to the reactive, largely non-veteran, political 
                                                           
3 J.H. Bentley, ‘Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History,’ American 
Historical Review, 101 (1996), 749-770. Even in victorious France, Adrian Gregory 
importantly notes, the defeats of 1870 and 1940 lend a different emphasis to 1914-18: a 
tragedy to be sure, but an ultimately victorious one. A. Gregory, The Last Great War: British 
Society and the First World War, (Cambridge, 2008), 2. 
4 For the impact of World War One, see I.K. Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, (London, 
1998), passim and R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship, (London, 
2005), passim. 
5 D. Cohen, The War Came Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany 1914-1939, 
(London, 2001), 3, ‘At the heart of this study is an apparent paradox. Contrary to 
historians’ expectations, the state’s largesse did not secure, nor did its absence preclude, 
the loyalty of veterans... In contrast [to Weimar Germany], British ex-servicemen remained 
the Crown’s loyal subjects though they received only meagre material compensation.’ 
6 W.G. Runciman, A Treatise on Social Theory, Volume Three: Applied Social Theory, 
(Cambridge, 1997) and Idem, ‘Has British Capitalism Changed Since the First World War?,’ 
British Journal of Sociology, 44 (1993), 53-67. 
7 M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics, 
(Cambridge, 1971) and R. Lowe, ‘Government,’ in S. Constantine, M.W. Kirby and M.B. Rose 
(eds), The First World War in British History, (London, 1995), 29-50. For the increased role 
of the state generally, see W.H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: The Rise of 
Collectivism, (London, 1983), 31-40. In 1910 public expenditure was 13% of GNP, half that 
of 1930. The percentage of the working population employed by the government also 
increased rapidly from 5.8% in 1911 to 9.7% by 1931. Lastly, the average number of 
statutes passed rose from 48.3 in the twentieth century’s first decade to 57.9 by its third.  
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elite who acquiesced to these changes in Westminster, there was a significant body 
of former soldiers urging the need for proactive measures which deserve greater 
attention. Rather than looking at why the elites succumb to pressure (or not), it is 
surely equally important to understand said pressure – both in terms of its origins 
and forms - as much as possible. If war could lay the groundwork for fascism, as 
George Mosse has argued, could it not also have implications for the ultimate 
preservation of democracy?8 
 We need to make a basic reconnection. The problem is that, in essence, we 
have divorced the ex-serviceman from the party political process in Great Britain. 
The reasons for this are numerous. Firstly, no ex-serviceman’s party entered the 
political arena in a serious way until Oswald Mosley went off the conventional rails 
after 1930. Previous efforts, including the anti-Semitic Silver Badge Party and the 
various candidates backed by MP turned fraudster Horatio Bottomley, were little 
beyond amateur. The subsequent failure of Mosleyite fascism rendered the notion 
essentially dead, it appears. Ex-servicemen’s grievances had been funneled off into 
the world of the pressure group: the National Union of Ex-Servicemen (NUX) for 
leftists, the British Legion for the right.9 By 1924 the Legion had over 150,000 
members, and approaching four times this figure by the outbreak of hostilities 15 
years later.10 Unlike much of Europe, Britain had no experience of a mass civilian 
army prior to 1914, and that soldiers conformed to pre-1914 political patterns 
should not shock. Given the sometimes disgraceful reputation of those who took 
the ex-serviceman label into the Westminster arena - Patriotism Perverted to 
borrow Richard Griffith’s phrase - it is perhaps not surprising Britons choose to 
                                                           
8 G.L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (New York, 1990), 7. 
9 As Niall Barr has recently illustrated, the British Legion remained – by and large – 
stringently apolitical at a national level. N. Barr, The Lion and the Poppy: British Veterans, 
Politics, and Society, 1921-1939, (London, 2005). 10: ‘The House of Commons Branch [of 
the Legion] contained over 150 members of Parliament, but was never able, or indeed 
designed, to marshal MPs in opposition to the party whips.’ Local exceptions, like Jack 
Cohen, of course existed, and maybe fertile ground for future research outside of an 
overtly Westminster project such as this. 
10 G. Wooton, The Official History of the British Legion, (London, 1956), 305. 
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regard the military and politics as fundamentally diverged.11 For all the sterling 
work surrounding single issues such as war pensions, there is room to explore the 
political process per se a little deeper.12  
 The classic accounts of the interwar epoch paid lip-service to the idea of a 
British war generation. A.J.P. Taylor and C.L. Mowat drew attention to a body of ex-
servicemen in parliament before essentially dismissing it.13 French historians have 
been similarly reticent to analyse les anciens combattants et la politique anglaise: 
Rene Remond comparing French ex-service movements to the American Legion 
and Mussolini, whilst Antoine Prost concentrated merely on the former.14 La 
generation du feu, evidently, does not translate politically across the English 
Channel.15 On the other hand, British Conservative historians have been willing to 
highlight the actions of young Tory veterans during this period, but this has almost 
always been within a party, rather than a legacy of war, context.16 In short, though 
Michael Paris’s portrayal of a Warrior Nation and Dan Todman’s account of the 
ambiguous lessons of war suggest the wheel may be turning, even prosaic 
historians can find it difficult to challenge ingrained assumptions about the 
                                                           
11 R. Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, the Right Club and British Anti-
Semitism, (London, 1998).  
12 Cohen and Barr aside, from the German perspective it would be remiss not to 
acknowledge R. Whalen, Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939, 
(Ithaca, 1984), on war pensions and the collapse of Weimar/rise of Nazism. On first glance, 
the European comparison really does do British democracy few favours with Weimar 
allocating over 20% of its 1931-2 expenditure on war pensions, whilst France mustered 
15%. Britain lagged behind on 5.9%. Cohen, War Came Home, 194.  
13 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-45 (Oxford, 1970), 176; C.L. Mowat, Britain Between 
the Wars 1918-1940, (London, 1966), 8. 
14 R. Remond, ‘Les Anciens Combattants et la Politique,’ Revue Française de Science 
Politique, 5 (1955), 267-290; A. Prost, Les Anciens Combattants 1914-1940, (Paris, 1977), 
passim. 
15 Though it does in terms of war memorials. See C. Jamet-Bellier de la Duboisiere, 
Commemorating the Lost Generation: First World War Memorials in Cambridge, Oxford and 
Some English Public Schools, Cambridge M. Litt Thesis, 1994, 8-9. 
16 For example, J. Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996, (London, 1996); 
A. Clark, The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State, 1922-1997, (London, 1998) and J. 
Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940, (London, 1978). Gary Sheffield, 
conversely, limited himself to the rather reserved comment that ‘some politicians 
politicians attempted to capitalise on their war service in an attempt to win veterans’ 
votes.’ G. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline 
in the British Army in the Era of the First World War, (London, 2000), 132. 
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separation of the political and military in Britain.17  
 Historians and social commentators have, it is true, skirted around the edge 
of telling the tale that is to follow. The decline of the aristocracy after 1918, and 
how they reconciled themselves to the new world - not always successfully - is a 
well trodden one this account implicitly explores, building upon the numerous 
“dinner table” interwar histories of gentrified figures.18 The problem with such 
accounts however is that they are often extremely self-contained. D.J. Taylor’s 
Bright Young People offers a good example when stating that 
 
the cult of youth was one to which practically every inhabitant of the 
British Isles in the 1920s would have unhesitatingly subscribed. One can 
see this everywhere in post-war life - in the determination of political 
parties to repopulate their ranks with youthful, media-friendly war 
veterans (Eden, Macmillan, Mosley), in the vogue for twenty-something 
playwrights and entertainers (Noel Coward, Ivor Novello).19 
 
Aside from the massive generalisation in the first sentence, histories such as these 
do not widely illuminate. To be sure, there was a matinee idol class of Briton 
between the wars whose story is worth telling. Yet if such a story is not fitted into 
the wider picture of interwar Britain, what use does it have? In our account then, 
Eden, Macmillan and Mosley are placed very much within the wider socio-political 
milieu, rather than the world of the country estate. Analysing how aristocrats 
adapted to the new electoral and societal order can provide more than a mere 
description of the desperate last throws of a decaying order.  That is not to say that 
the decline of the aristocracy has not been woven into the wider political picture 
previously, but that this account proposes to alter the scale a little. If you accept the 
                                                           
17 M. Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture 1850-2000, (Wiltshire, 
2000) and D. Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, (London, 2005). Even if Todman 
in particular suggests an ambiguity in the lessons of war, the crucial point is that such 
questions were part of the general zeitgeist. 
18 For example, A. De Courcy, The Viceroy’s Daughters: The Lives of the Curzon Sisters, 
(London, 2003) and J. Mitford, Hons and Rebels, (London, 1960) 
19 D.J. Taylor, Bright Young Things, (London, 2007), 36. 
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premise that most soldiers came back from the Great War - as Jay Winter, Robert 
Wohl and others have worked hard to illustrate demographically - the image of the 
isolated, sparse aristocrat becomes less tenable.20 It is almost Holocaust denial in 
reverse. Instead of David Irving trying to argue how millions of Jews presumably 
just disappeared between 1941 and 1945, historians have sometimes tended to 
impose an interwar Britain without the aristocrats who, in reality, manifestly were 
there.21 Antoine Prost voiced similar doubts as regards les Anciens Combattants in 
France: as he pointed out, ex-soldiers came home, and could live exceedingly 
normal post-1918 lives, for all the well-documented (genuine and mythologised) 
sorrow.22 We will turn to the various historiographies in greater depth at the 
beginning of each chapter. 
.2 The Pervasion of Trauma 
As we will see at the beginning of the first section, since the late 1920s it has 
been near impossible for the Great War to be understood in all its complexity in the 
popular mindset. As Gary Sheffield commented, once the literary dam of 1929-30 
burst, any hope of an alternative history of 1914-18 was essentially drowned in its 
midst.23 Graves, Remarque, Hemingway, Blunden, Sherriff and many others drove 
an industry that even today impresses in its scale.24 Blackadder Goes Forth, 
Gallipoli, and Un long dimanche de fiançailles, have provided something of a 
continuation onto screen, both big and small. Through such a prism the war, driven 
by the allegedly tame nature of the threat vis-à-vis that of Hitler two decades later, 
                                                           
20 J.M. Winter, ‘Britain’s “Lost Generation” of the First World War, Population Studies, 31 
(1977), 449-466, passim; Idem, The Great War and the British People, (London, 1985), 
passim; R. Wohl, The Generation of 1914, (Cambridge, Mass, 1979), passim. 
21 For the sake of acknowledging legal precedent, R.J. Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, 
Holocaust and the Irving Trial, (London, 2002). As Adrian Gregory notes, it would shock us 
far more if Billy Prior, the hero of Pat Barker’s fictional Regeneration Trilogy, was allowed 
to live. Gregory, Last Great War, 3. 
22 Prost, Les Anciens Combattants, passim. 
23 G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities, (London, 2000), 
6-7. 
24 R. Graves, Goodbye to All That, (London, 1960), E.M. Remarque, All Quiet on the Western 
Front, (London, 1929), E. Blunden, Undertones of War, (London, 1928), R.C. Sherriff, 
Journey’s End, (London, 1928) and the various lower profile works in R.M. Bracco, 
Merchants of Hope: British Middlebrow Writers and the First World War, (London, 1993). 
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by the staggeringly high death toll for such small territorial gain, and by the 
poignancy of the enthusiasm of 1914 being brought crashing down to earth, has 
become seen as ‘something worse than a tragedy, nothing less than the greatest 
error of modern history.’25 Given the failure of politicians (who had not fought) to 
justify their expansive claims of 1918, the ex-serviceman in British life was reduced 
to a position of great pathos, condemned to wallow in a world they had not fought 
for, nor could change. The myth of the war experience, shown by George Mosse to 
be so palpable across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, contrasted sharply with this 
ugly, drab new age.26 Reality or not, myths can stick. 
 The purpose of this study is to interrogate such phenomena. What will be 
outlined is that not only did former soldiers enter the nation’s politics in a palpable 
manner after 1918, they did so with strongly held views - albeit occasionally 
expressed in a vague, allegorical form - that the world needed to change. Unlike the 
authors and poets, whom Jay Winter has noted failed - willingly or not - to offer 
solutions to the moral problems posed by the war, veteran politicians had - the 
occasionally vagaries of the Westminster game aside - to articulate what they had 
learned in the trenches, and impart the lessons it begat.27 They were not merely 
voices crying in the wilderness, but an authentic, and to a degree influential, part of 
the mainstream political culture. War trauma in Great Britain was not the sole 
preserve of the middle or upper class author, it filtered into Westminster too. Men 
scarred by conflict, wearing their hearts on their sleeves and their medals on their 
chest, vocalised their horrific experiences in a whole number of ways, sometimes 
                                                           
25 N. Ferguson, The Pity of War, (London, 1999), 462. Gregory also points out that it 
prevents us asking more probing questions about 1939-45. Gregory, Last Great War, 4. He 
is adapting the argument in J. Grigg, ‘Nobility and War : The Unselfish Commitment ?,’ 
Encounter, 74 (1990), 21-7. 
26 G.L. Mosse, ‘Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience,’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 21 (1986), 491-513. The myth of the war experience, Mosse shows, 
was decidedly ambiguous. There was clearly glory and sorrow in conflict, and how best to 
represent these was a continual problem over the correct symbolism. The middle class, 
rural, author of the war experience which he posits could well have been a member of the 
Phoenix Generation. 
27 J.M. Winter, ‘Les poètes combattants de la Grande Guerre: Une Nouvelle Forme du Sacré’ 
in J. Becker, J.M. Winter, G. Krumeich, A. Becker and S. Audoin-Rousseau (eds), Guerre et 
Cultures 1914-1918, (Paris, 1994), 28-35, 34. 
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subtle, sometimes not. They were both the slave to, and master of, such a 
phenomenon. Clearly there was a degree, as chapter two will outline, to which they 
used the respect associated with being an ex-serviceman for electoral gain. Yet at 
the same time, these were tortured souls battling with great ontological crises. 
Having seen what they had, what could possibly make their existence worthwhile? 
What would constitute redemption for the dead?28 
 The Phoenix Generation of our title is in some sense ironic, given its origins 
in fiction. It refers to a novel by Henry Williamson, part of his Phillip Maddison 
series spanning the first half of the twentieth century, which dealt with the post 
1918 lives of a group of Britons who emerged like a collective phoenix from the 
flames of trench warfare.29 Williamson was famously radicalised to a great degree 
by his own war service, joining the British Union of Fascists in 1937 and sharing 
Mosley’s fate of incarceration in the summer of 1940. Though his politics were 
hardly typical, he represents a nice bridge between the cultural world which has 
hitherto shaped our comprehension of the effect of 1914-18, and the political arena 
in which we will focus. Our Phoenix Generation are neither fictitious nor could 
predicate themselves simply upon the written word. They were the one hundred, 
sometimes two hundred, plus veterans who, at one point or another, sat in the 
House of Commons under the Conservative banner between the wars. The much 
analysed literary picture is one part of the collective cultural consequence of war, 
our analysis of Conservative war veterans intends to show that Westminster 
politics forms another, equally if not more important, illustration. 
 Indeed, to ex-servicemen turned politicians the literary accounts of war 
service were inaccurate at best. Coming across a collection of Alec Waugh poems in 
the trenches, Alfred Duff Cooper found them ‘miserable.’ ‘These new poets’ - he 
wrote home to his lover Diana Manners - ‘seem to me especially bad.’ Whilst 
acknowledging the harm and destruction war could bring, Duff believed there was 
also ‘romance in it. Nothing so big can be without it - and there is beauty too - I 
                                                           
28 A question, as we will see, on the minds of many. S. Graham, The Challenge of the Dead, 
(London, 1921) and P. Gibbs, Realities of War, (London, 1920). 
29 H. Williamson, The Phoenix Generation, (London, 1985) 
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have seen plenty from our parting at Waterloo until today. And those poets ought 
to see it and reproduce it instead of going on whining and jibing.’30 Decades after 
the conflict Henry Page Croft provided a similar interpretation. Having ‘read many 
of the war books which were the rage about the years 1929 and 1930’ he ‘could 
only come to the conclusion that the writers were all shell-shock cases as indeed 
most of them confessed themselves to be.’ According to Croft, ‘they describe[d] the 
whole tone of the British Army in language so much at variance with the truth: 
there was nothing bestial or craven about the men I had the honour to serve 
with.’31 This is thus a new cohort, and a new way of viewing the conflict. 
.3 Structure 
 There is much terrain to traverse, and many historiographies to navigate. 
Conservative ideology - unsurprisingly given a party that could embrace both 
Thatcher and Macmillan - can be interpreted numerous ways, as can the actions of 
its individual followers.32 Remembrance and memory are likewise complex fields, 
which lead one into psychological and sociological questions of the collective mind 
and notions of truth.33 Then there are the contemporary figures who have 
spawned, willingly or not, their own enduring schools of thought: Churchill on 
foreign policy and Keynes on the economic slump.34 We will address these 
individually in detail at the beginning of each chapter, but the point should be made 
from the outset that this is an analysis plotting its way through many paths with 
varying levels of cohesion. If at times it stretches connections to breaking point, 
this is to be borne in mind. Ours is a story at once social, cultural, economic, 
political, military, and various shades of grey in between. 
                                                           
30 Duff Cooper to Diana Manners, 26 July 1918, A. Cooper (ed), A Durable Fire: The Letters 
of Duff and Diana Cooper 1913-1950, (London, 1983), 82. 
31 H. Page Croft, My Life of Strife, (London, 1972), 98-9. 
32 From the right of Clark, The Tories, to the Disraelian Centre of P. Williamson, Stanley 
Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and national values, (Cambridge, 1999). 
33 P. Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,’ Representations, 26 
(1989), 7-24; Fussell, Great War and Modern Memory. More generally, M.R. Trouillot, 
Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, (Boston, 1995). 
34 W.S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (London, 1952); for an example of Keynesian work, 
see R. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929-1931, (London, 
1970). 
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 All this means it does not follow an exactly chronological structure. There 
are clearly pros and cons to this. Certainly it does not provide the kind of linear 
narrative seen in, for example, Simon Ball’s The Guardsmen, nor does it go into the 
level of detail that book provides regarding the life of each individual MP – though 
with almost 450 Tory members elected between the wars having served, perhaps 
the reader will forgive this.35 Whilst dipping in and out of men’s lives may, on 
occasion, mean less attention is paid to the damascene conversions some 
undoubtedly experienced on various issues, it does allow for wider scope. This, 
after all, is a study of a collective mentalité, not a Carlylian take on great individuals 
or, like Maurice Cowling, merely concerning itself with the sixty or so politicians 
who ‘really mattered.’36 To take such an approach is unhelpful in the interwar 
period, as Philip Williamson noted, due to figures like Gandhi, the various Viceroys, 
and the nation’s bankers all exerting pressure on the big Westminster fish.37 In 
some sense then, though situated very much in Westminster ‘high politics,’ the 
House of Commons is almost a bystander in our story. What this study intends to 
uncover is not individual machinations, but a zeitgeist. Why Mosley and his cohort 
acted the way they did is of greater interest than every action they took along the 
way. We are covering decades of British history. If this investigation sheds some 
light on a range of issues which can then be followed up in greater depth, so much 
the better. 
 It might be suggested that this account concerns a rather monolithic group. 
This is a tale of almost exclusively middle and upper class men, set in a time when 
this cohort was beginning to lose its centuries old hold on social and political 
power. Whilst the attitudes of these men to the social ills of the day forms a key 
part of what follows, necessarily because of the story’s aristocratic setting the 
social ills themselves are at times placed in the background - though by no means 
                                                           
35 S. Ball, The Guardsmen: Harold Macmillan, Three Friends, and the World They Made, 
(London, 2004). 
36 T. Carlyle, The French Revolution: A History, (London, 1837); Cowling, Impact of Labour, 
3. 
37 P. Williamson, Formation of the National Government. British Politics 1929-1931, 
Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1987, 11. 
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to the degree outlined in previous accounts. Unemployment, industrial militancy, 
housing shortages and the slums have been amply covered by W.R. Garside, Ross 
McKibbin, Kevin Morgan and others.38 They have been moulded into both a 
pessimistic account of the interwar Condition of Britain - “locust years” rife with 
poverty - and a more sympathetic explanation, where the nation’s leaders strived, 
albeit in vain, against insurmountable odds of declining world conditions and the 
diminution of British power.39 There is no need to go over old ground 
unnecessarily. The musings and posturing of ex-servicemen against this backdrop 
is what this investigation will uncover, building upon the previous historiographies 
where necessary. 
 To the charge that such an outwardly homogeneous sample cannot 
illuminate much beyond themselves, two defences may be forwarded. Firstly, for 
all this body seems a little ‘clubby’ - to borrow David Marquand’s description of the 
civil service - the “club line” is not taken as gospel. Attempts are made to second 
guess and explain the motives behind the public discourse. Where war service is 
embellished this is pointed out. Where the nominally rebellious Phoenix 
Generation shied away from taking stands against their leaders, this is also 
highlighted. There is no preconceived pattern here. These were not men superior 
to their environment or independent of it, but political operators within a well 
established milieu. For all the sense we will glean that former soldiers believed 
themselves to be unique men on some kind of special mission, this is not to be 
accepted wholesale - as George Mosse has shown.40 We will, to be sure, look 
outside the club. 
                                                           
38 W.R. Garside, British Unemployment 1919-1939: A study in public policy, (Cambridge, 
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the Shadow of War,’ Historical Journal, 36 (1993), 993-1001. 
39 From the pessimistic side G.D.H. and M.I. Cole, The Condition of Britain, (London, 1937). 
Offering more sympathetic approaches Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, and, in foreign policy 
terms, J. Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (Chicago, 1989).  
40 G.L. Mosse, ‘Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience,’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 21 (1986), 491-513. 
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 Secondly, by taking the black sheep of the club seriously, this account 
challenges the very assumptions upon which it is built. Oswald Mosley is usually 
seen as Beyond the Pale, anathema to reasonable men.41 Yet for a significant period 
he was neither intellectually nor socially isolated from the group of men with 
whom he had arguably most in common, the Phoenix Generation presented here. 
Our fourth chapter will deal with his fate. More broadly, we must note that though 
these men may appear to be pillars of the establishment - emerging to lead 
respectable Conservatism in the 1940s and 1950s - this was not always the case. As 
the economy tumbled after 1929, they questioned the very foundations on which 
democracy was built. As Hitler threatened to conquer, they did not oppose him 
with any absolute consistency. By placing Mosley very much within his generation, 
you not only achieve a greater understanding of why he acted the way did, but gain 
a more balanced, less teleological, view of the contemporary picture. The black 
sheep, after all, was a sheep nonetheless. 
 Indeed, for all these men purported to be, and are often presented here as, 
decent, honest and brave, this was only one side of a very Janus faced collective. 
The Phoenix Generation are sketched out rather benignly in what follows, but this 
is not to suggest that all ex-servicemen followed this pattern. In challenging the 
interwar myth of the powerless and numerically tiny former soldier, the intention 
is certainly not to substitute this for a cohort of a uniquely angelic and tolerant 
disposition. The anti-Semitism of Archibald Ramsay and the eugenicist leanings of 
numerous Tory veterans serve as notice of this – many of whom, as our appendix 
notes, having formerly attended Eton alongside two principle movers and shakers 
in the bizarre (often pseudo) scientific circles that emerged in the 1920s and 
1930s, George Pitt-Rivers and C.P. Blacker.42 When Commander Robert Bower 
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goaded the (London born) Labour MP Manny Shinwell that he should ‘go back to 
Poland’ during a parliamentary debate, he was hardly suggestive of a particularly 
kind generation (if unparliamentary, Shinwell’s response of crossing the floor and 
punching him in the face was perhaps understandable).43 Mosley himself is 
arguably sketched out in an overly kind fashion for some, but this is merely in 
response to a historiography that writes him as National Socialist in the making 
rather than a product of his circumstances. Robert Skidelsky attempted, largely 
successfully, to do this in the late 1970s, yet the wheel has again turned. Stephen 
Dorril, for instance, was prepared to highlight any and every arguably proto-
fascistic statement in Mosley’s early career.44 Conversely, men such as Harold 
Macmillan have their careers viewed from the opposite perspective: as figures 
constantly reminiscing about the war, whose every move bears the stamp of the 
trenches.45 It is surely a little unfair to write the history of two men from such 
strikingly similar backgrounds in such a dissimilar manner. If the veterans 
presented here do not represent an absolutely comprehensive sample of the total 
ex-servicemen body, this is because ‘the crackpot’ has been well outlined 
elsewhere. 
 Though this study deals with ex-servicemen, this is not to suggest that this 
was the only profound experience one could take from this, or any, war. Men 
opposed the conflict for serious, understandable and justifiable reasons. An 
analysis, for example, of former members of the Union of Democratic Control 
turned Labour MPs, or those Liberals who opposed conscription, might prove 
equally fruitful, and certainly seems fertile ground for future research. The 
following does not consider such notions in length - it is, after all, a study of 
Conservatism - but does not ignore them entirely. Ramsay MacDonald, for example, 
is held up as an interesting counter to the sample under consideration. The Morel 
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Papers at LSE and those of Arthur Ponsonby at the Bodleian Library in Oxford are 
also used at points. We likewise include limited UDC related data. Further 
investigation here would be most welcome. 
.4 Methodology 
In terms of methodology, this analysis represents a partial return to Lewis 
Namier and prosopography. There is indeed something of an intellectual pedigree 
here. Following in the footsteps of Namier himself, historians have not been afraid 
to plunder the biographies of the nation’s politicians - however obscure. Ian 
Christie’s British Non-Elite MPs sought to show how the rise of the businessman to 
respectability was achieved by merchants and bankers becoming politicians in ever 
increasing numbers in the 18th and early 19th centuries.46 More recently, John 
Stewart’s The Battle for Health illustrated how the medical background of 
Somerville Hastings contributed to an intellectual climate which made the NHS 
possible.47 Finally, as our fifth chapter will show, Lynne Olson has provided an even 
more contemporary example of this phenomenon - illustrating how Troublesome 
Young Men helped topple Neville Chamberlain in 1940. The devil, it seems, can well 
and truly be in the detail.48 
 In such a spirit, and whilst not forgetting the issues inherent in any 
discussion of political culture - language, discourse, and the manipulation thereof - 
statistical analysis will not be eschewed, and at times will be prominent. In order to 
outline just how sizeable a phenomenon this study concerns itself with, raw 
numbers of MPs are required. Furthermore, to ascertain how these men think as a 
body, it is worth looking at how they vote in parliament. These are perhaps 
simplistic points, but worth making. In a subject - the British memory of the Great 
War - dominated by rumour, hyperbole, and misconception, facts that can be 
empirically verified matter more than ever; thus the attention paid in the second 
and fifth chapter. 
                                                           
46 I.R. Christie, British Non-Elite Mps, 1715-1820, (London, 1985).  
47 J. Stewart, The Battle for Health: A Political History of the Socialist Medical Association, 
1930-1951, (Aldershot, 1999). 
48 L. Olson, Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power in 1940 
and Helped to Save Britain, (New York, 2007). 
22 
 
 This remains however a study of political culture. It intertwines two 
narratives - the history of the Conservative Party with the effect of war - and seeks 
to explain not only how men acted, but why. In doing so it weaves a path between 
high politics and memory. This is not only true of its conclusions, but the methods 
it uses to achieve them. Thus, unlike those who doubt the utility of high politics - 
Ross McKibbin for one - this does not dismiss the private channels of 
communication between politicians as just gossip.49 Letters between figures both 
inside and outside our sample are used liberally. Equally however, our study 
clearly does not concern itself merely, or even primarily, with the conversation of 
those who govern. In this sense we part with Namier, who once famously enquired 
of a student during a PhD viva concerning the French Revolution, ‘why do you 
bother with these bandits?’50 MPs such as Albert Braithwaite, Michael Falcon and 
Arthur Hope are essentially unrecognisable to us, yet are woven into a narrative 
alongside familiar faces like Harold Macmillan. This is achieved through the mining 
of local newspapers and election material outside the established archival 
collections. The British Newspaper Library at Colindale is a treasure trove to those 
studying electioneering and political culture. The following makes full use of it: to 
study a generation, one must look outside the big names. 
 Thus in terms of originality this offers three distinct prongs of attack. Firstly, 
whilst paying attention to the archival collections of the big-hitters such as 
Churchill, Keynes and Lloyd George, this study makes use of material relatively 
neglected by historians. As with use of local newspapers, the collections cited here 
include smaller fry like John Loder and Robert Bower. Charles Loseby in particular 
represents a man, previously rather written off as an eccentric, whose papers are 
taken seriously here. We also include material only recently made available to the 
general public, such as Quintin Hogg’s papers on the Oxford By-Election of 1938 - 
which essentially served as a referendum on the Munich Agreement. Even 
prominent figures – let it be noted – can be ignored by historians: some of Louis 
Spears’s military papers at Kings College London had not been viewed in the 
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current author’s lifetime.51  
 At the same time, our Mannheimian methodological approach that war 
could filter through to a political war generation is something quite new in British 
political history.52 To be sure, historians have picked up on Westminster cliques 
which numbered many veterans - the ‘YMCA’ within 1920s Conservatism for one - 
but the idea that it extended beyond a few idealists has rarely been taken seriously. 
Yet the numbers do not lie: ex-servicemen entered politics, particularly the 
Conservative Party, in a big way after 1918. This, as we will see, was felt in every 
interwar parliament. One cannot approach issues like the Irish struggle for 
independence, the General Strike, the economic slump, and appeasement, without 
such an understanding. If all this study accomplishes is joining the dots between 
national culture and national politics, it will have served its purpose. 
 Lastly, in terms of the wider cultural milieu, this posits a collective in British 
life who did not take 1914 as the be all and end all. Clearly the beginning of the war 
- for all the continuities identified by Winter, Braybon and others - was a significant 
point of change in many regards.53 For one, it took a generation of British public 
schoolboys and threw them out into the carnage of warfare. Thus the warm 
reminiscences of Graves and his fellow authors for the good old days seen before 
the conflict, when the only concern before joining up was not missing out on the 
start of the Oxford term.54 Yet this view, together with the fact that the men under 
analysis here were members of the Conservative Party, has obscured the meaning 
they derived from the war. The figures of this study viewed (or at least described) 
1914 as imperfect, and something to be moved beyond, not as something to be 
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brought back into being as soon as possible.55 War is never a good thing, yet one 
cannot deny its power. The experience of the Great War made a group of men want 
to change the world. For all the tendency to view politicians, particularly in this 
media age, as opportunists, this is a notion we should take seriously. To be sure, 
their success rate in the coming years would rather mixed. If however we wish to 
understand not only what came to pass, but what could have done, these men 
deserve attention. Whilst it may be tempting to view interwar Britain as a Morbid 
Age – certainly there were those who saw the world gloomily – the cohort of this 
study form a powerful corrective; even a traditionally cautious body like the 
Conservative Party containing those arguing that positive, constructive action 
could correct any perceived national decline.56 
.5 War Memories and Conservatism 
What should be noted from the outset is that for the Phoenix Generation of 
politicians the defining moment of their lives was indeed the First World War - the 
exact nature of which we will address in our first chapter.57 This, let it also be 
observed, was a phenomenon most obviously seen amongst Conservatives. It is 
clearly something of an imprecise measure, but Labour veterans turned 
parliamentarians tended to devote less attention in their memoirs to the Great War 
than their Tory counterparts: Attlee gave over just 7 pages in his As It Happened, 
compared to the 27 in Mosley’s My Life and 81 in Oliver Lytellton’s Memoirs of Lord 
Chandos.58 The sheer volume of Tory reminiscences, as with the more cultural 
accounts, augurs its own problems. It is difficult not to be moved by the various 
autobiographies, and overwhelmed by their common narrative. Harold Macmillan’s 
Winds of Change was probably the most archetypal, and well suited his reputation 
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as old man shuffling around 10 Downing Street as its last Edwardian occupant. His 
description of ‘watch[ing] from my bedroom windows overlooking Horse Guards 
the rehearsals for the Birthday Parade…, [which] brought back, year by year, many 
memories,’ strikes one more as script for BBC Drama (cue flashback to the trenches 
here), than strictly accurate act of remembrance.59 Henry Willink’s addressing of 
his unpublished autobiography to his grandchildren is possibly but the open 
articulation of a tacit “writing for posterity” streak that runs through such tomes.60 
Indeed, the parallels within such books do invite some scepticism, particularly 
given the voluminous correspondence between the Phoenix Generation in old 
age.61 The tale of a spiritual awakening in 1914, followed by gallantly “mucking in” 
with the average Tommy whilst serving, and concluding with - again rather 
cinematically - a revelation that everything must change is an often peddled tale by 
the aged ex-serviceman turned politician.62 Though what follows largely 
substantiates it, we must be careful of a collective hindsight clouding the 
contemporary picture, particularly given the fact that some of the Phoenix 
Generation - like Willink - survived to take in the 1960s Lions Led by Donkeys 
interpretation of the conflict.63 As the family of C.P. Blacker (an Etonian 
contemporary of many future politicians) warned him when the 
eugenicist/scientist was writing his war memoirs, there was a real danger of 
simply parroting the Graves-Sassoon line.64 This was true of many. 
The Conservative Party generally is an equally slippery customer. Since John 
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64 C.P. Blacker, Have You Forgotten Yet? (Barnsley, 2000), vii.  
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Stuart Mill’s comment that it constituted ‘the stupidest party’ - devoid of 
intellectual fibre and, quite simply, ideas - both its members and critics have 
proved reluctant to articulate its doctrine with any degree of precision. And if one 
cannot do that, how do you prove a sample of its members deviated from this 
supposedly normal path? To begin with, academics have been a little too keen to 
seize upon Mill’s mantle. Disraeli’s plea for ‘above all - no programme’ should not 
be taken as the definitive representation of a party of such diverse interests and 
lobby groups.65 The implication seems to be that a party of the land, industry, 
Church of England and working class Tories - to name but a few of its ideological 
strands - would be a house ideologically divided, and prone to settle upon pure 
pragmatism. The Phoenix Generation themselves adopted this line on occasion. 
Describing why he could never join the Labour Party, Walter Elliot stated that ‘for 
most of us it is not the obscurities but the cast-iron cocksureness of Socialism 
which decides us against it.’66 John Buchan too placed great stock in a ‘sincere 
respect for facts’ over the ‘vague dogmas…regarded by their supporters with an 
almost religious veneration.’67 Yet this was not indicative of the trend. How could it 
be? In a world so turbulent – where so many European monarchies had been 
removed, where Lenin had provided an alternative to liberal democracy from the 
left and Mussolini from the right – conservatism could hardly remain impassive, as 
Philip Williamson has shown.68 Its case needed to be reasserted. As we will see, 
through cooperation with elements outside traditional conservative circles, visits 
to those nations which had jettisoned democracy, and the open articulation of 
policies running counter in both spirit and content to their leaders, the Phoenix 
Generation certainly imbued Conservatism with ideas. Whether Baldwin, 
Chamberlain or Churchill were prepared to adopt them would be another matter. 
In this light, one must be wary lest we accept the Correlli Barnett thesis of 
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continuities between pre-1914 public school, the Great War, and widespread, if 
tacit, pre-1945 Conservative acceptance of the coming welfare state. To Barnett, 
Labour’s ‘New Jerusalem’ held intellectual roots in ‘an idealistic response to the 
reality that, although Britain at the end of the nineteenth century was still the 
richest country in the world, her industrial masses were living out their lives in 
dreadful squalor and surpassing misery.’ After 1918 ‘even the Conservative Party 
had succumbed to the spirit of secularised religious idealism, for Stanley Baldwin, 
Neville Chamberlain and their closest colleagues (all public-school and Oxbridge 
men) were true Victorian moralists seeking to do good at home and abroad by the 
exercise of the Christian values.’ Finally this atmosphere produced ‘the younger 
generation of Conservative reformers in the 1930s and 1940s, men such as Quintin 
Hogg and R.A. Butler,’ who helped take the project forth.69 Our analysis paints a 
rather different picture to Barnett however. Whilst sympathies for the poor 
engendered by the war are repeatedly highlighted, it is the war’s centrality in this 
process that is continually stressed. Men such as Baldwin and Butler no doubt also 
cared, but they expressed themselves in rather different manners, and had 
different solutions, to those who had seen active service. It is important to tease 
out such nuances - perspective, and generational experience, mattered. 
.6 Mannheim and the Concept of Generations 
Generations can be described in many ways. Clearly there is the simple numerical 
approach - those born with a twenty-five, thirty or forty year bracket are a singular 
“generation.” This account clearly eschews this definition however. Instead, we 
posit a grouping joined together by a common experience: uniformed service in the 
                                                           
69 C. Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-1950, (Basingstoke, 
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of the ‘New Jerusalem’ covers both. J.D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 
1945-51, (London, 1964), 41 is in basic agreement when discussing developments in the 
1940s - ‘the central notion linking members of the Tory Reform Committee was the 
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This analysis, as chapter six will attest, disagrees. 
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First World War.70 Simon Ball has recently subjected this cohort, through the prism 
of Mosley’s New Party, to the rigours of Karl Mannheim’s theories.71 Mannheim, 
like this account, placed importance not only on chronological but experiential 
homogeneity. Aside from the superficial age comparisons, he posited three criteria. 
Firstly, a shared ‘actual’ experience - such as war service. Secondly, an ideological 
unity achieved through some common interpretation - such as political 
radicalisation by war. Lastly, a generation would be solidified by the formation of 
concrete association - from social mixing to the formation of a political party - 
where the shared experience could be vocalised and shaped, one might suggest 
homogenised, accordingly. Many historians have stressed the failure of the Phoenix 
Generation to be in this final stage: though there was some form of common 
narrative engendered by the war - seen in later life with the various 
autobiographies - this did not translate into a common contemporary block. This is 
true in part - certainly Mosley’s New Party and BUF did not attract the bulk of the 
Conservative Phoenix Generation. But, the following suggests, he may have been 
closer than we think. 
Mannheim is worth briefly dwelling upon. Born in 1893 in Budapest, and 
educated across Germany and Hungary, he settled in London upon exile from Nazi 
Germany in 1933. Though he did not see service in either Habsburg or German 
armies during the First World War, he took an active part in the Hungarian 
revolution that followed. His philosophical and sociological output was thus 
chronologically similar to the Phoenix Generation, and likewise profoundly 
influenced by the transitive experience of violence. Though devoting much time to 
                                                           
70 ‘Uniformed Service’ is a deliberately open-ended description. Given the tendency to play 
on any involvement in the war, I have made the decision to widen my sample to 
encompass this – essentially therefore we consider those donning a military uniform, or 
having served overseas in some cognate field. One of our cohort, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, 
MP for North Hammersmith 1924-6 and – as we will see – clear eccentric, was an official 
journalist on the frontline. In his case, he saw active service against the Communists in 
Hungary in 1919. Francis Fremantle, whom we will later encounter, would probably have 
agreed with this broad definition given he included his 58 year old self as evidence that the 
war generation in 1930 could be anything from 30 to 58 years old. Times, 29 November 
1930. 
71 S. Ball, 'Mosley and the Tories in 1930: The Problem of Generations,’ Journal of 
Contemporary British History, 23/4 (2009), 445-459. 
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analyses of Conservatism, his reluctance to enter debates regarding contemporary 
politics (at least before the early 1940s) lent his output in this area a more 
historical leaning than his overtly sociological tomes - thereby leaving 
interpretations of his politics to others.72 In this light, given his own theory that 
‘early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world,’ the comments 
of his friend and translator Paul Kecskemeti should not go unnoticed: 
Mannheim...spent his formative years in Hungary and Germany during a 
period of extraordinary social and intellectual ferment. It is somewhat 
difficult for the present generation [1953], accustomed to living in 
turmoil and amidst constant outbursts of violence, to recapture the 
impression of elemental upheaval and total collapse which seared itself 
into the soul of the ‘front generation’ of the First World War...What 
nobody would have thought possible suddenly turned out to be real...A 
complete reorientation was felt to be necessary: a re-examination of all 
traditional ideas about reality, all values, all principles.73 
Simon Ball described such rhetoric as almost Mosleyite.74 There is something in 
that. Yet as important is the indication that Mannheim and others were grasping 
after a vehicle for political and social change.  
 Though involved through his friend Gyorgy Lukacs in the short-lived 
Communist takeover, Mannheim did not join the Hungarian Communists, nor was 
he ever inclined to do so. Rather, he saw one’s generation playing as important a 
role as class.75 Quite aside from his evaluation of ‘the Problem of Generations,’ he 
                                                           
72 Mannheim is regarded as something of a guru of modern conservatism, though his work 
focussed primarily on the early nineteenth century. See D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr 
(eds), Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, (London, 1986), 3 on 
how Mannheim linked the rise of political conservatism to generational theory. 
73 K. Mannheim, P. Kecskemeti (ed), Essays on Sociology and Social Pyschology, (London, 
1953), 298; Idem, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge: Collected Works Volume Five, 
(London, 1997), 2. 
74 Ball, ‘Mosley and The Tories,’ 446. 
75 Seen throughout Wohl, Generation of 1914. Also C. Loader, The Intellectual Development 
of Karl Mannheim: Culture, Politics and Planning, (Cambridge, 1985), 83 shows that, whilst 
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placed great emphasis on ‘the problem of youth in a modern society.’ ‘Youth,’ he 
argued, ‘is neither progressive nor conservative by nature, but is a potentiality 
which is ready for any new start.’ 76 With implications for young Conservative MPs 
adopting – either for tactical reasons or out of genuine concern - causes previously 
the sole preserve of the left, he went on to claim that 
the adolescent is not only biologically in a state of fermentation, but 
sociologically he penetrates into a new world where the habits, customs 
and value systems are different from what he has known so far...This 
penetration from without into society makes Youth especially apt to 
sympathize with dynamic social movements which, for reasons mostly 
different from his, are dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs.77  
Though, as psephologists have noted, the Conservative Party is and was a 
relatively ‘sticky’ body – the sons of Tory fathers growing up to become politically 
Conservative in 89% of the cases Butler and Stokes observed in the 1960s – the 
shock of war combined with the adventurous, experimental nature of youth 
imbued within Mannheim the belief that such a generation could be a transitive 
body.78 
 Our analysis includes data relating to both the Phoenix Generation, 
and a control sample of Conservative MPs born between 1875 and 1900 who 
did not see active service in the conflict. Other than academic rigour, the 
explanation for this control effectively lies in the following statement in 
Mannheim’s ‘Problem of Generations’: 
The fact that people are born at the same time, or that their youth, 
adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
class did not supersede generation in Mannheim’s eyes, nor was the reverse true. Both 
mattered. 
76 K. Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist, (Edinburgh, 1943), 
35 
77 Ibid, 36. 
78 D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice, 
(Basingstoke, 1970), 47. 
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location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position 
to experience the same events and date etc., and especially that these 
experiences impinge upon a similarly stratified consciousness.79 
The degree then, to which a generation justifies the term depends on both cause 
and effect. The cause of its being is neither solely chronological, nor can the effect 
be merely self-description. As Mentré observed however, where one attributes the 
term ‘generation’ to some form of likeminded collective, loose or otherwise, is open 
to debate – something of particular relevance to interpretations of Mosley circa 
1930-1, but also to this project per se.80  Statistical deviations, from both the 
control sample and Conservative MP generally, will be delineated throughout. 
 Generational theory, as Mentre illustrated, is not uncontested – with 
problems assessing both intra-generational dialogue, and transmission of cultural 
norms between generations. Ball saw the reticence of Tory MPs to coalesce as 
evidence of its failure, whilst several analyses of the 1960s student movements 
have pointed to their own self-constructed, semi-artificial nature.81 The following 
both vindicates and challenges Mannheimian theory. Whilst pointing to areas of 
substantial agreement over social policy – and that derived from a common source, 
war – appeals to the wider public, both at the ballot box and over issues such as 
foreign policy, are shown to be rather more ambiguous. Certainly such oratory was 
based in wartime bravery and no little conviction, but its collective moralism, as we 
will see, was not without an element of playing to the gallery. As the years went by 
a common narrative of what was politically acceptable arguably rather replaced 
accurate remembrance of the generation’s spiritual birthplace, the First World 
War. To be sure, this analysis sets out to interrogate the positive and negative sides 
of generational theory, and of generations per se. 
                                                           
79 Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 297. 
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.7 Who Were the Phoenix Generation? 
Who then, were these politicians? Macmillan, Eden and Mosley are well 
known, but  our study covers more than the notorious. Though our analysis 
outlines their activities once in Parliament, it may help to paint a general 
impression here. All in all, there were 448 MPs who sat on the Tory benches 
between the wars having served during the Great War. The (mean) average 
Phoenix Generation member was born in 1882, entered the Commons in 1922 
(aged 31-2 at the start of the war therefore), and left politics for good in 1937.82 
Bonar Law and his successors achieved a net profit of ex-servicemen - 11 joining 
the party having been formerly elected as Liberals, whilst 4 MPs resigned the whip 
never to return it – testament, as we will see, to Baldwin’s liberal conservatism.83 
Amongst their chronological cohort ex-servicemen were in the majority:  72% 
(345) of Tory members who sat between 1918 and 1939 having been born 
between 1875 and 1900 were members of the Phoenix Generation delineated here.  
As mentioned, the 133 non-combatant members born during this period 
will, at times, form a control sample for our cohort. This control MP was 
overwhelmingly (though unlike the Phoenix Generation not exclusively) male. They 
most often missed active service through business commitments (36), or having 
continued to practice law (22). Their Commons career was likely to have been a 
little shorter (mean average 1926-1939) than that of the ex-servicemen, and they 
were less likely to have been an MP after 1945 (11.2% compared to the Phoenix 
Generation’s 13.8%).84 Approximately 4.5% of them would make Cabinet rank, 
again less than the 7% mustered by veterans. By contrast however, they lost, on 
average, less elections (37% compared to 41.5%) having become an MP – 
presumably because fewer of them fought in 1923 or 1929, and were, modally, 
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Appendix B.  
83 Macmillan and Nall resigned the whip, but subsequently returned to the party.  
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more a parliamentary product of the 1930s landslides than the 1920s electoral 
back and forth.85 
In general then, the Phoenix Generation offer a greater span of low and high 
level parliamentary politics than their chronological contemporaries. Their 26 
Cabinet Members who served in pre-1939 governments, 8 in wartime/caretaker 
administrations, and 8 after 1951 give a glimpse of life at the top. Yet the 93% who 
did not reach such an exalted rank almost provide an interesting case study of both 
intra-Conservative power politics, and the party’s appeal to the wider public. The 
control sample, as noted, will augment this.  
.8 Chapter by Chapter 
To illustrate the intentions, actions and movements of our titular cohort, 
this study will comprise six main chapters and a brief conclusion. Firstly, given 
British politicians later propensity to play upon their war records, and with the 
notion that their experiences shaped who they became in the coming years, it 
seems sensible to first outline what the war meant in terms of their early lives. 
Clearly, if our politicians were not all men of the Rupert Brooke punting down the 
River Cam type, they were not far from it - war was as big a shock to them as 
anyone else. We will thus outline the average childhood of such a future statesman, 
showing how a schooling that often hovered between the masculine and the 
feminine produced a slightly befuddled youth. Within such a context we may better 
understand the sometimes ‘unquestionably heartfelt, intense enthusiasm for 
war.’86 That war could mobilise the English politically is a notion that has been 
somewhat ignored in the general mindset, that it could mobilise in a positive sense 
even more so. In this first section we will show not only how war could scar both 
those who had and had not served, but how it could provide meaning and purpose 
to lives otherwise in danger of drifting in mediocrity. How Macmillan and Baldwin 
were differently affected by 1914-18, and the extent to which a psychological gap 
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could already be perceived between young and old, will form the basis of the first 
chapter. Duff Cooper’s comment that ‘we seem to be winning the war this week, 
and not on this front - which is all one can desire’ - may indicate that the lessons 
learned from the war were not always rooted in Boy’s Own heroism.87 
 We will then turn to the effect of veteran’s war records upon interwar 
elections. Eric Hobsbawm once wrote that ‘western democracies have not, on the 
whole, denied themselves the publicity value of military glory.’88 This was certainly 
the case in Great Britain where candidates took to the stage at election time 
knowing the war was a guaranteed point of reference, something arguably not true 
after 1945.89 At an individual level, our second chapter will show, a war record was 
a potential trump card at the ballot box. Nationally the consequences were even 
more important. With Lloyd George potentially able to exploit his own dynamic 
war, and Labour benefiting enormously from the expansion of the electorate in 
1918, the Conservatives needed to find something to bring to the table.90 A general 
softening of policy was clearly one thing Stanley Baldwin achieved after becoming 
leader in 1923, yet this was hardly likely to be enough against the parties of the 
left. This chapter will outline how, by getting war veterans into parliament in 
surprisingly high numbers, the Tories achieved an ephemeral appeal which helped 
counteract these seemingly disadvantageous conditions. If, as Jurgen Habermas 
suggests, most elections are decided by the apolitical this could be a crucial 
development indeed.91 
 National discourse then, was clearly one thing, yet our veterans also had to 
operate within a Conservative structure. Our third chapter will thus deal with the 
Tory Party and, more specifically, its leader Stanley Baldwin. Baldwin is 
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surprisingly difficult to get a grip on; inert in terms of policy yet fluent and 
sympathetic in rhetoric; a leader unwilling to lead, yet one with an undeniably 
popular appeal. Baldwin has often been dubbed - particularly with the rise of David 
Cameron - a Disraelian Tory par excellence.92 Whilst not ignoring his caring side 
however, it is necessary to probe what he actually achieved. We will therefore 
analyse how far his own leftist pretensions matched the ambitious plans of the 
Phoenix Generation. Veteran Tories, as we will see, were advocating a 
governmental structure that, even after 1945, appeared expansive indeed. Though 
not wishing to tear down the structures of the existing order in their entirety, they 
were increasingly at odds with Baldwin’s predilection to make little more than 
faltering steps in that direction. How the Phoenix Generation espoused a new 
doctrine, how this doctrine fitted in with leading leftist Tory thought, and how 
Baldwin somewhat played them, are notions our third chapter will consider. The 
historiographical shift towards acknowledging the constructive power of political 
centrism is, in this author’s opinion, probably a good thing – but there are nuances 
to explore.93 
 Though Baldwin will be portrayed as a man who, in part, ex-servicemen 
Tories could work with - certainly there were many worse alternatives - doubts 
will be cast as to his ideological, and experiential, similarity to them. A further 
question thus presents itself: if Baldwin could not lead a vanguard of activist right 
wing progressivism, then who could? Our fourth chapter will analyse one vocal 
pretender to the throne, Oswald Mosley. It is time, as noted, to take Mosley 
seriously. This was a man of, not somehow separate from, his generation. He learnt 
similar lessons from the war to others - the powers of the state needed to change to 
account for modern conditions, solutions needed to come from the left as well as 
the right, action was the key to success - and was, as we will see, regarded 
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ambiguously by his contemporaries. Though they recognised his arrogance, they 
also were attracted by his abilities. Whilst he entered the political wilderness after 
1930, this says as much about young Conservatives, as it does Oswald Mosley. How 
and why will be sketched out here. 
 If Mosley divided opinion, this was as true about the topic of our fifth 
section, foreign and imperial policy. Here there are so many myths and legends it is 
hard to know where to begin. The historiography on appeasement has wandered 
this way and that, from Churchill’s Gathering Storm decimation of anything 
remotely positive or even ambiguous about Chamberlain’s policy, through the 
Cowling and Charmley led revisionism of the 1970s and 80s, back to a 
condemnation of the appeasers by the turn of the millennium. By analysing how 
veterans of one war approached the possible onset of a second, we may see a more 
complex picture than previously thought. Attitudes to imperial questions - 
particularly Ireland and India - begat a muddled legacy of thought which 
Chamberlain and Halifax (a veteran himself of course) had to operate in. How ex-
servicemen Conservative MPs voted in the key questions of the day may surprise. 
How their public discourse matched later anti-appeasement legends even more so. 
There remains a certain moralistic dimension to foreign and imperial policy during 
this period - one predicated, essentially, on attitudes to Hitler; this possibly needs 
to be stripped away all together; at best, it requires extensive probing. Our fifth 
chapter will attempt to do just that. 
 Lastly, we will take our story into and beyond the century’s second 
cataclysmic conflict. All stories must end somewhere and would it seem a little 
remiss, having outlined the type of socially progressive, greatly (by pre-1914 
standards) expanded governmental structure the Phoenix Generation were arguing 
in favour of, not to sketch out the arrival of seemingly just a vehicle: Attlee’s 1945 
Labour Government, and its consequences.94 The effects of wartime coalition, we 
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are told by Addison and others, produced an acceptance of high, stable levels of 
employment, government investment, and greater intervention in economic 
matters amongst all parties.95 There is little doubt this view holds at least some 
validity – The Economist famously speaking of a “Mr Butskell”. Yet whilst it appears 
to be the vindication of everything the Phoenix Generation had fought for between 
the wars, this may not be so. To be sure, the post 1945 world was probably 
preferable to that of Baldwin and Chamberlain, but the extent to which it fulfilled 
the dreams and ambitions of the young Conservatives deserves attention. Our sixth 
chapter, prior to a brief concluding section, will thus re-examine Butskellism - both 
its origins and its postwar meaning. 
 Though paths would diverge from 1914 it seems apt, like the literary 
accounts, to begin in that most gentrified of settings: the British public school. 
Where more emblematic of the Phoenix Generation’s pre-war lives, indeed, than 
Eton?96 
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1: 1914 and All That 
 
Have we not one single politician who is really out to do his best, holiday or no 
holiday, or are they all an unscrupulous set of narrow-minded, self satisfied crassly 
ignorant notaries!  
- Anthony Eden, writing to his mother from the front, December 19171 
 
The Unionist Party - a flabby, jelly-like material containing of a number of nodules of 
soldier substance.  
- Leo Amery to George Lloyd, February 19162 
1.1 A Vision of Pre-War Eton 
The early July weather could scarcely have been finer as the future Prime Minister 
surveyed the scene around him. The sun’s rays illuminated the already splendid 
John Shaw designed school buildings. Pupils mingled happily if deferentially with 
masters, quoting Robert Peel at one moment, Benjamin Disraeli the next. Amidst 
the tranquillity of Eton College, it is true, Anthony Eden’s mind briefly mused on 
the recent happenings in Sarajevo, but like Agadir, he assumed, it would probably 
all blow over. It was such a terrible shame about Franz Ferdinand, but the great 
minds of Europe would surely not allow such an incident to destroy the longest 
period of peace the continent had ever known. Even had he been familiar with the 
term, it is unlikely he would written off pre-1914 diplomacy, in the words of the 
war weary Edmund Blackadder, as ‘bollocks.’3 As the sun began to dip, he 
considered his brother Timothy’s predicament – living as he was in Germany – but 
it was best not to dwell on such ominous matters. 
Anyway, there was so much to distract one. The excursions up the river to 
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the club at Queen’s Eyot were always fun; it all seemed ‘gaiety, sunshine and good 
food.’ And who could forget the recent match at Lord’s against Harrow – the 
opening batsman Vane-Tempest had made a quick fire 37, and thus secured 
himself the admiration of his entire House, particularly one younger boy named 
Boothby. It had been a glittering scene: the ladies in the latest fashions, the 
gentlemen (including the boys) in top hats, and wearing carnations. Strawberries 
and cream, Pimm’s for the masters, fresh lemonade for the boys. “Eden,” bellowed 
his house master Churchill, awakening him from his daydream, “how is the rowing 
coming along?” Amidst all this finery, Gavrilo Princip was but a name.4  
1.2 Back to Reality 
The above account is a fabrication: a collage of four memories of July 1914, 
distilled through the single personality of Anthony Eden. Individual facts – such as 
Eden worrying about his brother and the cricket match at Lord’s – are historically 
accurate, but have been twisted, lost both in the proverbial sands of time of the 
subject, and the (possibly mis)interpretation of the present author. As far as 
memory goes, one might point out, it was ever thus. ‘Memory instils remembrance 
with the sacred,’ noted Pierre Nora, ‘history, always prosaic, releases it again.’5 Yet 
- as our introduction noted - where the dividing line between dry, academic 
‘history’ and the more literary, allegorical, ‘memory’ actually falls is a particular 
problem when one comes to analysing the Great War and its aftermath. ‘The First 
World War was the great military and political event of its time,’ states Hynes, ‘but 
it was also the great imaginative event.’6 In his seminal work on The Great War and 
Modern Memory Fussell goes even further, pointing out that his book could easily 
have been subtitled ‘An Inquiry into the Curious Literariness of Real Life,’ and that 
the memoirs which form the basis of his study constitute, essentially, ‘a kind of 
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fiction.’7 Amen. Though by analysing the lives and actions of a group of men less 
likely to talk in metaphor, half truth, and irony – politicians – this account intends 
to circumvent such an approach, it would be foolish to lay claim to absolute fact in 
this most hazy period of modern British history. Hopefully however, we may avoid 
as much as possible the at once muddling and jarring dichotomy between Robert 
Graves’s pre-1914 world of ‘cucumber sandwiches’ and ‘chrysanthemums in 
bowls,’ and his life in the trenches, where he so poignantly described the process of 
trying to get shot on patrol, constituting as it did ‘my best way of lasting through to 
the end of the war.’8 Put simply, the Great War presents us with a paradox. Those 
who might best help us understand its destructive meaning are buried in the fields 
of Flanders, or on the beaches at Gallipoli, and are thus unable to inform the living 
of either the lessons they learned, or the world vision they were fighting for. 
In lieu of such testimony, we are thus reliant on the accounts of the living. 
To pick through such sources is however rather tricky. As Bogacz points out, ‘the 
European war became an occasion for a crusade that saw the mobilisation of an 
extraordinary language filled with abstract, euphemistic, spiritualised words and 
phrases under which were buried the realities of modern mechanised warfare.’9 
Just as importantly, in its aftermath, the more famous works of Robert Graves and 
Wilfred Owen were ‘accompanied by a host of minor literature which attempted to 
rescue war from futility not through the defunct rhetoric of glory and honour, but 
by describing for its readers the link between the suffering and the lessons of the 
war.’10 ‘The cessation of hostilities did not mean the end of the war experience but 
rather the beginning of a process in which that experience was framed, 
institutionalised, given ideological context, and relived in political action as well as 
fiction.’11 Few veterans considered their lives the same after the horrors they had 
witnessed. Though the deluge of fiction only began in the late 1920s with Goodbye 
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to All That and All Quiet on the Western Front, the war began to be memorialised – 
thus, in part, fictionalised – almost from the moment the last gun sounded. 
Whether because of the pressure to “make sense” of their experiences, a desire to 
augur social change, or genuine trauma, such authors would not allow Britons to 
forget the war years. 
All this was curiously “un-British,” or at least “un-English.” Memorials had, it 
is true, been erected to the fallen at Mafeking and Spion Kop, yet the volume of 
Boer War commemoration in no way compared to the aftermath of 1918. Why this 
was the case has been the source of much debate. To Bob Bushaway, the 
proliferation of memory – such as the 1920 unveiling of the Cenotaph and burial of 
the Unknown Warrior  – and the blinding spectacle of the pageantry in which it was 
conducted, essentially constituted a conjuring trick on behalf of the political 
establishment. With the introduction of Remembrance Sunday, he argues, ‘British 
society witnessed an annual event in which social and political unity was 
reaffirmed. Other views and criticisms of the Great War were regarded as doing 
dishonour to the dead.’ At the same time, ‘the emergence of a language of 
remembrance had the effect of enhancing and enshrining the experience of the 
war, thereby removing it from the sphere of normal social and political debate.’12 
Though it has gained its adherents such as Adrian Gregory, this view has been 
challenged on a number of levels.13 Alex King has interpreted mass 
commemoration as a ‘collective creative activity’ – that is to say the public were 
‘creators,’ not simply ‘consumers,’ of the feeling of national mourning.14 Jay Winter 
has argued that the manner in which the trenches were remembered essentially 
constituted a continuation of, rather than some pre-meditated break from, 
European tradition. Europeans came together to mourn the dead as they had 
always done, only scale and technology rendered any meaningful difference. The 
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grief they experienced, thus, was organic.15  
The rights and wrongs of this overarching argument – the manipulation of 
war from on high – need not concern us overly. What however we must 
acknowledge is that such a process was possible, and that the memory of 1914-18 
could be bent, twisted and fashioned to meet the needs of whoever took it upon 
themselves to attempt such a feat. This was as true for an up and coming politician 
such as Harold Macmillan, as it was for a high flyer like David Lloyd George, or 
wordsmith in the mould of Graves. The only difference being – as we will 
investigate in chapter two – that unlike those two figures, a Macmillan was unable 
either to hide behind high office, or escape Count of Monte Cristo like to a Mallorcan 
paradise when the going got tough. Our sample of politicians had to face their 
memories head on. 
1.3 Sheltered Beginnings 
To prove that the First World War was indeed the turning point in the lives 
of Britain’s finest that this study hypothesises, we must first look at the pre-war 
lives of the future Conservative statesmen. Aside from the obvious exposure to 
bloodshed and death – not exactly the average pre-1914 experience, though 
statesmen with combat experience (such as Churchill) provided something of an 
exception – what triggered the emergence of an empathetic mentality hitherto 
unseen in nominally Conservative circles? In what way was the war the bolt from 
the blue it appears in political memoirs? These are complex questions which 
cannot, as Robert Wohl somewhat sarcastically argues, simply be put down to the 
‘strong, brave and beautiful’ Generation of 1914 being ‘sacrificed, decimated, [and] 
destroyed’ on the battlefield.16 Indeed, the actual source of both the unrelenting 
drive and profound sense of guilt the war veteran felt – most especially amongst 
those who would become politicians in the 1920s – may take us to rather murkier 
parts of the human mind than the understandable sense of grief these men 
experienced. We will however get to that in due course. 
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 If human beings make up merely the product of their experiences, then 
Harold Macmillan and his future cohort would seemingly present rather mundane 
figures prior to the Great War. Winston Churchill re-enacting the battles of his 
great ancestor Marlborough with his toys at Blenheim Palace represents something 
of an atypical sense of childhood comfort, but it broadly conforms to the general 
pattern. If Freud is correct in assuming all adult neuroses can be traced back to a 
traumatic childhood, the great Viennese doctor would have to delve very deep into 
the psyches of Oswald Mosley or Harry Crookshank to find it. In Charles 
Masterman’s 1909 The Condition of England the problem this created was well 
surmised: 
 
In all cases prosperity has brought some especial dangers: a weakening 
of the willingness to work, a rejection of earlier simplicities, a too eager 
absorption in pleasure…[this in turn begat] the tyranny of the present 
upon the imagination [which] is perhaps the greatest of all obstacles to 
reform.17 
 
No wonder Keynes urged the need in The Economic Consequences of the Peace to 
look post-war, not to ‘the comforts of 1914, but to an immense broadening and 
intensification of them.’ However, he sagely warned, ‘it is only in England (and 
America) that it is possible to be so unconscious.’18 The struggle to change the 
static nature of British society, even after a catastrophe such as the First World 
War, forms the basis of this work’s later chapters. For now, let us explore its roots. 
As Masterman bemoaned, in certain quarters of Victorian and Edwardian 
England comfort had created lethargy. When the interwar politicians were in their 
infancy, the great British deeds – the colonisation of India, The Battle of Trafalgar, 
and even, in the case of the younger men, the scramble for Africa – were more part 
of the national folklore, than actually tangible - something Henry Willink described 
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well in his unpublished memoirs.19 Such men grew up amidst a very strange 
atmosphere – ultra-masculine in tone, yet rather feminine in practice.20 Actual 
suffering was rare, certainly compared to the Dickensian childhood of a man the 
great and the good would flock to in the 1920s, the auteur Charlie Chaplin, whose 
mother was sent to an insane asylum whilst he and his brother toiled in the 
workhouse.21 Conversely, Anthony Eden’s most disturbing childhood incident 
seems to have being given a pony whose tail ‘had been cruelly docked.’22 Not 
perhaps quite the same level of emotional scarring. 
 Where the nation’s future soldiers turned leaders may have suffered was in 
a mental, rather than physical, regard. Continually when reading the memoirs of 
such men one sees a division, mostly starkly expressed in the testimony of Philip 
Lloyd-Greame (later President of the Board of Trade), between a childhood and 
adolescence that was ‘happy’ yet ‘undistinguished.’23 Why was this case? Why did 
these men who were essentially being groomed to follow the footsteps of their 
forefathers – into the bar, civil service, possibly becoming non-descript yet loyal 
Tory backbenchers – feel so ill at ease with the world around them? The answer is, 
quite simply, that they did not.24 The neophilia the war veteran exuded after 1918 
was purely post-facto, they may well have latterly rejected ‘1914...with its little 
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artificial life [and] its stupendous selfishness,’ but this was only in retrospect.25 In 
reality such men emanated from the same sources and were happy with their lot. 
Harold Macmillan, Harry Crookshank, Bobbety Cranborne, Oliver Lyttelton, 
Anthony Eden, Bob Boothby – the list of old Etonians who would assume influential 
positions in the Tory Party over the following decades is legion (and, in Phoenix 
Generation terms, included in our appendix).26 Indeed, the overwhelming majority 
(81%) of Conservative MPs elected in 1918 had attended public school, a five 
percent increase from the December 1910 election.27 Predictably enough Oxbridge 
would house many such men once they reached university age – Cuthbert Headlam 
noting that the Conservative Parliamentary Party in 1932 contained 18 members 
from Magdalen College (Oxford) alone.28 There is little evidence that this path was 
in any way unsatisfactory to these young men. To be sure, aspects of their lives 
irked them – Oswald Mosley barely spoke to his philandering father, Lloyd-Greame 
eschewed reading law at Cambridge like his father and grandfather to take it at 
Oxford, Macmillan joined the Fabian Society whilst at that same university – yet 
these acts of rebellion were carried out within the ever so genteel surroundings of 
upper class England.29 The notion that Mosley could join the Labour Party, as he 
did in 1924, or that Macmillan could reject Conservatism wholesale, as he 
essentially did by resigning the whip in 1936, would have appeared unlikely in 
1914. One can scarcely overestimate the static nature of gentrified England in the 
Edwardian epoch – Roman Catholicism, with which Macmillan flirted under his 
mentor Ronald Knox but ultimately rejected for fear of upsetting his mother, was 
but one of many aspects of polite society which were to be seen but not heard.30 
 Looking at the lives of these men, there is scant evidence that this world in 
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any way upset them. Their perspective may have been narrow, but it seems they 
were content in this environment. In this regard then, one must have some 
sympathy with Robert Wohl’s attempts to denounce the notion that ‘all might have 
been different if only the splendid young men of 1914 had not given up their lives 
on the fields of Flanders.’31 This idea is highly questionable – all may well have 
been exactly the same, the ranks of the upper classes would have been a little fuller, 
but the status quo would most probably have been retained. As Siegfried Sassoon 
opined in 1915, ‘war is our scourge, yet war has made us wise. And, fighting for our 
freedom, we are free.’32 The freedom however was not that of preventing Prussian 
tyranny, but was rather more internal. The wisdom was not only that the world 
held bloodier realities than Henley or Lord’s, but that, quite simply, a world existed 
outside these places. 
 Of course, one must be careful lest we suggest that all the politicians in this 
study went straight from school or university to the battlefield. The war veteran 
was – in age terms – a diverse entity. George Llewellen Palmer, first elected as a 
Conservative for Westbury in 1918 after having commanded a brigade in the war 
was, having been born in 1857, a full 39 years older than Oswald Mosley, 
Lieutenant with the 16th Lancers, who entered the Commons that same year as 
member for Harrow. The notion that all ex-soldiers had embarked for Flanders 
fresh from Eton or Oxbridge is thus something of a fallacy, not helped by the fact 
that two of the wars most famous chroniclers – Robert Graves and Siegfried 
Sassoon – essentially did just that. In fact, as data in our appendix shows, Etonian 
future ex-servicemen were more likely to have left the school in 1890s than 1900s 
or 1910s.33 In reality then, many veterans later to become politicians had had a life 
before 1914, just one which was conducted within very narrow parameters. Some, 
like the former director of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce Frederick 
Astbury, had risen high in the business world, others such as Gerald Berkeley Hurst 
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had achieved literary notoriety, more still choosing the legal profession.34 
Doubtless had the war not occurred, those of the Graves generation – such as 
Mosley, Macmillan and Eden – would have followed a similar path. After all, these 
were men who could, had they truly desired, have rebelled against the country 
houses, public schools and staid nature of their upbringing. In many cases – the 
publishing heir Macmillan, and favourite of his John Bull-esque grandfather Mosley 
in particular – they possessed the ability to achieve financial independence from 
their parents once they came of age, yet evidently they had no wish to do so.  
Here is where the befuddling dichotomy of late Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain lies: a generation of boys were brought up, as the headmaster of Leo Amery 
noted, in ‘wholesome severity.’35 Through public school emphasis on sport and 
vigour, as Bourke observes, ‘manly virtues were instilled.’36 Fencing, shooting, and 
rugby undoubtedly reinforced senses of masculinity, the latter whose very ‘goal 
was to train young men to be leaders of the Empire, to demonstrate the superiority 
of the Anglo-Saxon race in peace and war.’37  ‘Sportsmen,’ as one French historian 
succinctly put it, were but little ‘warriors,’ and Anthony Fletcher’s analysis of 
Reggie Trench is probably not atypical in this regard.38  Even if, as Pound notes, 
English youth ‘was not in thrall to the associative oppressiveness of such symbols’ 
as Napoleon’s tomb or the German memorials of 1871, they were raised to regard 
physicality in positive terms.39 There was, as Samuel Hynes has noted, an 
Edwardian Turn of Mind - even Malcolm MacDonald, son of Ramsay, was not 
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immune from such a schooling.40  
The various Officer Training Corps were an interesting manifestation of the 
type of issues surrounding masculinity which DeGroot, Neddam and Tosh have 
explored.41 Following Eton’s example in 1860, and the steady trickle of schools to 
introduce cadet training in the 1870s and 1880s, the Boer War - and the fears of 
degeneration it had exposed - produced a groundswell in favour of the OTCs.42 
Those pupils enrolled were - for ten days to two weeks a year whilst at camp - 
‘removed altogether from the influences of everyday life, uniformed…under strict 
discipline,’ and imbued with the ‘understanding that the first requirements of the 
moment are always military ones.’43 At the outbreak of war almost 10,000 boys 
were in this position. Included in the appendix of Captain Haig-Brown’s 1915 O.T.C. 
and the Great War are also the thousands of graduates gazetted between August 
1914 and the following March. With regards to names that will litter our story, one 
might note John Loder, Harold Macmillan, Oliver Stanley and Henry Willink from 
Eton, Oswald Mosley and Philip Lloyd-Greame from Winchester, Euan Wallace and 
Leonard Ropner from Harrow, as well as Clement Attlee and Walter Elliot from 
their respective universities.44 
Yet concurrent to this hyper-masculine trend was a similar national urge to 
create a race of little Byrons. The very fact that such literary accounts of the Great 
War could be written, serving as evidence that Graves and his cohort were raised in 
atmosphere where tackling Ancient Greek philosophy was deemed as important as 
tackling an advancing prop forward. Despite the well documented second class 
status afforded to women before and after the Great War in British society, the 
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realm of the upper class youth was paradoxically much more feminine than in 
contemporary times.45 Though tales of ‘rugger’ increasingly made up a public 
school boy’s reading in the early 1900s, this was more than offset by other aspects 
of their childhood. Anthony Eden, for example, recalled the rather effete nature of 
his home: 
 
The formal Victorian garden was submerged in schemes of colour, with 
the pervading scent of lavender and rosemary and sweet briar. My 
father built the terraces which set off Bonomi’s architecture and, above 
all, thinned and planted at every angle from the house until the trees 
were Windlestone’s chief glory. It was the same within the house. Apart 
from the pictures and furniture, the decoration, the curtains, the library 
kept up to date, all these taught, beguiled, even inspired any visitor in 
the least sensitive to beauty.46 
 
If Britain’s young bourgeoise and aristocrats were raised with a sword in one hand, 
they were taught to wield a pen in the other. The classics were devoured, holidays 
taken abroad, and foreign languages mastered – even that most quintessential 
Englishman, Stanley Baldwin, acquainting himself with French, German and 
Italian.47 If there was a source of resentment amongst such figures before 1914, it 
was at the state of uncertainty this contradiction produced. With the advent of that 
‘tragic and unnecessary conflict,’ the First World War, this was to be all too 
decisively resolved.48 
1.4 The Meaning of 1914 
What happened across Europe in August 1914 remains contentious. Like the war 
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itself, much is shrouded in aesthetic mystery. To the immediate onlooker, the 
various declarations of war seemed to produce a collective outpouring of emotion 
seldom seen before, or indeed since.49 To one impoverished man, standing in 
Munich’s Odeonplatz, this was a time to thank ‘Heaven…for granting me the good 
fortune of being permitted to live at this time.’50 Although as one of the chief critics 
of ‘the myth of war enthusiasm,’ Niall Ferguson, points out, ‘it is hard to believe 
that any sentiment felt by Adolf Hitler was…universal,’ one cannot argue with the 
numbers – particularly in the British case.51 No fewer than 300,000 men enlisted in 
the first month of the war, 100,000 more than called for. In a single week (30 
August-5 September 1914) 174,901 men joined up, forcing the army to raise its 
minimum height restrictions.52 Truly astonishing. 
 Of greater interest than “what” happened however, is “why.” Ferguson has 
postulated five possible reasons for mass war enthusiasm, so far as it existed: 
successful recruiting techniques; female pressure; peer-group (i.e. male) pressure; 
economic motives, and simple impulse.53 We will turn to a few of these, in so far as 
they relate to future Conservative politicians, later. It is first necessary to 
acknowledge that the upper class “toff” enlisting found himself in a very different 
position to the average Tommy. To begin with – and possibly with an eye to 
posterity – such men picked the division they joined up with a great deal of care. 
Harold Macmillan’s story is possibly the most indicative, using his mother’s 
connections to secure himself a place in the prestigious Grenadier Guards, after 
passing out of Kitchener’s New Army.54 At Eton there was much talk ‘as to which 
regiment we should try to join,’ remembered Eden. ‘The Coldstream were at 
Windsor and an easy contact. The Grenadier Guards had a firm and loyal following, 
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and there were always Greenjackets around.’55 Given the bloody rights of passage 
they were to receive, such petty matters seem almost tragicomic in their 
irrelevance – Robert Graves emphasising the pointlessness of it in all in Goodbye to 
All That: 
 
I used to congratulate myself on having quite blindly chosen the Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers of all regiments in the army. “Good God! I used to think. 
“Suppose that when war broke out I had been living in Cheshire, and 
had applied for a commission in the Cheshire Regiment.”56 
 
Such childish concerns would be challenged all too quickly.57 
 Nevertheless, the importance of such matters indicate that for Britain’s 
upper class war was a choice not an imperative. Until conscription was introduced 
in 1916 it was perfectly possible to avoid service, whether by choice or 
governmental decree. Alfred Duff Cooper, later member for Oldham and prominent 
critic of Chamberlain’s policy of  appeasement, did not become a soldier until the 
spring of 1917 – his job in the foreign office rendering him ineligible for combat, 
and chomping at the bit.58 This is indeed what makes the notion of a “Lost 
Generation” more plausible than has been acknowledged by some historians. 
Demographically of course, it is doubtful – as Wohl notes, ‘British losses were 
proportionately less than those of the other major European countries that went to 
war in 1914…[L]osses…had been terrible. But not sufficient to destroy a 
generation.’59 The oft repeated statement – which wartime schoolboy turned Tory 
rebel Bob Boothby recounted – that the First World War ‘wiped out a whole 
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generation’ does not bear close scrutiny.60 Indeed, as mischief maker par excellence 
A.J.P. Taylor pointed out, if one takes into account decreased emigration rates from 
the British Isles during the conflict, 1914-18 marked a net increase in the British 
population – even amongst those of fighting age.61 Furthermore, as Mueller has 
shown with reference to the Taiping rebellion in mid-nineteenth century China 
(where 30,000,000 people lost their lives), and the total destruction of Carthage by 
Rome in 146BC, the Great War was hardly unique in terms of mass slaughter.62 
This however, is only half the story.63 
 The men of the “Lost Generation” – those found pre-war ‘at Oxford and 
Cambridge, and…at the better public schools,’ who ‘volunteered for service in the 
fighting forces and did whatever they could to…secure their transfer to the field of 
battle’- certainly do deserve credit, whatever their later tendency to mythologise 
their deeds, and the extent of their loses.64 Their mistake was to over emphasise 
the dysgenic nature of the conflict, which as Winter argues can largely be blamed 
upon post 1918 ideas of European malaise; of the strength and vitality of British 
society being undermined; of, as Spengler famously put it, The Decline of the West.65 
The need, as Spengler declared, to see the war as a ‘historical change of phase’ 
imbued the upper strata of European society to look for answers that were not 
there – auguring, as Croce argued, the emergence of fascism in Italy.66 In Britain the 
aristocracy essentially invented a legend – not admittedly without some factual 
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accuracy, as casuality rates at Eton illustrated – that they had been exterminated.67 
This obscures the real truth – that whilst the upper class milieu of which future 
politicians were a part did not shoulder all, or even most, of the burden of war, 
theirs was almost certainly the most altruistic effort in British society. As Ferguson 
points out, economics was perhaps the determining factor in people’s decision to 
enlist. The peak of British unemployment caused by financial panic at the outbreak 
of war was also the peak level of enlistment. Nine out of ten of the working men 
laid off in Bristol in the first month of the war joined up, indicating that ‘men were 
not wholly irrational.’68 Soldiers joined for their pockets, as much as their hearts – 
in a war rumoured to be “over by Christmas,” it may well have seemed easy money. 
As Adrian Gregory has recently concurred, for a working class often living in 
conditions akin to a modern day third world slum, the trenches could be a route 
out of hell.69 If nothing else, to the average worker eating meat on a daily basis - 
even the dreaded Machonochie stew - was a real treat.70 To a group of men raised 
at public school, educated at Oxbridge, and with prominent societal connections, 
such concerns were hardly paramount.71 
 At the same time, a high proportion of the population – principally the 
working class – were simply unfit for combat duty, or were unable to leave their 
current jobs (pre-conscription) with the horrific spectre of unemployment 
awaiting them should they return. The National Service Medical Board, which 
examined two and a half million men during the last year of the war, deemed 41.4 
percent of them either ‘not able to undergo physical exertion’ or ‘totally…unfit for 
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any military service.’72 Two years earlier, governmental papers indicated that 
whereas fewer than 1 in 4 pre-war workers in mines and quarries had volunteered 
by April 1916, over 40% of finance and commercial employees had joined up, 
which would increase to 58% by July 1917.73 This then was not an even war, but 
one which was a greater danger to white rather than blue collar workers. It is 
difficult to imagine an Edward Wood (later Foreign Secretary as Lord Halifax), born 
with only one hand, serving in the trenches had he been born in the workhouse – 
for he would possibly have lacked both the ability to leave behind any employment 
he had mustered (even with presumably pitiful pay), and the connections to “pass” 
any medical examination. It was to him, perhaps more than any other, a choice to 
serve. 
 Yet if these men were not coerced into conflict, we must acknowledge one 
profoundly important point with particular relevance to their later understanding 
of the meaning of war. That if their upbringing had hovered between the femininity 
of the written word and the masculinity of the public school, they, like the entire 
nation, were about to become immersed in a world where masculinity was 
elevated to ever increasing heights.74 In light of the grim acceptance which greeted 
the war in 1939, the atmosphere in 1914 seems almost incomprehensible. In a 
large part this took the form of women bestowing upon men either honour or 
disgrace, depending on the man’s military credentials. On the one hand, 
encouraged by propagandists such as Arthur Conan Doyle, groups of women took it 
upon themselves to show contempt for the unenlisted, and even hand out white 
feathers to those wearing mufti. One personal advertisement in The Times even 
tauntingly announced: ‘Englishwoman undertakes to Form and Equip a Regiment 
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of Women for the Firing Line if lawn tennis and cricketing young men will agree to 
act as Red Cross nurses in such a Regiment.’75 At the same time, Angela Woollacott 
has argued that ‘in late 1914 an epidemic of khaki fever broke out across Britain. 
Young women, it seemed, were so attracted to men in military uniform that they 
behaved in immodest and even dangerous ways.’ Denied the patriotic fulfilment 
that only enlistment could bring, girls as young as thirteen congregated vicariously 
with uniformed men, delivering the kind of ego boost that no amount of rugby or 
academic success could bring.76 These efforts were only amateur however. 
 More important was the concertedly aggressive cultural environment 
whipped up by the establishment. A nation bellicosely going to war – plus ça 
change, one might reply. Yet the Great War was certainly a little different. 
Recruiting techniques were highly polished – the Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee (PRC) sent out 8 million recruiting letters and distributed 54 million 
posters, leaflets and other publications.77 In an age of mass media, something of a 
war psychosis was whipped up. Kitchener’s jabbing finger, militaristic newspaper 
editorials, all were designed to appeal to masculine tendencies. Leaders such as 
that in the Newcastle Daily Chronicle on 1 September 1914 served to fuel the fire: 
‘We must have more men from Britain – our allies have already given the full 
extent of their manhood.’78 The biggest offender would be Lord Northcliffe, whose 
input into British policy through The Times did much to drive the nation into war, 
and reduce any chance of a quick peace: ‘nationhood has its responsibilities as well 
as its privileges…each must sacrifice himself for all’; ‘the time has come for 
defending all we hold dear, by force of arms and with all the manhood we possess’, 
the rhetoric of those crucial weeks scarcely paused for breath.79 To be fair to 
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Northcliffe, all this was but the tip of the iceberg.80 During the Boer War conflict 
had been presented in redemptive, rather than apocalyptic terms. ‘Out of the 
present strife and conflict,’ declared The Daily Mail in 1900, ‘shall emerge an 
Empire stronger, more fully prepared, amply equipped against the worst our foes 
can do against us.’81 Four years later, even The Daily Mirror praised British military 
intervention in Tibet, Nigeria and Somaliland: ‘That England is at war shows an 
amount of energy and superabundant spirits that go a long way to demonstrate 
that we are not a decaying race.’82  
There was clearly a strange contradiction in fin-de-siècle and Edwardian 
Britain. Unlike Germany they possessed numerous “places in the sun,” London was 
the financial capital of the world, and the upstart contenders to their supremacy – 
Japan, Germany, the United States – lagged behind them. Even if the economic gap 
was closing, as illustrated by the increasingly dominant levels of American and 
German steel production, Britannia still ruled the waves. Yet amongst the 
intelligentsia – the press, commentators such as Booth, Rowntree and Masterman – 
was the notion that the nation was in decay. Working class lives could often be, as 
Masterman noted, ‘laborious and disappointing,’ and the slums were still far from 
being cleared.83 That this had contemporary political ramifications has been well 
documented – redistribution of wealth finally becoming accepted practice with the 
progressive Liberal reforms (Old Age Pensions for the elderly from 1908, Labour 
exchanges for the unemployed from 1909, and National Insurance from 1911) 
standing as some of the hallmarks of British social legislation. Yet the very 
necessity of such measures produced within the national conscience feelings of 
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extreme tension and under confidence. The bellicosity of the press and rush of so-
called “war enthusiasm” – both before and during the First World War – was but 
collective over compensation. As Stromberg has illustrated, simply because after 
1918 the world came to view war as horrific we should not be blinded to its 
perceived redemptive qualities in the early 1900s.84 War, as Arno Mayer points out, 
could serve as the release of pent up pressure in a society.85 This need not take the 
conspiratorial form proposed by Fritz Fischer – whereby German leaders 
attempted their 1914 Griff Nach der Weltmacht to allay domestic strife – but could, 
as in the British case before the Great War, take a more cultural dimension.86 
Perceived malaise, if not necessitating drastic action, made it more amenable.87 
This is how we must view the interwar generation of politicians during this 
period. Nervous no doubt, but excited at the prospect “to do something” which 
would release the shackles of their rather listless youth. Noblesse oblige, the chance 
to participate in the great event of their time, and patriotism informed their 
decision to fight, much more to be enthused about doing so, than other, socially and 
economically less fortunate, contemporaries. The feminity and inertia of their 
upbringing was about to be replaced with that most manly of endeavours: war. Or 
so they thought. 
1.5 Different Types of Wars 
There is a tendency to think of the First World War as a homogeneous experience. 
Doubtless, individual campaigns have had their differences exposed – Lawrence of 
Arabia, ANZACs at Gallipoli, Sassoon and Graves in France – but we still tend to 
think of these experiences as variations upon a collective theme of perpetual 
horror. The First World War was a total war, no doubt. Few would have 
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experienced 1914-18 without a family member or friend enlisting, whilst the 
Zeppelin raids brought war to mainland Britain for the first time since the days of 
Bonnie Prince Charlie. Despite this, the tacitly implied notion that for four years 
day and night the nation in its entirety either fired a gun or mourned loved ones is 
obviously implausible. The war years were multi-faceted, and were not all faced 
ankle deep in the mud of Flanders. 
 The starkest contrast it produced forms the focus of this study – the 
discrepancy between those who served, and those who did not. It is worthwhile 
briefly turning to the experience of Colonel Lambert Ward, who commanded the 
Howe Battalion of the Royal Naval Division in 1916. In one of his first 
parliamentary speeches, Ward, elected in 1918 as Conservative MP for Hull North 
West, delivered an address which even in the dusty pages of Hansard remains 
deeply moving – similar in tone, it seems, to A.P. Herbert’s The Secret Battle 
published that year.88 A subject, ‘impossible to bring…forward during the war,’ had 
been on his ‘mind for a considerable time’:  
 
I should like to obtain an assurance from the Secretary of State for War 
that there shall be no difference made between the graves of those men 
who were killed in action or died of wounds and disease, and the graves 
of those unfortunate men who paid the penalties of their lives under 
Sections 4 and 12 of the Army Act, or who, in other words, were tried by 
court-martial and shot for cowardice or desertion in the face of the 
enemy…I bring this forward because it has been on my conscience for 
some time, as, unfortunately, it was my unfortunate duty to sit on a 
court-martial at which five men were sentenced to death…I had the 
uncomfortable feeling that, even with my limited knowledge of law, I 
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could have got each one of those men off on a technicality if I had been 
in a position to act as their friend.89 
  
How could men without such horrific experience ever truly understand the tragedy 
of which Ward was a part? This was a question he himself went on to cover: 
 
I ask the House not to dismiss this petition by the remark that these 
men were cowards and deserved their fate. They were not cowards in 
the accepted meaning of the word. At any rate they did not display one-
tenth part of the cowardice that was displayed by the crowds in London 
who went flocking to the tube stations on the first alarm of an air raid…I 
think it is well that it should be made publicly known and that the 
people of this country should understand what war is, and that Hon. 
Members of this House who have done well in the War, without perhaps 
having been very near the front line, should understand that from the 
point of view of Tommy up in the trenches war is not a question of 
honours and decorations, but war is just hell.90 
 
Ward’s speech would pass without comment for the rest of the debate. Indeed, it 
was only in 2006 that all 306 British soldiers shot for desertion and cowardice 
were pardoned, with families of the executed suffering for many years ‘financial 
hardship (not helped by the lack of military pensions), stigma, and shame.’91  
According to Putkowski and Sykes’s Shot at Dawn, Ward’s question had 
been prompted by a newspaper report concerning ‘Jim’ who, having served 
bravely, experienced shell shock which prevented him leaving his trenches and 
engaging the enemy.92 ‘Jim’ was, it appears, Private Frederick Butcher – executed 
by friends and comrades who softly whispered ‘au revoir’ in his ear minutes before 
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pulling the triggers which ended his life. Butcher’s mother was informed he had 
been killed in action, and his name appears on Folkestone’s War Memorial.93 After 
Ward’s abortive effort, the Labour MP Ernest Thurtle took up the mantle. Getting 
the Labour Party to adopt the abolition of the death penalty for military cowardice 
in 1925, he took the motion to the floor of the Commons in April 1930. 
There are two ways to view the debate that ensued.  On the one hand, over 
half (58.5%, 80 MPs) the Phoenix Generation voted for Lambert Ward’s 
amendment to retain the death penalty for those who deserted under, essentially, 
conditions of shell-shock, and then went on to encourage the others to desert. 
George Courthope’s motion to keep the penalty for deserting a patrol post saw 
similar, if slightly reduced, levels of support from Tory veterans (53%, 72 MPs).94 
No Conservative member voted with Labour, arguably vindicating Putkowski and 
Sykes’s charged remark about ‘the Tory dinosaurs in both houses.’95 On the other 
hand, there was more support for an evolution in policy than Lambert Ward had 
received in 1919. Though right-wing MPs like Tufton Beamish believed ‘the man 
who is conquered by fear is a coward, and deserves all he gets,’ members like John 
Hills, Gerald Berkeley Hurst and Lambert Ward himself reached rather different 
conclusions.96 Denouncing the principle of pour encourager les autres which had 
justified the 1914 Army Act, Hills did not ‘see what good you can do by shooting a 
man for cowardice, neither do I see that by carrying out a sentence of that kind you 
strengthen the nerves of the comrades of the man who is shot.’ Calling into 
question conscription, he believed politicians ‘have no right to take a man from the 
factory or the farm and put him into khaki and a tin hat, and then shoot him if he 
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shows cowardice.’97 Abstaining from such votes was thus as much from genuine 
conviction as party politics (or the simple laziness of not wishing to vote), making 
the numbers somewhat ambiguous. These, to be sure, were difficult questions for 
veterans. 
 Ward’s and Hills’s speeches were indicative, illustrating the vastly different 
feelings engendered by huddling in a tube station to avoid a Zeppelin, and leading 
men to battle over the bodies of one’s comrades. It would be men of the former 
experience, those without combat experience, who would lead Britain between the 
wars – indeed, of the four signatures at Munich, only Neville Chamberlain’s 
constituted that of a man who had enjoyed civilian life throughout the Great War. 
There are of course demographic explanations for this – not only were the 
numbers of the war generation reduced by the toll of conflict, but given their youth 
it was always going to be difficult to secure promotion within an inert organisation 
such as the Conservative Party. Nevertheless, we should not automatically assume 
that those without combat experience learnt no lessons from the war years, or, as 
we will later outline, were in no position to act. 
 To begin with, one must acknowledge the traumatic effect that the death of 
loved ones must have had on politicians who remained at home. Herbert Asquith 
and Andrew Bonar Law both lost sons during the war, and the psychological 
wounds hearing of the death, hundreds of miles from home, of one’s offspring are 
scarcely comprehensible. Stanley Baldwin, whose son Oliver returned unscathed 
from the conflict, acknowledged at the unveiling of a War memorial in Harrow the, 
often unspoken, terror of seeing swathes of the nation’s youth marching off to 
combat. ‘Of all those in 1914, as every schoolmaster and every parent knows,’ he 
began, ‘every boy, though he seldom acknowledged it, knew that he had to pass 
literally through the valley of the shadow of death, and he knew he might never 
emerge from it. That knowledge left marks on the character of thousands of 
Englishmen that will never be obliterated.’98 The impotence of not being able to 
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prevent the death of friends, so often attributed to the front generation, was also 
prevalent amongst those who stayed in Britain. It imbued a similar determination 
to, as Baldwin put it, build a better ‘superstructure…upon the foundations 
cemented in their blood.’99 The difference lay in the fact that men such as Neville 
Chamberlain did not actually witness the horrors that would undoubtedly haunt 
them in later years, and in whose honour they would erect monument after 
monument. This begat the learning of different lessons from 1914-18, which 
chapter three will address. 
 For all that the literary accounts of Sassoon and Owen colour our 
understanding of the trenches, at least they had actually served. One is struck, 
reading the testimony of those who remained at home, how little such men could 
know of events on the continent. Men who would later allow the Great War to 
frame much of their policy – one thinks here principally of Chamberlain and 
appeasement – actually derived much of their understanding of it from tittle-tattle 
and hearsay. ‘I hope the change in command will bring about an improvement in 
the conduct of the war,’ wrote Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida in December 
1915, ‘I have been told that D. Haig has not a brain but if he has the right character I 
think that is even more important.’100 Such a brain, as Alan Clark famously argued 
(albeit in a polemical manner), led to ‘twenty-seven months of slaughter and 
exhaustion, [Haig leaving the Tommy] so perilously exposed that they were nearly 
annihilated.’101 Gerald DeGroot and J.P. Harris have arguably presented a more 
nuanced case of late.102 Either way, in the aftermath of war – presumably because 
Britain’s contemporary leaders had not personally faced the brunt of some of his 
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more incompetent measures – the Field Marshall was treated remarkably well by 
the Conservative establishment, particularly upon his death in 1928. Of the Somme, 
Geoffrey Dawson’s Times obituary opined that ‘in the judgment of history it may be 
that the country will recognise the wisdom and discount the cost.’ In a broad sense 
it praised his ‘industry, coolness, [and] tenacity.’ In the Commons, Baldwin 
eschewed delivering a verdict on his military record as ‘the time has not come for 
us to judge,’ but did praise both his regimental following of government orders, and 
his postwar humanitarian work as president of the British Legion.103 For all Clark 
has been challenged by modern historians like Gary Sheffield, one must 
acknowledge that the initial whitewashing of Haig’s reputation owed much to the 
fact that Britain’s post 1918 leaders were in no position to judge his war (either 
positively or negatively), given, as Baldwin famously espoused to Keynes, they 
contained so many who had done well out of avoiding battle.104 In most cases, 
discussions over the rights and wrongs of Haig’s leadership waited until later 
life.105 
 At the same time, part of the reason the Mosleys and Macmillans attempted 
to play upon their war record was that – aside from the physical scars they bore – 
the non-combatant post 1918 politician sometimes held so poor a notion of what 
was going on during the war. No doubt such men made generous gestures – 
Baldwin effectively donated £120,000 to the government for war purposes, and 
Neville Chamberlain organised a Christmas parcel to be sent to all troops of 
Birmingham battalions – but these were sometimes in lieu of a profound 
understanding of the state of play.106 In the diaries and letters of such men one sees 
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constantly phrases such as ‘I don’t know.’107 Information about the war, such as it 
was, could sometimes be derived from questionable sources - Prime Minister 
turned honours salesman David Lloyd George, or the gossipy tables of the Café 
Royal and Carlton Club.108 Chamberlain is an extreme case – he was notoriously 
ignorant of matters military – but differences between home and the trenches 
clearly existed, particularly given, as Bridgeman bemoaned, levels of governmental 
censorship.109 
 One must also consider that amongst this group would be men – latterly, of 
course, boys – who had avoided military service in the Great War not through 
objection, old age or being required elsewhere, but simply because they were too 
young. Rab Butler is a typical example: 
 
The 1914 war started when I was eleven…I was at Marlborough nearly 
sixteen, when the war ended. Did I realise then, as I do now, how nearly 
I had missed that, to so many, overpowering experience...When I first 
entered the House of Commons in 1929 the cloak room attendants 
zealously and persistently called us all by military titles. I was ashamed 
not to have my title but bore it for a year or two until I became a 
Minister.110 
 
The shame missing this experience imbued could manifest itself in an almost 
canine like loyalty to those, but a few years older, who had served – that figures as 
seemingly divergent as John Strachey and Bob Boothby would both fall under the 
spell of Oswald Mosley serves as evidence of this. To the latter, during 1914-18 
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school work was secondary, Boothby doing enough work at Eton ‘to keep my 
place,’ but thinking ‘of nothing but the war.’ Upon his wall, to the surprise of his 
housemaster, were pinned not photographs of his parents, but pictures of Jellicoe 
and Beatty. As he later wrote: 
 
It is difficult to exaggerate the traumatic effect of the casualties in 
France upon the lives of boys who grew to maturity during the years 
between 1914 and 1918. Every Sunday the names of the fallen were 
read out in College chapel. As we saw all the heroes of our youth being 
killed, one by one, and not far away, our whole attitude towards life 
changed, “Eat and drink and try to be merry, for tomorrow you will 
surely die” became our motto. Neuve Chapelle, Loos, the Somme and 
Passchendaele bit deep into our small souls. If early and bloody death 
was apparently an inevitable consequence of life, what was the point of 
it?111 
 
Such a cavalier attitude to life led to serial adultery on the part of many of this 
generation in the interwar period – Mosley, Duff Cooper, Boothby – and it is 
likewise important to note that despite the brave service war veterans put in, the 
years 1914-18 were not without pleasure. 
 Following his withdrawal from active service on account of his injured leg, 
Oswald Mosley’s ‘time until the end of the war was occupied by a plunge into social 
life, which began on crutches in London [and] was pursued with zest through the 
ample opportunities then provided.’112 The great hostesses of the period – Lady 
Astor, Lady Cunard and Maxine Elliott – kept the glittering social scene alive and 
well, and offered future politicians a chance to meet men such as F.E. Smith and 
Winston Churchill.113 For all that Duff Cooper’s winning of the DSO in 1918 would 
seemingly make his war worthwhile, one must note the quasi-comic nature in 
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which he spent the majority of it. Unable to enlist until 1917 because of his work at 
the Foreign Office, the first three years of his war were more notable for their 
debauchery than their heroism. Though he played an administrative role in 
attempting to get Italy and Bulgaria to intervene on the side of the Entente, he 
perpetually wished ‘I had something to do instead of everlasting office boy work.’ 
In social terms he did, pursuing both Diana Manners and alcohol with equal vigour. 
Of the former he became incredibly jealous when she drove home with a friend 
soon to go back to the war, Michael Herbert – ‘I thereupon made a scene and said 
that I would never forgive her.’ One wonders how far this feeling of impotence (a 
rarity for the sexually prolific Duff) triggered his desire to enlist as soon as 
possible. Of the latter, things were more comedic. In November 1915, a drunk Duff 
broke into his own home, climbing ‘over some railings close to my own rooms. I 
can’t think how I managed to get over them all in a top hat and an overcoat. The 
latter was considerably torn, so were my trousers.’ All this left him making ‘only 
[one] resolve for [1916], to get rid of my reputation for drunkenness.’ 114 In the 
year of the Somme then, Duff Cooper’s fiercest enemy would be lady liquor. 
Evidence enough that for future politicians the years 1914 to 1918 were filled with 
as much ‘poppycock,’ as ‘mud’ and ‘blood.’115  
1.6 The Mundane Side of Conflict   
Though the exhilarating experience of joining up, and the non-military life they also 
led during the war, forms an important part of what the Macmillan cohort of 
politicians took from 1914-18, it is their actions on the battlefield that would 
essentially define them, rightly or wrongly, as a generation. ‘I had entered the 
holocaust still childish,’ recalled Eden, ‘and I emerged tempered by my experience, 
but with my illusions intact, neither shattered nor cynical to face a changed 
world.’116 What then, happened to produce this reaction? 
 Despite pointing out the notion that soldiers invariably did not serve for the 
                                                           
114  Norwich, Duff Cooper Diaries, 7-8, 25-6, 19, 23. [26 April 1915], [25 February 1916], [2 
November 1915], [30 December 1915]. 
115 G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War, (London, 2004) 
116  Eden, Another World, 150. 
67 
 
entirety of the conflict, it would be churlish to deny that the future British politician 
was capable of extremely brave deeds. Robert Gee – later, as we will see, political 
conqueror of Ramsay MacDonald amidst a highly charged East Woolwich by-
election in 1921 – would win the Victoria Cross for his outstanding courage whilst 
serving with the Royal Fusiliers. On 30 November 1917 at Masnieres and Les Rues 
Vertes, an attack by the enemy captured brigade headquarters and ammunition 
dump. Captain Gee, finding himself a prisoner, managed to escape and organised a 
party of the brigade staff with which he attacked the enemy, closely followed by 
two companies of infantry. He cleared the locality and established a defensive 
flank, then finding an enemy machine-gun still in action, with a revolver in each 
hand he went forward and captured the gun, killing eight of the crew. He was 
wounded, but would not have his wound dressed until the defence was 
organised.117 Gee’s wound was minor in comparison to other veterans. Serving 
with the Guardsmen, Harry Crookshank would be buried for almost a day under 
four feet of earth in August 1915 after a mine exploded – earning him the nickname 
“Lazarus” upon discovery – and later still would be castrated by a shell at the 
Somme.118 His close friend Harold Macmillan would fare a little better, but he too 
would take bullets to the hand, hip and head, and would spend the last two years of 
the conflict in and out of hospital.119 
 Yet conflict is about much more than learning to conquer one’s own fear of 
death. Bravery was certainly one lesson, but the war begat others. From the world 
of slightly pointless bon vivants and gaiety, men were brought into an existence at 
once both comradely and isolating. Writing to his mother from Marles-les-Mines in 
September 1915, Macmillan would write happily of men singing ‘music-hall ditties 
and sentimental love songs – anything and everything. It was really rather 
wonderful.’120 Starting the war aged ‘thirty, but nothing short of terrified,’ John 
Moore-Brabazon (MP for Chatham from 1918 and later Churchill’s wartime 
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Minister of Transport) found solace in the men around him in the Royal Flying 
Corps. ‘As I look back,’ he wrote in 1956, ‘I am convinced that there was more 
talent in No. 9 Squadron congregated together than I have ever come across in my 
life. There wasn’t a single man in it who did not distinguish himself,’ including 
indeed Brabazon himself, who would win the Military Cross.121 One imagines that 
for those who served in a medical capacity – such as Walter Elliot in the Scots Greys 
– the attachment to one’s comrades was even stronger. The experience Elliot had 
(later rewarded by adding a bar to his already attained MC) of manning a 
regimental aid post for twelve hours, attending to over 250 wounded and 
evacuating all to the dressing station, must have been profound indeed. As Eden 
noted when observing a dying rifleman, ‘the wound was in the jugular and we 
could not even check the bleeding. It was horrible to be so helpless.’122 This may 
well have been responsible for the reaction noted by Elliot’s good friend, fellow 
veteran, and later Liberal MP Colin Coote: ‘I think the whole epoch of 1914-18 
came too close to his deep heart’s core for any tale of any part of it to rise readily to 
his lips. There were occasional signs of deep feeling…the rest was silence.’123 
 This in turn indicates another consequence of war – its loneliness. However 
much such retrospective accounts are seeking to manipulate the reader by the use 
of pathos, one cannot help be moved by prose illustrating the tragic beauty of war: 
 
There was too a certain exhilaration in going up over the top at night. 
Lights fired into the air continually from both side illuminated the night 
sky, and the whistle of passing bullets contributed to the eerie beauty of 
the stark surroundings. There was a certain tragic loveliness in that 
unearthly desolation, the ultimate nihilism of man’s failed spirit. Also, 
for many at that stage a wound could seem a release and death was 
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peace.124 
 
This was a war of the masses, millions of men facing each other across no man’s 
land. Yet, as Lloyd-Greame noted, ‘the memories of the ordinary in any war, though 
for him they recall indelible pictures and friendships broken only by death, while 
common to us all, are essentially personal.’125 Images such as that described above 
by Mosley are important – regardless of whether they accurately represent the 
thrill of battle, what they certainly do illustrate is the detachment felt by the 
individual during such tribulations. How could it be any other way? If evil is truly 
banal, then survival amidst such evil must surely take the same form. To protect 
themselves against the horrors, the future politicians cocooned themselves away 
from feeling anything. Macmillan commenting to his mother that ‘perhaps the most 
extraordinary thing about a modern battlefield is the desolation and emptiness of it 
all…the thrill of battle comes now only once or twice in a twelvemonth. We need 
not so much the gallantry of our fathers; we need that indomitable and patient 
determination which has saved England over and over again.’126 
 Such determination was not only required when going over the top, for the 
First World War was as much about surviving perpetual boredom, as it was 
dodging German bullets. Though we must acknowledge that the often mundane 
nature of war letters owed much to the desire to shield loved ones from the 
horrors of battle, they were also dull simply because that was the nature of conflict. 
Warfare was dangerous, but the danger was unavoidable, it was the mind numbing 
slog of it all that plagued the educated future Conservative members. Lloyd-
Greame’s letters home tell of ‘long day[s] in the trenches,’ requests for ‘another tin 
of F + M Ration Chocolate,’ and the unfortunate spectre of ‘much office work to get 
through as ever.’ Beyond bland generalisations such as ‘the [soldiers] are in 
wonderfully good condition…I think they will give a good account of themselves,’ 
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there is precious little mention of the battlefield.127 Here we must introduce a 
notion that we will turn to later: that war, far from being the fulfilment of the 
masculine ideal preached in British public schools and raised to ever new heights 
by the bellicose press, was in fact a bitter disappointment. Mosley would later ask, 
‘what option had I really got in this [war] except to be killed or to win the Military 
Cross? It was life simplified.’128 Yet clearly there was an option, for neither extreme 
would occur. Is it so far fetched to assume therefore, that the post-war radical 
conservatism a significant number of veterans would espouse, came not just from 
some notion of having being cheated of the “homes fit for heroes” they and their 
comrades had earned, but from the pent up pressure to do something, emphatically 
not released by a war which was ultimately rather flat? Having built themselves up 
to such a high pitch of tension from 1914, the war almost descended into a bloodier 
version of the same type of slightly pointless societal back and forth the young men 
had witnessed at home: Eden expressing amused indignation at being asked to 
shave after a night of heavy shelling, whilst Duff Cooper still found time in France 
to enjoy ‘sitting in a garden, talking about poetry and women and getting drunk.’129 
The thought of going to war in 1917 had filled the London based Duff with 
‘exhilaration,’ he envied ‘the experience and adventure everyone else had.’130 When 
he finally got to the battlefield however he discovered that ‘I am getting very bored 
here. The life [is] monotonous.’131 It was this monotony, every bit as much as his 
DSO, that fired his later radicalism.132 
 Radical conservatism, of course, was not without precedent. Amidst fears, 
even amongst right-wing elements such as Leo Maxse’s National Review, that 
‘outside Birmingham, the Labour Party is robbing us of the Tory democracy which 
has been the mainstay of the Unionist cause for the past twenty years,’ constructive 
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Conservatives set about trying to woo the working class.133 Joseph Chamberlain’s 
campaign for a quasi-socialistic form of imperial preference (carried forth into the 
postwar world by that Great War veteran Leo Amery), Conservative trade 
unionism espoused by groups such as F. Hastings Medhurst’s Trade Union Tariff 
Reform Association, and the output of journals such as The Worker (latterly The 
Man and The Woman) all augured a Conservatism not as aristocratically aloof as 
that of Lord Salisbury. 134 Nevertheless, before the First World War such 
benevolence tended to take the form of out and out paternalism, there were few 
Booth and Rowntrees – prepared to walk amongst the slums – in Edwardian 
Conservatism. From 1914 this began to change. Upon his arrival at the front Harold 
Macmillan received his first lesson, an unexpectedly moving one, in working-class 
culture. Putting to work censoring soldiers correspondence, he would write to his 
mother that ‘they have big hearts, these soldiers, and it is a very pathetic task to 
have to read all their letters home…There comes occasionally a grim sentence or 
two, which reveals in a flash a sordid family drama. “Mother, are you ever going to 
write to me. I have written ten times and had no answer. Are you on the drink 
again, that Uncle George write me the children are in a shocking state? [sic].”’135 
Though the army hierarchy made any notions of absolute equality amongst men 
impossible, by serving in positions in constant contact with working class 
Tommies, future Conservative politicians would have a much greater 
understanding of the working man than their forefathers. Few times in his life, 
Eden recalled, possessed ‘the same close personal character of comradeship as life 
with the Yeoman Rifles, where we had enlisted together, trained together, fought 
together. The more beastly and dangerous the conditions, the more this association 
seemed to count.’136 Though not all veterans would tread the same path to Labour 
as that of middle and upper class men Clement Attlee (a relatively rare exception to 
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the rule who bore pre-1914 witness to the drudgery of East London slums), Oswald 
Mosley and Hugh Dalton, they were imbued with a greater social conscience than 
had previously been the case amongst their class.137 When veterans such as John 
Davidson, elected for Fareham in 1918, declared that starting with the birth of a 
child, they ‘desired to see it properly housed, fed and clothed, in order that it might 
have a proper start in life,’ they were espousing an empathetic mentality that could 
only have come from contact with the working man.138 Even if historians such as 
Ross McKibbin have pointed out the socially inert nature of postwar Britain, this 
was a revolutionary step indeed.139 The Conservative Party coming down from its 
high horse – influenced naturally by the growing working class electorate after the 
Reform Acts of 1918 – was a profound step in British politics.140 
1.7 Reactions to the Armistice 
After all the struggle, monotony, and, very occasionally, the pleasures of war, 
‘Britain [had been] raised by the efforts of the young generation to a pinnacle of 
power and of greatness.’141 Her principle foes, Germany and Austria-Hungary had 
been vanquished, and her potential rival Russia appeared in a state from which it 
would never recover. This, then, was surely a time for rejoicing. No need to 
question, as Hitler did while convalescing in Pasewalk Military Hospital, ‘how could 
this deed be justified to future generations?’142 Certainly no need, as did that same 
German Corporal, to blame the fate of the war on Jews, Marxists and leftists. To be 
sure, men were worried about getting back to civilian life as soon as possible, but 
there was still time to celebrate. Even amidst scant resources and the need to 
maintain Army discipline, Gregory notes, Dieppe saw wild jubiliation amongst 
British and Australian troops – matching even that of the celebrations in Trafalgar 
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Square.143 The Times would comment the following on London’s East End: 
 
At its best the East-end is not pleasing to any of the senses. After a night 
of drizzling rain and tramping crowds it is far from its best. Yet for all its 
dinginess and dirt the East-end looked almost as gay yesterday as the 
West, and gayer than most of the “comfortable” suburbs. The humblest 
little road could boast hundreds of tiny little flags, hung about the doors 
and windows or strung across the street.144 
 
Amongst the generally buoyant mood however, as Arthur Marwick has noted, the 
veteran would often feel little but numbness, and this certainly appears true of the 
men who would shape British policy for the next forty years.145 
 As Philip Gibbs would write in 1920, ‘where was the nation’s gratitude for 
the men who had fought and died, or fought and lived?...That…is the question that 
was asked by millions of men in England…and it was assured in their own brains 
by a bitterness and indignation, out of which may be lit the fires of the 
revolutionary spirit.’146 ‘Modern civilization,’ he would argue, ‘was wrecked on 
those fire-blasted fields [of the Somme], though they led to what we called 
“victory.” More died there than the flower of our youth. The old order of the world 
died there [as men]…vowed not to tolerate a system of thought which had led up to 
such a monstrous massacre.’147 For all the possible later reinvention, this indeed 
seems to be an accurate representation of contemporary feeling. One must be 
careful, Mosley’s assertion that on 11 November 1918 he ‘dedicated myself to 
politics’ bares remarkable similarity to Hitler’s claim in Mein Kampf that on that 
same night ‘I, for my part, decided to go into politics.’148 Both are nonsense – the 
former having already been adopted by his constituency, the latter in no position to 
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decide anything, save the topic of his next mediocre painting. Yet one need not be 
so cynical all across the board. 
 ‘Would anything be the same again? How far could pre-war life be restored?’ 
Both were questions plaguing Harold Macmillan. ‘These were questions many 
people evaded: some devoted themselves as far as possible to the reconstruction of 
the old world; some dreamed of building a new one.’149 Placing himself firmly in 
the latter camp, the future appeared uncertain yet beguiling. ‘To a young man of 
twenty-four, scarred but not disfigured, and with all the quick mental and moral 
recovery of which youth is capable, life at the end of 1918 seemed to offer an 
attractive, not to say exciting, prospect.’150 Tinged with sadness, ‘few of the 
survivors of [Macmillan’s] own age felt able to shake off the memory of these 
years.’ He continued, ‘we were haunted by them. We almost began to feel a sense of 
guilt for not having shared the fate of our friends and comrades. We certainly felt 
an obligation to make some decent use of the life that had been spared to us.’151 
Even if, then, the notion of some kind of armistice night revelation seems a little 
bogus – Macmillan himself admitting that ‘when the war ended most of us were at a 
loss as to how to take up our lives’ – ideas were clearly beginning to percolate in 
the young men’s minds.152 
 As Mosley passed through the festive streets of London on 11 November, he 
scoffed at the ‘smooth, smug people, who had never fought or suffered’ gorging 
themselves on fine wine and good food. Standing ‘aside from the delirious throng, 
silent and alone,’ he was ‘ravaged by memory.’ The one million dead of the British 
Empire weighed heavy on his mind. Pre-empting Stephen Graham’s 1921 Challenge 
of the Dead, where ‘the dead challenge the living in choruses of silence from broad 
fields of burial,’ Mosley now saw that ‘driving purpose had begun; there must be no 
more war.’153 Such purpose would lead him possibly into madness, certainly into 
wartime internment, but little of that could have been predicted in 1918. That 
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Mosley’s path could have been trodden by many of his generation will form the 
basis of a later chapter. For now let us note that as the war came to a close, even a 
figure at the heart of the establishment, Edward Wood, was thinking on much the 
same lines. Whilst acknowledging that ‘we need time and distance to gain correct 
perspective,’ Wood believed the war to have been ‘a stern critic and reformer of 
modes of thought and ways of life.’ The ‘natural and spontaneous revolt of a people’ 
that had occurred in August 1914, and the four years of faithful service it begat, 
augured policies constructed to the tune of the national, rather than traditionally 
Conservative, gospel.154  
The ‘silly people’ which Duff Cooper encountered on Armistice Day, 
‘laughing and cheering,’ had already been rendered something of an “other” by the 
war generation. ‘Those whose only taste of actual warfare was an occasional air-
raid,’ as one future MP wrote, simply could not understand.155 Their experience of 
war on the home front could never compare with what men such as Eden, Mosley 
and Macmillan had witnessed on the continent. Speaking in 1926, Stanley Baldwin 
hoped that future historians would be able to write that ‘a generation indeed was 
wiped out, but from their graves sprang a rebirth and a new kindling of the spirit 
that raised our country to heights which surpass the dreams of those of her sons 
who in past ages had sacrificed most and had loved her best.’156 How far this came 
to pass, and how far those not ‘wiped out’ believed it to have done so, forms the 
basis of this study. 
1.8 A Concluding Supposition 
It is not the proviso of historians to indulge in speculation. Yet in a study that takes 
something of a pyschological approach – judging mentality every bit as much as 
action – it is perhaps unavoidable. Hitherto, academics have been content to argue 
that political radicalism after the First World War was a result of the traumatic 
effect of seeing one’s comrades die in cold blood, having to commit (or at least 
facilitate) murderous deeds oneself, and pent up anger at those who did not serve. 
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Veterans from Hitler to Graves put forward much the same line, and its partial 
relevance is undeniable. The predominantly middle and upper class veterans of 
this analysis perhaps offer something different however. As we have seen, these 
were men who were raised in a strange dichotomy of masculine activities and 
feminine literature, who were sent to war amidst a heady atmosphere of 
Germanophobia convinced that they would finally become the decisive historical 
actors their staid youth had denied them. Yet what happened next? These, after all, 
were men of the officer class.157 Their task was to lead men into battle rather than 
necessarily execute murderous orders themselves. This had two consequences. 
Firstly, when a comrade died it hit them doubly hard. But, just as importantly, their 
elevated rank actually rendered them a little impotent. As Jessica Meyer has 
recently shown, ‘action was the very thing denied to the soldier and the 
emblematic figure was that of the neurasthenic war-damaged man….rather than an 
autonomous man of action who controlled his own destiny. The dominant 
masculine figure of the war thus became one associated with emasculation rather 
than with normative masculinity.’158 Having joined up believing they would finally 
resolve the befuddling masculine-feminine nature of their upbringing then, their 
war did not necessarily deliver this. Indeed, it arguably created a feeling of greater 
helplessness, greater impotency, which begat a determination to do something 
with their post-war lives.  
 These men had survived the bloodiest, most mechanised carnage Europe 
had ever seen. This created a multitude of feelings – guilt at having lost so many 
friends, a certain arrogance based upon almost Darwinian notions of survival of the 
fittest, and an impotence derived from, in many cases, not having fought the gung-
ho war they envisaged when joining up. The extent to which men felt these 
emotions differed from individual to individual, but that it had an acute effect one 
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cannot doubt. After 1918 they would attempt to make sense of their wartime 
experiences through political action.159 To this we now turn. 
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2: The Conservative Electoral Appeal Between the Wars  
 
This election is all over the country a triumph for jingoism. 
- James Davidson to Arthur Ponsonby (founder member of the Union of Democratic 
Control), December 19181 
 
The choice is between the Union Jack and the Red Flag. 
- Commander Marsden, as Conservative parliamentary candidate for North 
Battersea, May 19292 
2.1 Why Vote Tory? 
Before we begin to evaluate the principles and actions of the politicians under 
consideration in this study, we may state a truism: they made, in electoral terms, 
the pragmatically correct choice in becoming Conservatives. Even with the 
criticisms levelled at interwar governmental policy from numerous sources - 
socialist, Churchillian, Keynesian - the facts are stark. Between the wars, save two 
brief interruptions from Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Party (1924, 1929-31), the 
Conservatives either occupied 10 Downing Street directly or had the incumbent 
largely in their pocket. Much of this time, it is true, was made up of nominal 
coalitions, but in all of these the Tories held dominant influence. Despite the 
revolutionary challenges to the British way of life from many fronts - the 
expansionist programmes of Mosley and Lloyd George, the socialism of Labour, 
mass unemployment, the continental examples of, initially successful, 
totalitarianism - remarkably little of this potentially revolutionary atmosphere 
permeated the upper echelons of Westminster politics. In 1923 the nation was led 
by a socially progressive (in pre-1914 terms) Conservative averse to unnecessary 
foreign adventure, and this would still be the case in 1939. The question that 
puzzles is why this was so. How on earth, with an electorate vastly more working 
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class than had ever been the case before the 1918 Representation of the People Act, 
and with unemployment perpetually above the dreaded ten per cent, did the 
Conservative Party achieve a dominance that had eluded them under arguably 
more favourable pre-war conditions? Put simply, how did they win so many 
elections? By reference to local press reports, the following will argue that 
ephemeral use of war veterans certainly played its part. 
 There have been many attempts to date to explain the arguably perverse 
phenomenon of Tory success in a newly democratic political culture. Though our 
next chapter will deal with the man more directly, we must first note the influence 
of that oddly mercurial figure, Stanley Baldwin. To Baldwin’s most staunch 
defender, Philip Williamson, the carefully cultivated image of amiable 
Worcestershire pig farmer has blinded us to his considerable political skill. 
‘Addressing his party and the public with a new note of purposefulness, idealism, 
and sensitivity towards labour,’ Williamson argues, Baldwin harnessed ‘national 
values’ to ‘Conservative causes.’3 Andrew Taylor essentially agrees, pointing out 
that, unlike the industrial charter after the second war, Baldwin successfully 
bridged the gap between party principle and the needs of the masses.4 Even if, as 
John Charmley states, Baldwin’s projection as a simple, honest, quintessentially 
British chap sometimes amounted to little more than portraying the left, by 
contrast, as a foreign ideology in the pay of Zinoviev, there is little doubt his 
leadership was an asset to the party.5 For as David Close has concluded, by painting 
his policies - such as they were - in such broad brush strokes, Baldwin allowed the 
Conservatives to become so synonymous with the nation that two successive Tory 
administrations - 1931 and 1935 - could be presented to the public as “National” in 
character.6 In an age of turbulence, dependability sold. 
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 Looking beyond the leader, it must also be noted that in some ways the 
Conservatives adapted to the post 1918 world considerably better than the 
traditionally more progressive parties. It is true, as Ross McKibbin points out, they 
enjoyed the considerable advantage of holding the levers of state just as 
technological improvements were making such control ever more important.7 
Indeed, as Jon Lawrence suggests, who knows what Lloyd George or Mosley could 
have achieved with such advantages.8 Thus, as the number of radio licenses 
increased from 36,000 in 1922 to 8.9 million by 1939, access to the BBC became 
ever more important.9 This does however slightly ignore the fact that Baldwin was 
simply better at projecting his message than MacDonald - he, rather than the 
slightly dour Scot, would often deliver National Government propaganda even with 
the latter in Number Ten. It is also highly implausible that Baldwin could have 
hoodwinked a nation for well over decade without having at least some ideological 
points to make. For though politicians of every persuasion from Adolf Hitler to 
Barack Obama can sell themselves by the force of their conviction, they must at 
least hold some convictions in the first place. Glitz and glamour are not enough, or 
at least one hopes so. 
 McKibbin has further explanations. Though the rotten borough basically 
became extinct in 1832, he is correct to point out that certain anachronisms in 
constituency boundaries (and / including Northern Ireland) gave the 
Conservatives a few bonus seats - though his estimate of anything up to 30 seems a 
little generous, and, in any case, the Tories often won by much more than this.10 
More importantly, he attempts to highlight a selfish side to Conservative policy that 
deserves exploration. In the mid 1920s Conservative membership swelled to 
around 700,000 - double that of Labour. Crucially, McKibbin claims, the middle 
class nature of this new Conservative constituency begat an emphasis in policy on 
                                                           
7 R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950, (Oxford, 1991), 
293. 
8 J. Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair, 
(Oxford, 2009), 96. 
9 Taylor, ‘Speaking to Democracy,’ 81. 
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deflationary economics -  whereby “money” was protected at the expense of getting 
men jobs. Allied to this was the creation - completely the opposite of Baldwin’s 
harmonious rhetoric - of “two Nations”: the working class, work shy, almost 
parasitic “other”, and the ordinary, decent, predominantly middle class “public.” 
The “other” were abandoned, save for the small percentage needed to decide 
elections, to Labour, whilst the “public” were to be kept out of the hands of Lloyd 
George, Mosley, or whomever else attempted to claim them from the centre or 
right.11 This tactical abandonment of the working classes by Baldwin is essentially 
corroborated by David Jarvis, who believes ‘the seductive [Joseph] Chamberlainite 
fallacy that a working-class electorate could be won for the right by a “big idea” lost 
its hold of the party…[After 1918] the Conservative party would never again waste 
its energies in chasing that alluring but illusory prize, the working-class vote.’12 In 
such a conception, policy becomes almost a numbers game: enact whatever policies 
you wish so long as at least 51% of the next election will go your way. 
 Again however, this seems at least partially flawed. Whilst pragmatism can 
never be wholly detached from political action, the conspiratorial element of 
McKibbin’s argument, though rigorously (and indeed well) argued, seems to verge 
on the churlish. Politicians are not all liars. Principle does exist. Why did Baldwin 
go the polls in 1923, armed with the knowledge that he might very well lose, on a 
pledge to introduce tariff reform? Because Bonar Law said the party would do so. 
One must naturally be suspicious of one’s leaders - the idea that policy could be 
tailored to winning an election is undeniable - yet the notion that Baldwin would 
deliberately condemn an entire class to poverty to save his own job seems a step 
too far. Indeed, as Margaret Thatcher illustrated, Conservative policy seemingly 
aimed at the middle classes can play surprising well to a working class audience. 
The 1920s “Essex Man” was bombarded with aspirational propaganda - ‘When you 
are asked “Is it your own house?” how proud you are when you can say “YES!” 
‘Yours! But not under socialism’ - is it so unthinkable that some of this hit home? 
                                                           
11 Ibid, 267. 
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Even if, as Morgan writes, hardly one tenth of the country could have answered 
‘yes’ to the above questions, the appeal was as much to future aspirations and a 
vicarious stake in the nation as to existing realities.13 Conservative appeal could be 
a multi-faceted thing indeed: if the party could find the right hook to hang its 
agenda upon, there was no reason why it could not triumph in a fair fight. Even 
sections of the working class could often be persuaded, as Engels wrote to Marx, to 
‘discredit itself terribly’ and vote Tory.14 
 
2.2 The War and Elections 
 Each of these explanations therefore present us with a problem. Baldwin 
was clearly a skilful politician, and led a party which managed, by 1931, to have 
become intertwined with notions of Britishness and “the nation.” Yet how? Baldwin 
was a decent man, of religious conviction and sympathetic character, but was this 
really enough to convince the public not to turn to alternatives.15 The Conservative 
Party certainly appropriated the Union Jack between the wars, but given they were 
led into elections first by a Canadian in Bonar Law, then a country squire turned 
captain of industry in Baldwin, the explanations for this presumably lie beyond the 
leadership. Similarly, it is all very well for critics from the left to deride the party’s 
national appeal, but one must note that Bonar Law and Baldwin won significant 
victories outside the country’s more salubrious locations. For every Westminster, 
Chelsea and Epping in the blue column, one can point to electoral successes in 
places such as Barnard Castle, Birmingham Handsworth, and Liverpool Fairfield. 
Places where, as Macmillan noted in his own marginal seat of Stockton, workers 
were ‘hanging around the streets or haunting the factories in despair,’ still voted 
                                                           
13 K. Morgan, ‘The Conservative Party and Mass Housing, 1918-39,’ in S. Ball and I. Holliday 
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14 P. Norton and A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, (London, 1981), 176. 
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Conservative.16 Until now, historians have seemingly been content either to leave 
the question of why this happens open, or place the emphasis on essentially 
negative points such as persuasive use of the new media, or the implosion of the 
Liberals and incompetence of Labour. This however seems incomplete. 
 Instead, we must begin to acknowledge that the appropriation of 
supposedly national ideals by the Conservative Party in this period was not some 
twist of fate or political conjuring trick, but merely, in part, the logical outcome of 
the candidates they forwarded at General Elections, and the cultural legacy of the 
Great War. As the previous chapter noted, much of our understanding of the 1914-
18 conflict is metaphorical, and arrives in the form of platitudes. ‘The cream of 
Britain’s manhood was killed in the last war,’ proclaimed one MP too young to 
fight, ‘and those who survived were never allowed to play any part in the 
rebuilding of Europe.’17 Whilst Bob Boothby’s point has merit in the narrow 
context of the peace treaties, and has some credence in terms of those holders of 
cabinet office, the notion that the war generation were in no position to influence 
public affairs in interwar Britain is debatable. Perhaps because the most high 
profile figures in Westminster tended to be men of additional years, historians 
have seemingly applied this theory across the parliamentary board. To be sure, 
there is little to be gained by defining a generation purely based on age - as did C.L. 
Mowat in declaring there to be exactly 100 “war generation” MPs in 1918, by which 
he meant 100 members aged 41 or less.18 Such methods offer us nothing except the 
reinforcement of old stereotypes. In any case, as we will see, Mowat was way off in 
his estimation. We must begin to dig a little deeper, and go beyond such simplistic 
assumptions. 
 War has, after all, long been considered a decisive factor in elections around 
the globe. In America, founded lest we forget by violent revolution, a man’s 
character has essentially been assessed by his bravery in the face of danger. No 
surprise then, that at the last two presidential elections - McCain-Obama and Bush-
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Kerry - the candidate with the military record has virtually defined his campaign 
upon militaristic rhetoric: “John Kerry: reporting for duty,” and such like. Similarly, 
over four decades earlier John Fitzgerald Kennedy was able to use his brave service 
in the Second World War to counteract any lingering doubts that voting for a 
Roman Catholic was somehow “un-American.” Europe too has seen its ex-
servicemen prosper politically. Whereas Hitler and Mussolini used their exploits in 
the trenches to attract members to their ‘fighting part[ies], which pursue aims 
ruthlessly, with every means, even with force,’ Charles De Gaulle would appeal to ‘a 
certain idea of France,’ ‘where all [her] sons and daughters marched towards the 
national goal, hand in hand,’ as they had supposedly done during the occupation 
(though where Vichy fitted in is anyone’s guess).19 That we do not place such 
cultural emphasis on military records in recent British elections possibly emanates 
from Churchill’s crushing defeat in 1945, and the seemingly paradoxical image of 
the heroic war leader being jettisoned by his own people. Nevertheless, that a 
Westminster election could be influenced by such ephemera is a notion we must 
consider.  
 A closer evaluation of British General Election campaigns reveals that not 
only did the Conservative Party carve itself out a moral appeal which no other 
party could match during the interwar period, but it did so by forwarding 
candidates who had just passed that ultimate test of courage: serving in the First 
World War. When we speak of the Conservative appeal to national values in this 
epoch, we cannot forget the war years. For what major party was better placed to 
capitalise on the spirit engendered by the trenches? Ramsay MacDonald had 
opposed the war in 1914, fundamentally misreading the mob in doing so, and 
though Arthur Henderson’s Cabinet service had somewhat redressed the balance, 
Labour could always be accused - as illustrated by public acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the Zinoviev letter in 1924 - as being treacherous.20 Likewise, the split 
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1934, (Exeter, 1983), 17, [Hitler on 26 October 1920]; C. de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre, 
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in the Liberal Party between Asquith and Lloyd George, exacerbated by the Maurice 
Case, meant that the other major force in British politics was poorly placed to profit 
from such a legacy, even if it included “the man who won the war.” Liberalism, as 
Michael Bentley has perceptively shown, in any case suffered from a rather 
Panglossian view of the world – believing the pre-1914 order in which they were 
ascendant would return soon enough once people worked the horrors of the war 
out of their collective system.21  Placed against these two groups, the Conservatives 
- who had patriotically served under a Liberal Premier throughout the conflict, and 
were pragmatic enough to adapt to the times - appeared very attractive indeed. 
 The war years no doubt helped the Conservative image of patriotism, but 
the point is that after 1918 such an image needed “patriots” to sell it. It seems 
doubtful that most would-be Tory MPs joined the party because Bonar Law served 
dutifully under Lloyd George or some such. Instead most took the view of Oswald 
Mosley, a man who ‘knew little of Conservative sentiment and cared less.’ ‘I was 
going into the House of Commons as one of the representatives of the war 
generation, for that purpose alone.’22 John Davidson, campaigning in Fareham, was 
not unique amongst Conservative veteran candidates in declaring himself not to be 
a ‘party politician, but a man who was out to do the very best for the welfare and 
progress of the country as a whole.’23 ‘Pre-war labels,’ as John Buchan declared, had 
essentially become ‘meaningless.’24 Presumably then, such men assumed the 
pragmatic - and accurate - belief that a modicum of influence under the Unionist 
banner was better than risking failure through association with one of the more 
radical ex-Servicemen groups, such as the Silver Badge Party (with appending anti-
Semitism) or any of the movements under the wing of Horatio Bottomley (editor of 
John Bull and later convicted of fraud).25 Toryism was also of course the creed of 
most of their ancestors, and, like Reggie Maudling two decades later, even if they 
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saw Liberal and Conservative parties as relatively similar, only the latter was free 
of chronic divisions – in short, the better bet.26 Why they chose the Conservative 
Party is almost irrelevant however. Much more important, and hitherto ignored, is 
what the Conservative Party could make of them. 
 It is strange that, whilst academics have not been shy in exploring potential 
links between Great War commemoration and post-war politics, they have been 
less willing to investigate the seemingly obvious ramifications this may have had 
concerning elections. For instance, whilst to Mayo ‘attempts to commemorate war 
unavoidably create a distinct political landscape,’ they do not portend an 
endeavour by the existing order to reinforce itself.27 Conversely, to Bob Bushaway, 
‘throughout the interwar period British society witnessed an annual event (11 
November) in which social and political unity was reaffirmed. The mass[es were] 
denied access to a political critique of the war by Kipling’s universal motto “lest we 
forget”.’28 Regardless of whether one accepts the slightly anodyne view of Mayo or 
the Oliver Stone-esque conspiracy of Bushaway, that there is a debate at all is very 
important. If the Cenotaph potentially constitutes political currency, the same must 
surely be true of Great War survivors - more so, since they can manifestly nail their 
own colours to the electoral mast, and directly apportion their own kudos to 
contemporary causes. 
2.3 Electoral Statistics 
 Investigation reveals that whilst the myth of a “lost generation” pervades 
the national consciousness, any prosopographical analysis of the House of 
Commons shows it to be false. The idea, which Robert Wohl firmly derides, that 
soldiers ‘limped home in 1919 to find…the hard-faced old men had come back and 
seized the levers of power’ is a nice story, but its validity is at least questionable.29 
Westminster was not simply a refuge for ‘hard faced men who look as if they had 
                                                           
26 See L. Baston, Reggie: The Life of Reginald Maudling, (Stroud, 2004), 36-7. 
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done very well out of the war,’ but actually, in generational terms, rather a diverse 
body.30 The numbers of men who brought to the post 1918 Commons the 
experiences outlined in the previous chapter were large, and massively 
concentrated within the Conservative ranks. The statistics make very interesting 
reading, as a turn of the page will reveal. 
  
                                                           
30 P. Williamson and E. Baldwin (eds), Baldwin Papers: A Conservative Statesman, 1908-
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Great War Veterans Elected in British General Elections, 1918-193531 
Party 1918 ‘22 ‘23 ‘24 ‘29 ‘31 ‘35 
Conservative 148 143 113 200 135 221 171 
(Non-Coupon 
Cons) 
9       
Constitutional    5    
Independent 
Government 
Supporter 
2     2 1 
Combined 
Liberal 
31 34 43 13 15 17 13 
Of which        
(Lloyd George) 22 14    1 1 
(Asquith) 8 19      
(Simonite)      8 9 
(Samuelite)      8 3 
Other Libs 1 1      
Labour Party 5 9 14 14 32 5 18 
Nat. Labour      2 4 
Independents 1 2 2 1  2 1 
Silver Badge 1       
Page Croft-ite 1       
Total 189 188 172 233 182 249 208 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
31 Compiled from M. Stenton and S. Lees, Who’s who of British Members of Parliament: a 
bibliographical dictionary of the House of Commons, based on annual volumes of ‘Dod’s 
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The above as expressed as percentages of the total parliamentary party 
Party   Year     
 1918 ‘22 ‘23 ‘24 ‘29 ‘31 ‘35 
Conservatives 39 41.5 44 48.5 52 47 44 
Combined Lib   27 9 9 24 24 
(LG Libs) 17 26      
(Asquith  Libs) 22 31      
Labour 9 6 7 9 11 10 12 
 
Consevative dominance is striking. Even though, given their electoral success, one 
would expect most veterans in the Commons to belong to that party, the scale is 
not at all proportional. This is most obviously the case in 1929 - the one election 
they clearly lost during this period. Despite recording 260 seats to Labour’s 288, 
Baldwin could call upon the support of over four times as many ex-servicemen as 
MacDonald. A.J.P Taylor’s comment that at that election, ‘the Conservatives 
appropriated patriotism,’ is thus more accurate than perhaps he realised.32 Lloyd 
George, arguably better placed to achieve veteran support, was stymied by the 
general collapse of British Liberalism, and his own failure to build the “home fit for 
heroes” after 1918.33 The 43 ex-soldier MPs he mustered in 1923 was derisory by 
Conservative standards. One can analyse the Commons many ways, but by every 
measure the average Conservative MP was likely to have had a “better” war than 
his Liberal or Socialist counterpart. The number of war medals won provides a 
                                                           
32 A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, (Oxford, 1970), 334. 
33 This should be qualified somewhat, for opinions regarding the Welshman were varied 
even during the conflict. Officers imprisoned at the Somme could believe Lloyd George 
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soldiers could be different: ‘the prisoners say that all Tommies without exception would 
like to see him on a spell in the trenches, an experience which would incline him to peace 
soon enough. The soldiers believe that he alone is to blame for the fact that the war has 
lasted such a long time and that it is still going on.’ C. Duffy, Through German Eyes: The 
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further example. 
 
Number of Military Crosses, DSOs, Victoria Crosses and French Croix de Guerres in 
Parliament34 
Party   Year     
 1918 ‘22 ‘23 ‘24 ‘29 ‘31 ‘35 
Conservative 40 34 30 55 36 60 45 
Labour 1 2 3 1 5 2 2 
LG Lib 10     1 1 
Combined 
Liberal 
(14) 15 22 6 7 (5) (4) 
Simonites      3 2 
Samuelites      1 1 
Asquith Lib 4       
Other 3   2  1  
 
All this of course did not give Bonar Law, Baldwin and Chamberlain a free ride at 
Number Ten. However, what it did provide was a moral dimension to the 
Conservative arsenal. The charismatic appeal imbued by such glamorous veterans 
complemented the party’s traditional and legal claims to authority, thus providing 
some kind of Weberian synthesis. The draw towards objects with only an arbitrary 
value - such as a war medal - is, as Hegel noted, uniquely human.35 What separates 
us from the animals is our willingness to risk our lives for reasons of pure prestige. 
Unlike any other species, we demand recognition of ourselves as human, and are 
prepared to fight to the death to achieve it. Clearly Imperial Germany - however 
much it may have constituted a threat to the British way of life - was not a direct 
threat to the life of the individual Briton before 1914. People’s willingness to fight 
was thus the fulfillment of the most innately human ideal: the desire for 
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recognition. Little wonder veterans were, and are, accorded such respect. Little 
wonder too, that the Conservative Party became seen as the “natural” party of 
government after 1918, containing as it did so many of Hegel’s “First Men.” 
 Whether there were degrees of prestige with regard to the various spheres 
of conflict is an interesting point. Aside from Gallipoli, most of the locations we 
immediately associate with the Great War are on the Western Front: the Somme, 
Ypres, Verdun, and so on. This is understandable: estimates vary but most studies 
claim around 80% of British troops saw some service in the West. Certainly ‘the 
troglodyte world’ chronicled by Graves and Blunden, and analysed by Fussell and 
others, is resolutely that of the Western Front.36 When we think of “the trenches,” 
we see rainy Belgian fields not sunny Middle Eastern desert. This may seem a 
trivial distinction, for troops fighting the Ottomans were no less brave than those 
facing the Germans, yet it is an important one. The quintessential experience for 
the British soldier was defined as trench warfare on the Western Front. To gain 
maximum political capital from their service, then, it was important that the future 
MP served in this sphere. By and large, they did: 
MPs Elected in British General Elections Having Seen Service on the Western 
Front37 
Party 1918 ‘22 ‘23 ‘24 ‘29 ‘31 ‘35 
Conservative 86 100 72 143 164 126 144 
Labour 4 7 21 10 26 5 16 
Liberal 21 25 12 10 13 15 12 
Other 4 2 2 6  4 6 
 
As a later chapter will illustrate, the effect upon parliamentary debates in the late 
1930s of having well over a hundred veterans of the century’s first German war 
was profound. That the vast majority of these were nominally bound to support 
Chamberlainian appeasement would be supremely important. For now, we need 
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simply note that Westminster’s Great War veterans had, for the most part, 
experienced the archetypal version of the 1914-18 conflict. They, and the 
Conservative Party most backed, were well placed to reap the electoral rewards. 
2.4 Selling one’s war record 
 To begin with, many Conservative candidates used their war records to 
camouflage their often scant governmental, administrative or even general life 
experience. This was quite understandable - not only was service a noble 
endeavour, but it had robbed young men of the years in which they would normally 
have gained such competences. ‘Mr Fred Henderson, who was also standing, had 
done good work at home,’ proclaimed a 1918 election letter from Lloyd George and 
Bonar Law to the Norfolk people, ‘but not better than Captain [Michael] Falcon had 
done by helping General Allenby to secure one of the greatest victories in military 
history.’38 The account of Albert Braithwaite’s candidacy in the 1926 by-election in 
Buckrose is similarly indicative. Briefly touching on the fact that Braithwaite was a 
managing director of a large Leeds-based firm, his campaign manager followed up 
by ‘mention[ing] that Major Braithwaite served in the Army as a private and rose to 
the rank of major and gained the DSO, of course, so did many others. He only 
mentioned this to show the kind of man he was.’39 This idea that a war record begat 
some kind of vague moral supremacy was certainly one Conservative campaign 
agents cottoned on to quicker than their mainstream counterparts. Leo Amery - 
prominent on the political stage before 1914 after all - devoted two pages of a 1918 
election leaflet to his war service, whilst John Loder gave over approximately one 
fifth of his 1929 version to the same.40 Contrast such bellicosity with the 1929 
veteran Liberal candidate in Brecon, Cemlyn Jones, who played upon his 
proficiency in the Welsh language rather than the war, and A.V. Alexander, whose 
Labour newspaper printed four pages in 1931 extolling his virtues without once 
                                                           
38 Norfolk News, 7 December 1918. 
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mentioning the trenches.41 Whilst Hugh Dalton’s London School of Economics 
fellowship may indeed have suggested a more competent MP than his war service, 
people vote as much with their hearts as with their heads, and perhaps his 1922 
candidacy - even in academic Cambridge - should have recognised this.42 The 
Conservatives it seems may have better understood the psychology of the masses 
who, particularly in depressed times financially, lusted after heroes from a glorious 
past. ‘Gallant commander,’ ‘the glamour of an old soldier,’ such descriptions littered 
newspaper coverage of Conservative veteran candidacies.43 Put simply, the war 
sold, and the Tories knew this. 
 Unlike their Labour opponents, Conservative candidates were virtually 
immune to any suggestion of treachery. Seymour Cocks may have written 
sympathetically to Arthur Ponsonby that the 1918 election was ‘the biggest joke of 
the century, … a joke that will wear thin,’ but one cannot ignore the fact that, 
despite Labour possessing many exponents of the war - James O’Grady, John Hodge 
and Ben Tillett - that party could perpetually be dubbed unpatriotic.44 1918 is, to 
be sure, a slight anomaly.45 Whilst, as Cocks noted, ‘the electorate evidently 
preferred the Bottomleys and Pemberton Billings to serious politicians,’ they 
would begin to change their tune.46 As Sally Harris has noted, no member of the 
Union of Democratic Control - who had opposed the war from the outset and urged 
for a negotiated peace - was elected to parliament at the khaki election, though she 
neglects to mention Neil McLean’s successful candidacy in Govan having been a 
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conscientious objector.47 This began to change: a tally of Labour MPs reveals 27 
former UDC members in the 1929 parliament (9% of the total PLP), and 13 by 
1935 (8% of the total). These figures, it may be noted, were only marginally less 
than the numbers of veterans they secured in parliament. Nevertheless, the idea 
that Labour candidates would constantly have to face accusations - particularly 
when the Tories shifted the discourse in that direction - of betraying their country 
is an important one. Gee versus MacDonald in Woolwich, as we will see, was 
perhaps apex of this. For now we may note the 1920 words of E.D. Morel, founder 
of the Union of Democratic Control, on his potential parliamentary candidacy in 
Dundee: 
 
I retreat not one inch from the position I took up on the war when it 
broke out; I stand by everything I have said and everything I have 
written during the past five years, and I would not be induced to 
compromise in this respect in the slightest degree in order to secure 
votes... [Y]ou would have to be prepared for an avalanche of mud being 
thrown at your candidate, if I were your man. Mud no doubt is always 
thrown at elections, but this would be something quite special and 
peculiar, and quite out of the ordinary. There are a number of influential 
persons in governing circles who would move heaven and earth to keep 
me out of Parliament, and no calumny would be too vile, and no charge 
too grotesque for them to launch. In that respect they would stick at 
nothing.48 
 
 One method of highlighting such discrepancies in the party’s war records, 
clearly, was the production of the Phoenix Generation come election time - for not 
by chance would Morel’s opponent be that great self-publicist, Winston Spencer 
Churchill. 
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 As alluded to previously, the war resolved the masculine-feminine balance 
in British society decisively in favour of the former. Despite women being given the 
vote as reward for the sterling efforts many had shown between 1914 and 1918, 
the ultimate test of humanity had become one’s courage in the face of danger. 
Manliness was in, effeteness out. This had consequences concerning election 
campaigns as Jon Lawrence notes; ‘between the wars, displays of bravado from the 
platform [were] viewed with remarkable indulgence. Time and again newspapers 
reported, without hint of disapproval, incidents where candidates invited hecklers 
onto the platform to sort things out like men.’49 Whilst the violence inherent in the 
political “brawl” worried sections of right-wing opinion predisposed to see ‘a 
deeply rooted pathology within the social system,’ this fear was exclusively applied 
to the collective mob, not the candidates themselves.50 When Oliver Locker-
Lampson surrounded himself with a fascistic militia, left his platform to grab a 
cheeky questioner by the tie and the hair, and addressed a meeting that escalated 
into a collection of free fights, the Birmingham Gazette proclaimed itself ‘amazed,’ 
but scarcely critical.51 The character of interwar electioneering was clearly tailored 
towards men. In part this was tactical, before 1928 women needed to be nine years 
older than men to vote, but even after the “flappers” entered the electoral playing 
field no party exactly chased the female vote - though most were prepared to blame 
the supposedly unpredictable woman voter when they lost.52 If Edwardian society 
had been chauvinistic, the war reinforced within people’s minds that this was 
indeed logical.53 The Times spoke for many in declaring that women should be 
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spared the rough and tumble of the political meeting, and others noted the lack of 
feminine presence at such occasions.54 If homes should be fit for male heroes, 
elections were, in part, treated in a tacitly similar vein. 
 At the same time, women - even before 1928 - possessed a useful role in the 
mindset of the Tory electoral machine. Violence, to be sure, was a male preserve: 
the war had been seen to vindicate that. Yet a distinction had to be wrought 
between the kind of rough and tumble seen at Tory meetings like Locker-
Lampson’s, and that at the other parties, most obviously Labour. Sometimes subtly, 
often not, the Conservatives were trying to draw a fault line between the 
ephemeral appeal both parties offered. Thus a Cambridge newspaper could report 
the Conservative candidate Captain Briscoe saying ‘that the Red Flag and the Union 
Jack could not fly together. (Applause). The day that the Red Flag was hoisted over 
the country, the Union Jack must go down. He meant to see that the Union Jack was 
kept flying.’55 Whilst the two parties were in fact acting little different - for all the 
symbolic importance, they were essentially just waving flags at one another - it was 
the intention of the Tory propaganda machine to hammer home the divergence in 
tone. So it was with political violence. This, as Lawrence crucially points out, was 
no longer an exclusively male polity.56 The boorish nature of pre-1914 politics 
would no longer do, particularly if Labour was to be portrayed as thuggish, 
disorganized hooligans. Thus war veterans were very useful – fulfilling traditional 
masculine images of bravery and strength, and not alienating women by virtue of 
their previous gallantry. If things got rough, the audience was seen as being in the 
right hands. 
 In other regards however, the war changed the character of the British 
electoral map. Whilst we tend to think of the effect of conflict in national terms - in 
this sense, that a notable percentage of potential voters had been killed - war 
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trauma was in fact felt more deeply at a local level. Lutyen’s Cenotaph may have 
become the centrepiece for collective mourning, but it is scarcely possible to find a 
town in Britain that does not commemorate its own fallen sons. In an age where 
unifying concepts such as regular cross country travel and a national mass media 
were only just starting to become familiar, the world was a lot smaller. 
Grandstanding on issues of national importance was obviously necessary on 
occasion, but MPs were and are elected at a local level. Here a war record offered 
two distinct advantages. Firstly, service in a local regiment was perfect local 
newspaper fodder. Christopher Lowther, speaking as a Coalition Conservative in 
1918, was fervently keen to point out that he had ‘made a great many friends in 
[the Cumberland Yeomanry],’ and could ‘honestly say it was in a way perhaps the 
happiest time of my life when I was with all these excellent fellows from this 
county.’57  Excellent fellows who would presumably pay him back on polling day. 
Put simply, being a native of – or having some connection like war service to - one’s 
intended seat counted for much more than in contemporary times. Jack Strange, 
the gardener of Major Philip Colfox, was accordingly despatched to a meeting of the 
Liberal Candidate, a Welsh Methodist Minister named Chapel, to ask him the way to 
Halstock – a remote nearby town – in the dark. During the same campaign, Colfox 
was able to scrape home despite local newspapers reporting ‘the Major has done it 
now’ after he angrily responded to Chapel’s prediction of victory: ‘if you think that 
you are a bigger B.F. than I thought you were.’ These were local elections fought 
with regard to local sensibilities: ‘a great local character’ like Colfox could get away 
with much. 58 
 Secondly, many areas of the British Isles - Scapa Flow and Portsmouth for 
example - had essentially been on the front line, and were thus particularly attuned 
to the importance of whether one had fought or not. In the years immediately 
following the war, local press coverage could be consequently vitriolic. Hull, hit by 
German bombing raids during the war, is a good case in point. Throughout the 
1918 campaign The Hull Daily News was in virtual hysterics: ‘The Zeppelins Foul 
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Work: Striking Record of German Infamy’; ‘What Hull will Never Forget: The 
Murderous Work of the Zeppelins’; ‘More pictures of Zeppelin Raid Damage.’59 That 
Hull would return four MPs with some form of patriotic war service - including 
three Coalition Conservatives - perhaps comes as little surprise amidst such a 
heady atmosphere. The war naturally did not remove traditional barometers such 
as class and wealth from the political equation, but it provided a further plain on 
which contests could be fought, and one in which the Conservatives held a distinct 
advantage. 
2.5 Veterans Against Non-Combatants 
 Some caution is necessary however. One does not wish to overemphasise 
the importance of a war record, for it was no guarantee of positive coverage. The 
case of Robert Gee serves ample notice of this. Gee was clearly a brave man, whose 
heroism we encountered in chapter one. That his opponent in the 1921 by-election 
at Woolwich should be Ramsay MacDonald, whose stance in 1914 had brought him 
social (even his son disagreed) and political isolation, constitutes one of history’s 
more amusing ironies.60 Almost from the outset, Gee - backed by that rogue Horatio 
Bottomley - seems to have decided to make the contest purely based on the 
differences between his and MacDonald’s wars. When addressing constituents, Gee 
‘asked them to vote for the man who fought for his country - not for the man who 
was a friend of every country but his own.’61 He would go on to declare himself 
‘desirous on this and every occasion of preventing mischievous men from entering 
the House of Commons, and particularly those who in time of stress and peril did 
nothing… to back the men who were fighting their country’s battles.’62 Gee crossed 
a line, no question. Tellingly according to the local newspaper, ‘in the view of some 
experienced electioneers’ the MacDonald equals traitor ‘innuendo has been 
pressed a little too hard at the Coalition meetings. Voters would like to know a little 
more about what the gallant Captain will do when he sits in the House of 
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Commons.’63 Gee constitutes something of an extreme case - unlike a Mosley or 
Eden he was not a career politician, and not only did he not adhere to the rules of 
the game, he probably did not even understand them. Nevertheless, his success 
must be acknowledged, defeating as he did a future Prime Minister in one of 
Labour’s traditional strongholds. 
 Whilst no doubt veterans proved an asset to the Conservative Party, it 
should also be stressed that contemporary politicians needed such men to prevent 
the fermentation of discontent, and conserve the status quo against any 
revolutionary zeal. As Stephen Ward has shown, particularly in the years 
immediately following 1918, the prospects for revolution in Great Britain were 
arguably as high as any time since Chartism in the mid-nineteenth century.64 The 
only way British homes were fit for heroes after 1918 was that you needed to be a 
hero to live in one. When the Liberal Party in Brecon asked people in 1924 to ‘vote 
for [the incumbent] Jenkins who is all out for ex-Servicemen,’ it simply could not fly 
in the face of Lloyd George’s failure to deliver upon his famous pledge.65 Though 
Jenkins had paid high tribute to ex-servicemen when unveiling a local war 
memorial, he himself had not served, and the soldierly vote deserted him to the 
Conservative Captain Walter D’Arcy Hall, whose Military Cross and Croix de Guerre 
were worth a thousand valedictory speeches. Conversely, whilst campaigning in 
Buckrose, one of Albert Braithwaite’s supporters was able to claim that ‘no man in 
Leeds had worked harder than Maj. Braithwaite had done on behalf of the 
pensioners, and the discharged soldiers, or done more to help those who had 
contracted illnesses during the war.’ He was met with sustained applause.66 
Therein lay the difference.  
 Even if such veterans subsequently expressed real animosity towards those 
non-combatants who entered parliament having allegedly profited during the war, 
they themselves provided the necessary antidote for a Conservative party that 
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might otherwise have appeared a little selfish. ‘The 1919 House of Commons’ to 
Philip Lloyd-Greame was a curious amalgam of ‘men who had served in the war; 
but with that leaven an admixture of war profiteers.’67 Alongside the Liberal 
maverick Joseph Kenworthy he would be praised by the Daily Mail as being the 
polar opposite to the ’war profiteers [who were] content to have achieved for a 
time the social distinction of being an MP.’68 Mosley too noted that whilst ‘the 
soldiers back from the war were not all idealists and the businessmen were not all 
war profiteers…there was a certain psychological division. The war generation was 
more disposed to take the 1918 programmes seriously.’69 This was rather lucky, 
for as Baldwin wrote to his mother in 1919, the ‘prevailing type’ of Conservative 
MP was ‘a rather successful-looking business kind which is not very attractive.’70 
Not every politician would be as generous as the future party leader himself - who 
in 1919 would anonymously write off £150,000, twenty per cent of his estate, to 
the government.71 That ex-soldier MPs provided a visible alternative to the forces 
‘out for what they can get during the war,’ men that made Baldwin ‘sick,’ was an 
important point in smoothing over the slightly tarnished Conservative 
reputation.72 
2.6 A Different Type of Candidate? 
 Whether veteran Tory candidates actually offered anything massively 
dissimilar from their non-combatant counterparts is debatable. Certainly they were 
more prone to hyperbole. ‘Before the war,’ declared Davidson in Fareham, ‘it had 
been said that [we] were a decadent race, but this had been proved incorrect. Men 
had performed acts of valour equal to any in the history of the nation.’73  Like 
Oswald Spengler, many ex-servicemen candidates proclaimed the Great War to be 
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‘a type of historical change of phase.’74 It formed ‘the point of contact,’ as Buchan 
noted, ’of a world vanishing and a world arriving.’75 Where, as Runciman argues, 
after 1945 British society did not drastically evolve, in the years following 1918 it 
was very much seen as doing so, and veteran politicians played their part in 
stoking such feeling.76 Addressing a League of Youth meeting in October 1919, 
Mosley pointed to a group of men that ‘has learnt to distrust old age and loath its 
activities,’ adding ‘the opportunity of youth is at this moment unbounded.’77 The 
discontent that many veterans began to feel as time passed was not therefore so 
much a result of the contemporary picture, though things were indeed bad, but 
how the Britain of reality measured up to the one they dreamed of in 1918. Indeed, 
as early as 1923, veteran politicians were already admitting that slogans uttered in 
the fervour of 1918 were unhelpful. Ernest Brown, standing as a Liberal and holder 
of the Military Cross, declared that year in Rugby that rhetoric such as ‘hang the 
Kaiser’ and ‘Britain for the British’ was ‘well intentioned’ but ‘bore no relation to 
reality.’78 When we later turn to veterans murmuring against Baldwin and 
Chamberlain, it must always be borne in mind how far such views were 
determined by the ex-soldier’s own tendency towards exaggeration in the period 
immediately following the Armistice. The pressure of, as Mosley put it, ‘betray[ing] 
the trust that was placed in us by thousands of our generation who marched with 
us on the greatest of all crusades,’ and ‘who perished confident that a regenerated 
world would arise from their ashes,’ was simply too much.79 
 One must acknowledge that such vague talk in part reflected a basic lack of 
knowledge, understandable given the war years had robbed Conservative 
candidates of their usual schooling at Oxford or Cambridge. At a meeting of farmers 
with his Liberal opponent Henry Vanney, Braithwaite was forced to admit that, 
contrary to his opponents long standing membership of the National Farmers 
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Union and knowledge ‘about foot and mouth,’ ‘he did not profess to be a practical 
farmer, and could not solve all ills.’80 Similarly, Henry Page Croft would bemoan the 
fighting of his sacred tariff cause in 1923. ‘There was a new generation of 
politicians who “knew not Joseph”,’ he complained. ‘Most of our candidates only 
entered political life after the war, and not one in ten of them had the remotest idea 
how to state the tariff case.’81 Given such occasional gaps in experience, it is slightly 
ironic that in 1935 one veteran, Harold Balfour, felt qualified to give a series of 
lectures explaining the parliamentary system in the most inanely simple fashion: 
‘You may ask why should the King send for one of just a few men? Why not one of 
many others? The answer is that these men are Party Leaders.’82 Hardly a new 
Hobbes or Locke. Such veterans, however brave they had been in the war, were 
also prone to be less than illuminating in times of peace.  
 Perhaps because the ex-serviceman gained a more rounded profile as the 
years went by, it is likewise important to note that the appeal of the veteran did not 
experience greatly diminishing returns. In the late 1930s electioneers were still 
keen to point to their candidates bravery some two decades earlier. In 1935 the 
local Conservative newspaper spoke with pride that ‘[Lord William] Scott…had war 
service in France and Flanders from 1915 to 1918, with the 10th Hussars, being 
awarded the MC.’ Even in 1938, with another conflict becoming a distinct 
possibility, Henry Willink was portrayed as a ‘real man’s man,’ his service at the 
Somme, and Military Cross being held up by a Conservative Central Office keen to 
‘devote a section [of the Ipswich by-election material] to the War.’83 Once in 
parliament, veterans clung to their military titles. Harry remained “Captain 
Crookshank” until 1951 following the pattern of most ex-servicemen in 
maintaining publicly their military rank until elevation to the Privy Council 
(Lieutenant Colonel Rt. Hon Samuel Hoare was a notable exception). Thus in 1937: 
Brigadier General Louis Spears, Rear Admiral Murray Sueter, Captain Rt Hon Euan 
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Wallace, Brigadier-General Henry Page Croft, and so on.84 Though he had been a 
King’s Counsellor for decades, Charles Loseby still used the “MC” in his title as late 
as 1967 - possibly to offset the dubious nature of his later legal career.85 
Appropriation of the memory of the trenches was thus a permanent process, 
particularly for a Conservative Party increasingly needing, or at least choosing, to 
sell itself as “National.” 
2.7 A Consensus in the Making? 
 The move towards a “National” spirit at elections is an interesting 
phenomenon. One can of course trace its roots back to Benjamin Disraeli, however 
the post 1918 years were equally vital in its progression. Most historians have 
understandably attributed this to Baldwin, speaking as he did of a national ‘spirit of 
brotherhood in which alone great things can be accomplished.’86 Yet Baldwin 
himself was profoundly influenced by the message preached by his younger 
supporters. Let us not forget, Britain was governed for over half the interwar 
period by a peacetime coalition government, which in the modern era is almost 
unthinkable. That this came to pass was partly a result of the rhetoric of former 
soldiers, men to whom, after all, the notion of partnership had previously been one 
of life or death. Coalitions may be made by leaders, but they are held together by 
the rank and file. Thus when Leo Amery - Conservative to the core before 1914 and 
even prepared to risk civil war lest Ulster be handed over to Catholic ‘chinks’ - 
starts in 1918 to denounce the old party divisions, …the old party catchwords, 
…the old party prejudices,’ people listen. That such an ideologue could spout the 
following not only reflects a certain amnesia, but a genuine evolution in thought: 
‘have we already forgotten to what a plight the old party business brought us 
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before?’87 Evidently, in some respects, he had. 
 As Geoffrey Searle has illustrated, ‘the quest for national government has 
been a continuous feature of modern British politics.’88 That this search would find 
fulfillment in 1918, 1931, 1935 and - most importantly, and most fully - in 1940, 
owes much to the articulation of such a spirit by the Phoenix Generation of 
politicians. In 1918, as Searle notes, a radical like Mosley was by no means unique 
amidst a ‘sense of shared purpose [to unite] people of widely different 
backgrounds.’89 Thus spoke ex-serviceman Richard Colvin in Epping, ‘the 
reconstruction of our social life…can best be accomplished by the combined 
action of all Parties, and must not be hampered or delayed by Party politics 
and Party strife.’90 Indeed, Conservative candidates such as John Birchall in Leeds 
generally articulated a greater antipathy to the ‘party or caucus system’ than their 
Liberal or Labour veteran counterparts.91 Liberals in particular seemed to have 
envisaged the party game continuing a little longer: in Barnstaple their nominee 
John Tudor Rees was asked whether he would support a Coalition Government if it 
came into conflict with Liberal principles. His answer was brevity itself, ‘No.’92 This 
was clearly a trend carried over from the war, for the Conservative Party was the 
only major force that had not split over the issue of how the conflict should be 
waged, and thus possessed a greater post-war homogeneity. 
 As we will further explore, even if some of these figures rejected outright 
fusion with Lloyd George in the early 1920s or National Labour in the 1930s, such 
sympathy for traditionally non-Conservative causes was not merely sop for the 
electorate. Whilst pre-war Conservative radicals may have forwarded policies such 
as tariff reform and the development of social welfare which the post-1918 
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generation may well have agreed with, they also proposed large expansion of the 
Armed Forces, militant resistance to Home Rule in Ireland, and rejection of pretty 
much every Labour Party initiative which a man such as Harold Macmillan would 
have found anathema.93 There was a marked difference in the type of Tory 
radicalism projected to the electorate by John Loder to that of Lord Milner, Leo 
Maxse and others before 1918. Thus, when speaking to the people, the Loder 
generation showed ‘a recognition that the masses, even if personally industrious, 
live perennially on the edge of an abyss, their normal earnings never sufficing to 
provide for even the ordinary emergencies.’94 Having fought alongside honest 
Tommy Atkins, middle class Tories could no longer dismiss the working class as 
parasitic, scarcely even British untermenschen.95 Edward Wood articulated an even 
greater change in his Great Opportunity - published on the eve of the 1918 election. 
 
The war…has taught all parties much. Labour leaders, with few 
exceptions have proved that they really represent their organisation in 
giving disinterested and patriotic support to the national cause. It is to 
be hoped that the days when recognition of trade union leaders as 
spokesmen in industrial disputes was refused have gone.96   
 
This was a profound statement for a Conservative to make at election time. Even if 
1919 and 1926 would render the hope of Wood’s last sentence a little unfulfilled, 
the war, most clearly recognised by its combatants, had brought the left “into the 
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nation.” If Britannia were to rule the waves, it first had to reconcile its own internal 
differences.  If the Tory party was to dominate at elections, it needed to recognise 
this fact.  
 Yet if the war provided men such as Wood with a mindset broadly more 
sympathetic to the plight of the average worker, their socialistic world view was 
completed by exposure to such people in their domestic abodes. The spectre of a 
man such as Oswald Mosley - heir to a baronetcy no less - campaigning in the 
Birmingham slums, even after his defection to Labour, was admittedly bizarre. 
Stories circulated of Mosley leaving his Rolls-Royce outside the city centre and 
changing into a modest Ford. Oliver Baldwin even jovially asked him ‘where’s the 
champagne?’ when inspecting his pub lunch of fish and chips.97 Beyond such 
amusement, something rather profound was occurring however. To a man such as 
Alfred Duff Cooper, campaigning in Oldham was as big a culture shock as the war 
years. ‘I learnt a great deal in Oldham,’ he later wrote. ‘I had no idea before I went 
there that in every ward of a great industrial city there were working men’s clubs 
devoted to each of the three political parties. There were eleven Conservative clubs 
in Oldham and each had to be visited at least once a year.’98 Such visits gave him 
the chance to hear the ordinary man’s complaints, discuss potential solutions, and 
gave him a greater overall understanding of his mentality. Before 1924 Duff Cooper 
had been a Die Hard, seeing the right of the party as remaining true to Conservative 
tradition. Yet ‘in Oldham I had a glimpse of the condition of the people and had 
realised that a man’s head must be as wrong as his heart who denied the need of 
social reform.’99 A great change was afoot. 
2.8 Geographical Divides 
 Acknowledging such leftwards movement however, the scale of 
Conservative victories within this period remains shocking. In 1923, when 
Baldwin’s tariff reform policy flops at the ballot box, places outside the Tory 
heartland such as Sheffield Hallam, Hull North West and Sedgefield - future 
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constituency of Labour’s most successful Prime Minister no less  - still return 
Conservatives: those who fought in the First World War. Even in the electoral 
annus horibilis of 1929, a few marginal seats represented by war generation 
candidates - Aberdeen and Kincardine Central, Chippenham, Yeovil and the like - 
do go Baldwin’s way. Clearly however in the latter case, this was not a universal 
trend. As Charmley has pointed out, those Conservative MPs first elected in the 
deluge of 1924 faced a much tougher time than the generation of 1923.100 As one 
such 1924 Phoenix Generation debutant Cuthbert Headlam constantly bemoaned, 
the previous years intake enjoyed a far easier electoral ride.101 Whereas the 1923 
ex-servicemen MPs found southern constituencies such as Cambridgeshire, 
Worcester and Hitchin, most of the following year’s additions to the Commons 
came from northern, working class, areas in Labour’s heartland. Unlike the 
Anthony Edens of the world, safe in the knowledge they would always - even in a 
1929 nightmare - be returned, men like Headlam believed themselves to be little 
use to the party save swelling the backbenches, and fighting tough contests “the 
coming men” needed to be spared.102 
 Indeed, there does seem to be a discrepancy between those elected in 1923 
and 1924. Of the twelve veteran MPs elected in 1923 who faced a contest in 1929, 
only two lost: Leonard Ropner in Sedgefield, and Alan McLean in Norfolk - the 
latter by less than 800 votes. In contrast, the 1924 intake served extremely badly. 
Of the 50 ex-servicemen to contest in 1929, over half (29) lost.103  The defeats 
could also be massive: Arthur Hope, armed with his Military Cross and Croix de 
Guerre, lost Nuneaton by over 12,000 votes; Christopher Brooke, with his DSO, 
dropped Pontefract by over 7,000. Fifteen of the twenty three losers were defeated 
by over two thousand votes. In defeat however - as Page Croft had declared of 
protectionism in 1923 - such Conservative candidates fought the good leftist fight. 
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Two of the four authors of Industry and the State, a book espousing passionate 
leftist Conservatism to a tee, would lose.104 They were however fighting in Stockton 
and Leicester, not traditionally safe Tory seats. In such areas it was vital war 
generation MPs made the argument for a more progressive Conservative policy, 
even if, in 1929, it was often doomed to failure. Baldwin, as we will see, would have 
to serve two masters: the Die Hards and the advanced young democrats. If all the 
Conservatives had offered at the ballot box was the Imperialism of Lloyd, the anti-
socialism of Churchill and the bizarrely moralistic rants of William Joynson Hicks, 
they would have headed for an even larger defeat.  
 Headlam may have, with some justification, seen his missing the 1929-31 
parliament as detrimental to his future chances of promotion, but the cohort who 
suffered defeat in 1929 with him provided something great in defeat. In an election 
fought on an anodyne, if not completely implausible policy of “safety first,” it was 
important that those radical elements in Conservatism stood up - if only to counter 
Lloyd George’s pledge that We Can Conquer Unemployment. Lloyd George’s claims 
to be able to institute a massive scheme of public works ‘without inflation and 
without increasing the scale of taxation’ may seem unrealistic in retrospect, but his 
view that ‘the determination to succeed is half the battle’ may well have struck a 
chord against a seemingly lethargic Baldwinian line.105 Thus, whilst Macmillan was 
‘very properly’ voted out, ‘there was no ill feeling, for both my wife and I were 
popular.’106 If the official party line of ‘safety meant the dole’ - both for the ordinary 
worker, and disposed MP - such progressives at least possessed the comfort of 
knowing they had argued against ‘an economic theory and system which had long 
ceased to have any validity.’107 As we will see, Stuart Ball’s view that post 1945 
Macmillan-Butler Conservatism was essentially a reaction to Baldwin’s economic 
caution cannot be fully sustained across the board, but the divergence in spirit - if 
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not always policy - in this period was already marked.108 Industry and the State, 
even with a leader with whom the YMCA generation could seemingly do business,  
‘was heresy in traditional Conservative circles, since it advocated a state role in 
industry and the Daily Mail denounced it as socialism in disguise.’109 Macmillan 
could thus argue for its implementation at election time, but the final decision 
would always be Baldwin’s, and the electorate knew this. In any case, the absence 
from the 1929-31 parliament (or most of it) of men such as Macmillan, Loder and 
Duff Cooper would as profoundly effect the expansionist efforts of Mosley and 
Lloyd George, as it would the path of contemporary Conservatism. Most of the 1929 
losers were back in the House through the essentially free ride of 1931 (still in time 
to see much of the slump), and in more amenable southern constituencies - St 
George’s for Duff, Lewes for Loder. If the 1923ers faced a simpler electoral path 
than those elected a year later, let us not overestimate the significance of this 
pattern. During 1929-31, in any case, the Conservatives were out of office: in terms 
of progression within the forces of Unionism, it was not the worst parliament to 
miss.110 
2.9 Moving Beyond the Myths 
 It seems to be a myth every bit as potent as the complete annihilation of 
British youth in the trenches that the war generation politicians first burned 
brightly, then had their hope, and careers, extinguished. Presumably the career of 
Oswald Mosley accounts for much of this. As we have seen however, this is 
unhelpful. There were over 200 MPs with experience of the Great War in the House 
of Commons throughout the 1930s. Neville Chamberlain’s first cabinet of 1937 
contained 11 former soldiers, including the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon, and Secretary for War Leslie Hore-
Belisha. The landslides of 1931 and 1935 may have seen some getting lost in the 
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shuffle, but at least veterans were in parliament in the first place. Indeed, with the 
election in 1928 of Edward FitzRoy - wounded at the battle of Ypres - as Speaker of 
the House of Commons, veterans were well placed to make a parliamentary impact. 
The average year a veteran Conservative MP first elected to the Commons in 1918 
would bow out of politics was, coincidentally, 1929. Thus even the run of the mill 
political plodder had over a decade to make his mark. The idea that, in electoral 
terms, the war generation was denied opportunity is only partly sustainable - and 
when we turn to the career of Mosley, and how so few Tory radicals followed his 
path, an important notion. If some fell out of the loop, it was not always the fault of 
a supposedly out of touch party hierarchy. Baldwin may indeed have ‘frustrated the 
coming younger men’ on occasion, but the war generation was certainly given a fair 
crack of the whip come election time. If Headlam lost Barnard Castle in 1935, when 
National candidates swept the board yet again, this was not necessarily the fault of 
the party leader, Neville Chamberlain, Lord Hailsham or other old men who had 
done “well out of the war.” Most war veterans prospered and had opportunity 
enough to make a difference: they were a permanent feature of interwar British 
politics. 
 That most rallied to the Conservative banner was an essential pattern if one 
wants to truly understand the outcome of contemporary elections. In order to 
persuade a sizeable proportion of the population to vote against their economic 
interest, which, given successive Conservative administrations’ complete failure to 
solve the problem of ‘endemic’ unemployment seems an accurate assertion, the 
party had to offer the electorate something.111 One can concentrate, as critics of the 
left have done, on propagandistic portrayals of Labour as propagating an ‘alien and 
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foreign heresy.’112 One must also note the tactical isolation of David Lloyd George 
by Stanley Baldwin, but eventually one has to recognise the merits of Conservatism 
during this period. Later chapters will have much to say deriding both the proto-
Hayekian school of thought that state intervention was per se a dangerous thing, 
and the cowardice of both the party leadership and Phoenix Generation in failing to 
challenge such notions, yet we must also acknowledge the great electoral 
achievement of Baldwinian Conservatism. As Mark Mazower has powerfully 
shown, ‘today it is hard to see the inter-war experiment with democracy for the 
novelty it was: yet we should certainly not assume that democracy is suited to 
Europe. Though we may like to think democracy’s victory in the Cold War proves 
its deep roots in Europe’s soil, history tells us otherwise.’113  
 Indeed, after 1918 only on the continent’s northern fringes did effective 
parliamentary rule survive. One reads much, particularly from Conservative 
thinkers, that the British are somehow innately democratic. ‘In England the 
[democratic] beliefs of the Right are descended from the beliefs of a great mass of 
people held for hundreds of years,’ wrote Walter Elliot MC, they are ‘based on the 
observation of life and not on a priori reasoning.’114 This is as simplistic as 
assuming all Englishmen drink tea and ride big red buses. In fact, if one believes 
Stanley Baldwin, it was only ‘since 1918 [that] this country has become a 
democracy.’115 One might even more accurately say it did so in 1928. The interwar 
years saw not only the emergence onto the public stage of fascism and communism 
therefore, but also introduced the notion of genuine parliamentary accountability 
into the political culture. At the ballot box, the Conservative Party, and the forces of 
stability if not creation, needed a selling point to keep voters away from the 
revolutionaries. To suggest the British people almost vote Conservative in some 
kind of unthinking fugue is simply insulting. Yet it is difficult to explain how Britain 
rejected seemingly viable alternatives to Conservatism. To do so required two 
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elements: the successful portrayal of non-Conservative political movements as 
“unpatriotic,” and the suppression - whether by the carrot or the stick - of those 
forces within the party who might have rocked the boat. It was a delicate balancing 
act. The first, as we have seen, was accomplished in part by the unsubtle 
brandishing of veteran candidates come election time. The second was a little more 
complex. It is to that question, and Stanley Baldwin’s role within it that forms the 
basis for our next chapter. 
113 
 
3: The Baldwin Enigma 
 
In a talk with G[eoffrey] L[loyd] he referred to [his senior colleagues] as having no 
vision and talked of his wish to retire at such a time as he could hand over to a 
younger man. G.L. and I talked of his preference for younger men and his 
understanding of them. 
- Rab Butler’s take on Stanley Baldwin during the 1930 leadership crisis.1 
 
Have you any outstanding young men in the Commons coming along? 
No, not one. 
- Baldwin in private conversation with Thomas Jones, 1934.2 
3.1 Baldwin’s position 
If the previous chapter was an analysis of how power can be gained, this one 
constitutes an interpretation of how it can be wielded. ‘How’ is a very crucial word 
here. British politics, as Rab Butler noted, is The Art of the Possible.3 To understand 
why statesmen act the way they do, one must understand the parameters in which 
they operate. Excepting the dictatorships - and even Hitler has been dubbed a 
“weak dictator” - power is always a relative concept. Thus, inter-parliamentary 
relationships matter. A leader can only be as powerful, as forceful, as ideologically 
vigorous as the people around them allow. Power is a two way process: a leader 
may command, but needs followers. In other words, why things happen depend on 
how they came to pass: nothing is automatic. These may seem truisms, but they are 
important. 
 This is particularly important in the case of Stanley Baldwin to whom we 
now turn. Baldwin’s place in British history is bizarre. In popular culture he almost 
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fits the title of Robert Blake’s book on Bonar Law, The Unknown Prime Minister.4 In 
the 2002 BBC poll to determine the 100 Greatest Britons, Baldwin failed to make a 
list that included contemporaries such as Nye Bevan and Lloyd George, and 
controversial figures such as Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher. In the spectre 
of Churchillian heroes, and Chamberlainite villains, he has seemingly become 
rather lost in the mists of time. Without wishing to concentrate on one book, for it 
is indeed excellent, the title of Graham Stewart’s Burying Caesar: Churchill, 
Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party, is symptomatic of a wider 
phenomenon.5 The most influential and indicative Conservative politician of his 
epoch, Stanley Baldwin, has been largely written out of a narrative that was 
essentially his own. 
 Where historians have commented, the divergence of opinion on Baldwin, 
for such a mild mannered man, has been surprisingly marked. As with much 
concerning this period, the critical side of the debate stems hugely from Winston 
Spencer Churchill. One entry in the index of The Gathering Storm was enough to 
sink a reputation: ‘Baldwin, Rt. Hon Stanley…confesses putting party before 
country.’6 A Baldwin parliamentary speech from 1936 is quoted thus: 
 
Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was 
rearming, and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific 
democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think 
of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of 
view more certain.7 
 
This, Churchill concludes 
was indeed appalling frankness. It carried naked truth about his 
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motives into indecency. That a Prime Minister should avow that he had 
not done his duty in regard to national safety because he was afraid of 
losing the election was an incident without parallel in our 
Parliamentary history…[It was] less than justice to the British people.8 
 
This claim appears highly debatable, even potentially libelous - at any rate, as 
Robert Blake acknowledged as early as 1960, ‘it has no justification.’9 Whereas 
Churchill implies that Baldwin is referring to the General Election of 1935, a 
cursory glance at the speech reveals he is in fact discussing the Fulham by-election 
of 1933, and the need for the country to convince itself - not be dictated to or lied 
to from on high - of the dangers that lay ahead. ‘I think,’ Baldwin went on to say, 
‘the country learned by certain events that took place during the winter of 1934-5 
what the perils might be to it…We got from the country [in the 1935 election] - 
with a large majority - a mandate for doing a thing that no one, twelve months 
before, would have believed possible.’10 The notion that Baldwin stabbed the 
nation in the back for personal gain at the 1935 General Election is therefore a 
decidedly shaky one, but perhaps with the view that “there is no smoke without 
fire” many have seen fit to denigrate him on a range of issues in its stead.  
 Such was the climate, that when even using the word ‘Baldwin’ in the 
postwar 1945 epoch, Tories were careful to highlight to listeners when they did not 
mean Stanley.11 Whereas Baldwin’s son Arthur found it difficult to publish his 
sympathetic 1955 account ‘involving as it did some necessary criticisms of 
Churchill,’ post-war attacks on the man were aplenty.12 Though acknowledging his 
efforts in healing industrial strife, biographies by G.M. Young, and later Keith 
Middlemass and John Barnes, told the story of a man lethargic in the face of 
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impending danger, even though both had set out to try and rehabilitate him.13 This 
was a charge hit further home by Dilks’s and Macmillan’s accounts of the 1970s, 
which argued that whilst Baldwin may have started with good intentions, tiredness 
rendered him ineffective as a leader after the General Strike.14 As even a relatively 
supportive commentator, Blake, notes, the Conservative Party - in massive part due 
to Baldwin’s vapid leadership - had no clue what to do with the power it managed 
to acquire between the two wars.15 Thus, the story goes, Britain spiralled almost 
imperceptibly downwards: unemployment, Indian devolution, the abdication of 
Edward VIII, all being allowed to happen with little concerted resistance from on 
high. The ensuing national lack of confidence, according to Skidelsky, begat 
appeasement and the Second World War.16 
 We will address foreign policy, Churchill and Chamberlain later. If one 
wants to understand specifically conservative politics between the wars, these are 
not the things to concentrate on however. Foreign policy, as we will see, was an 
issue even the seemingly most staunch government supporter - or denouncer - 
could vacillate on. Equally, though their isolation has perhaps been overplayed, 
both Churchill and Chamberlain were occasionally representative of somewhat 
narrow sections of their party. Chamberlain was a punctilious pedant, according to 
Headlam ‘more machine than man.’17 Though Macmillan would later acknowledge 
him as ‘one of the great reformers’ for his work as Minister of Health in the 1920s, 
the two would barely speak for the entirety of the 1929 parliament.18 He could 
often lack, to return to Headlam, that ‘spark of humanity.’19 Churchill, if more 
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deliberately casting himself as a maverick, was similarly polarising. The times he 
was on the “wrong side” of an argument are almost too numerous to list: Gallipoli; 
threatening war over Chanak; the return to the Gold Standard; India, the abdication 
and many more. Even for a young man looking for a political patron, he was a 
dangerous prospect to be treated with the utmost caution. For all his flaws then, as 
Blake argues, it was Baldwin who ‘represented with singular accuracy the mood of 
a nation wearied by the sufferings of war and its aftermath.’20 He may at times have 
appeared simultaneously ‘unideological’ to the Die Hards like George Lloyd, the 
Chamberlainite bureaucrats and the young progressives of this study, but who was 
more indicative of a nation still seeking ontological meaning after the recent 
holocaust?21 
 Baldwin’s principle misfortune lies not in the criticism that has been 
levelled, nor the retaliatory defences. The hagiographies of the man, for instance, 
sometimes verge on the hilarious. Bechhofer Roberts’s Stanley Baldwin: Man or 
Miracle? poses the taxing question, ‘[b]irth, merit or accident: which is the basis of 
his greatness?’22 Presumably viewing the British political scene through the lens of 
Mack Sennett, he concludes Baldwin to be a second ‘Charlie Chaplin, who wins our 
affectionate pity with his shoulder-shrugging, cane-twiddling renunciation of 
unattainable triumphs.’23 Similarly, the anthropological preoccupation biographers 
have had with his Anglo-Celtic heritage does not really astound or illuminate, even 
if the notion that ‘had he been pure bred he would have experienced a greater 
intensification of strength and imagination’ is a little hard to swallow.24 Where the 
paucity of understanding about the man causes problems are over more serious 
issues, and to that we must turn to Philip Williamson. 
 Williamson has been Baldwin’s most steadfast supporter. To him, ‘ascribing 
Baldwin’s success simply to the occupation of the “centre” or “middle” of politics 
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presumes that a political “centre” pre-existed in some manifest and stable form, 
rather than having to be defined and constructed.’25 Conservatism, he goes on, was 
not just ‘an empty container filled and re-filled by the expediencies of the moment,’ 
but an organic and malleable political philosophy.26 Whilst Baldwin could never 
exactly be described as a man of action, Williamson’s point deserves consideration. 
For Blake, he ‘led the party from a position of moderation, seeking to conciliate his 
opponents, to blur the harsh edges of class conflict, and to display as far as he could 
the more humane aspect of Conservatism. Up to a point he succeeded.’27 Three of 
the party’s achievements under his leadership bear repetition. Firstly, Baldwin 
persuaded the Conservative Party to reject Macquisten’s divisive parliamentary bill 
attacking trade union funding to the Labour Party with an oratory flourish: ‘give us 
peace in our time, O Lord.’28 Secondly, his handling of the General Strike was, by 
popular consensus, generally competent. As Macmillan later put it, ‘with his 
sympathy, his understanding, and his steadiness [Baldwin] saved a strike from 
drifting into a revolt.’29 Perhaps because he believed the owners and the miners to 
be ‘equally stupid,’ he saved the country from civil war. Lastly, there was the 
Abdication. Though one can interpret Baldwin’s actions as ‘a shameless concoction 
of hypocrisy and untruth,’ once again he took the wind out of the sails of those 
potentially revolutionary King supporters, Winston Churchill or perhaps even 
Mosley’s Blackshirts, with his undemonstrative stoicism.30 As Charmley notes, the 
idea that Baldwin was a complete failure simply does not stand up to any close 
scrutiny.31 If Disraeli renders such a notion somewhat limited, John Ramsden was 
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sage to acknowledge the soothing features of his ‘New Conservatism.’32 
 We must therefore reconcile two notions. The idea that Baldwin led a party 
for almost fifteen years as a bumbling incompetent, yet clearly accomplished much. 
With reference to the Phoenix Generation however, something of a synthesis can 
be found. Let us view Baldwin anew: for what he presides over is something very 
profound. What happens in Britain between the wars was conservatism par 
excellence. Despite an empire under strain, a decimated economy, and the 
emergence of a Labour Party with links - if drastically overemphasised by the right 
- to revolutionary socialist and communist parties on the continent, the machinery 
of government scarcely trembled. That this came to pass was not the result of some 
political drift reminiscent of a dreamy Jerome K. Jerome novel. The fugue like state 
in which interwar British politics seems to have passed in such an interpretation is 
not tenable: men acted, and their actions had direct consequences. 
3.2 The Wider Impact of the War 
 The Great War caused a cleavage in the British political scene. We are 
choosing to concentrate in the main on those who fought, how the memory of the 
trenches imbued a profoundly different world view to those men who experienced 
1914-18 at home. This is however a little incomplete, for though veterans such as 
Macmillan were particularly radicalised by their soldierly experience, we must also 
make a further point: that those who did not fight could also be significantly moved 
by the war. Other than the divergence between ex-combatants and ‘the hard-faced 
old men,’ therefore, there was an equally important overall variance of opinion: 
between those men to whom the spectre of the war gave hope - who looked to its 
heroism as well as its carnage - and those who found in it little but despair, and saw 
it purely as proof of man’s inhumanity to man. Let us not, after all, underestimate 
the traumatic effect of thousands upon thousands of mutilated bodies - dead and 
alive - returning to a home front whose inhabitants were unable to prevent such 
suffering. 
 This impotence in turn created the type of mentality this chapter wishes to 
                                                           
32 J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940, (London, 1978), 190. 
120 
 
address: that of a profoundly pessimistic and mournful Conservatism which saw 
danger at every turn and proceeded to take the most cautious route out of every 
problem. To put it concisely, the Baldwin-Chamberlain brand of Conservatism was 
a decisive, deliberate assertion of inaction in the face of a world teetering on the 
edge of disaster, in which Baldwin provided the rhetoric, and Chamberlain the 
details.33 Unlike some, the Baldwin-Chamberlain axis did not necessarily believe 
the war had proved man innately selfish, merely that it had highlighted potential 
danger. Churchill provides an interesting example of this first phenomenon, as a 
man whose liberal faith was punctured by the war. Proclaiming the end of ‘the mild 
and vague Liberalism of the early years of the twentieth century,’ and the eclipse of 
‘the surge and hopes and illusions that followed the armistice of the Great War,’ he 
believed ‘we are entering a period when the struggle for self-preservation is going 
to present itself with great intenseness.’34 Writing to the normally rather mild 
mannered Lord Linlithgow, he bemoaned that  
 
All the time you and your friends go on mouthing the bland platitudes of 
an easy safe triumphant age which has passed away, whereas the tide 
has turned and you will be engulfed by it. In my view England is now 
beginning a new period of struggle and fighting for its life, and the crux 
of it will be not only the retention of India but a much stronger assertion 
of commercial rights…Your schemes are twenty years behind the 
times.35 
 
The last sentence, for a man who had relatively recently doomed the country to the 
Gold Standard, was hypocritical at best. Nevertheless, it was illustrative of a man 
whom the war had rendered pessimistic and reactionary - which, when we turn to 
the General Strike, we will see had consequences. 
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 Whereas the destructive Churchill represents a rather unimportant, and 
indeed uninteresting, figure during the interwar epoch, the Baldwin-Chamberlain 
project was clearly more important. Both men learned much from the Great War 
battlefield in their absence. Visiting France in 1919, Chamberlain found ‘the 
battlefields themselves…the most dreary sight imaginable.’ He found it ‘thrilling to 
see the actual spots about which one had so often read.’ Not having been there in 
combat however, his mind was rendered intensely mournful: ‘I had one 
disappointment, I could not find [his cousin] Norman’s grave.’36 There is a 
wonderfully indicative moment in Chamberlain’s letters to his sister Hilda in which 
he describes Ypres as  
 
even more destroyed than I had imagined. There is literally nothing left 
and one could hardly find a square foot that had not been hit by some 
projectile. They can’t leave it as it is, it is too dangerous. The few 
remaining walls would soon tumble down. On the other hand, to rebuild 
would be to obliterate all trace of what has been before. I can’t think 
what they will do.37 
 
One could scarcely come up with a better metaphor for the mind traumatised by 
the war, yet not having experienced it firsthand. If the war had left the veteran 
politician slightly muddled in his world view - for reform but uncertain how to 
achieve it - it also left those who had not fought in something of quandary. Some 
meaning clearly had to be wrought from the recent holocaust, but of what type? 
 Mankind after the Great War, concluded Baldwin, was like a blind person 
walking through a minefield.38 They needed constant guiding and should not be 
forced along too quickly.  As Williamson argues, in Baldwin’s mind progress was 
not inevitable:  ‘checks, even retrogression, could come, whether from external or 
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internal causes.’39 ‘There are large masses in this country who have not…yet had 
time to develop a keen political sense themselves,’ he proclaimed in 1927. ‘They 
are only too prone to be led away by really skilful and clever propaganda designed 
by appealing to their better qualities, to[wards] ends they would be the last to 
desire if they realised what those ends were.’40 The Conservative election slogan of 
1929, “Safety First,” was thus further reaching than the imminent need to stave off 
MacDonald and Snowden. ‘There may be a better industrial system imaginable 
than ours, and I hope indeed we may be slowly moving towards something better,’ 
declared Baldwin in 1925, ‘but there is no doubt in my mind that if it were possible 
to destroy the present system in a moment, those who destroyed it would cause a 
shipwreck, and they would not bring into being a ship in which to take away the 
survivors.’41 A government’s job was not to propose wide ranging schemes to cure 
society’s ills, indeed there was ‘little that a Government can do,…reforms [and] 
revolutions must come from the people themselves.’42 Indeed, this was a policy 
rather desperately highlighted by Baldwin writing an open letter to The Times in 
August 1928 asking 150,000 employers to take on displaced and out of work 
miners.43 Political action in the Baldwin conception was to be limited in scale, 
rooted in common sense, and predicated on preserving individual freedom.44 And 
that was about it. Any form of debate which verged on being both constructive and 
holistic, as the 1922 Committee discovered, was anti-Baldwinian.45 
3.3 Baldwin’s words and his deeds 
 Baldwin, as we will see, made all the right progressive noises. Young 
veterans could see in him the leader of the party of the Nation, not of any class.’46 
Duff Cooper could acknowledge his handling of the General Strike as ‘the greatest 
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personal and public triumph that any Prime Minister has ever had.’47 They could, 
like Rab Butler, see in him ‘my mentor…amongst living statesmen.’48 Yet a 
fundamental rupture between such figures and Baldwin, obscured by his 
harmonious rhetoric and convivial personal relations, remained. He did of course 
have the power of patronage, and when he told ‘my dear Edward, [you] will have to 
be Foreign Secretary in years to come’ presumably veterans such as Wood listened 
intently.49 Little of these kind words resulted in concrete action however; his 
occasional musings about removing from his government everyone over the age of 
60 were little but hot air, despite the party’s tumbling fortunes in by-elections.50 In 
reality, to leave the 1924-29 cabinet of old men, one either had to die, resign like 
Cecil, or flee to the city to earn money years of drinking had squandered a la 
Birkenhead.51 Though Baldwin claimed the Great War had robbed the nation of the 
great talents who would have replaced the geriatrics, presumably this would not 
have sat too well with the forty plus per cent of contemporary MPs who had fought 
and survived.52 As Charmley has noted, whilst ‘the left of the party received 
preferment from Baldwin…only those MPs who behaved themselves could expect a 
reward.’53 It would take until 1934 for one of the authors of the interventionist 
Industry and the State to reach the Cabinet, and that was more due to Oliver Stanley 
being Lord Derby’s son than his progressive rejection of ‘laissez-faire’ and belief in 
‘more widespread ownership.’54 By his own admission (at least according to Bob 
Boothby), the 1930s Conservative Party led by Baldwin was ‘incompetent’ and 
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‘extremely reactionary,’ diametrically opposed to the efficiency and progression 
obsessed Phoenix Generation.55 
 What we must begin to see is that Baldwin does not simply preside over the 
course of interwar events, but makes (or un-makes) them. He consciously acted to 
stifle the forces which might have led to the apocalyptic nightmare of the Great 
War trench or, contemporaneously, the Crocean liberal malaise which produced 
fascism. Conversing with Rab Butler in the 1930s, Baldwin remarked that ‘life in 
the country makes you see things whole and will enable you, like me, to steer 
between Harold Macmillan and Henry Page Croft: then you will be on the path to 
leader of the Conservative Party.’56 He certainly followed his own advice, and this 
was not simply down to the pragmatic necessity to avoid offending either wing of 
the party: Baldwin actually believed this was the way politics should be conducted. 
We must thus be careful not to see in Baldwin’s seemingly progressive rhetoric the 
words of a man determined to move the country forward. By not vehemently 
opposing the Labour Party in the bellicose terms employed by Churchill and the 
die-hards, he appeared much more modernising than the extent his deliberately 
strategised inactivity actually allowed, let alone entailed.57 In such a context Chips 
Channon’s comment that Baldwin was ‘half Machiavelli, half Milton’ seems 
appropriate indeed.58  
 It is worth looking again beyond the hot air at what Baldwin actually enacts, 
and the 1925 Macquisten Bill referred to earlier is as good a place to start as any. 
Frederick Macquisten - a proven die-hard on issues as bizarrely moralistic as 
lesbianism - attempted to introduce a piece of legislation designed to replace the 
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existing “contracting-out” mechanism of trade union funding going to the Labour 
Party with a “contracting-in” option. Baldwin then delivered one of his most 
famous speeches in response, stating that whilst the bill was essentially sound he 
would encourage his supporters to reject it so as to encourage a more peaceable 
kingdom, free of strife and internal conflict. All seemingly well and good: 
progressive politics getting the better of a mentality the country was better off rid 
of, or so Baldwin’s historiographical supporters have argued.59 The support his 
speech received from young veterans, both Conservative and Liberal, was 
significant - the sheer volume of maiden speeches on the matter was noticeable to 
even a normal critic like Arthur Henderson.60 It is worth quoting a couple of ex-
serviceman responses: 
 
Wedgwood Benn (Liberal) 
 
The Prime Minister in that remarkable speech, lifted the whole thing far 
above the controversy in which I admit I should have indulged with 
pleasure. He has not threatened, and he has not even admonished. He 
has appealed to the spirit of fair play and of peace, which is instinctive 
in the hearts of all of us who sit in this House.61 
 
Oliver Stanley (Conservative) 
 
I understood [from contemporary press reports] that it would be the 
wicked Conservative party who were pressing this Measure against the 
Socialists speaking on behalf of the trade unions, yet I myself came 
down prepared to vote against the Bill. When I listened to what if I may 
with humility describe as the wonderful speech of the Prime Minister, I 
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was even more convinced than before.62 
 
The problem arising from such positive feeling however was that it was clearly a 
little misplaced. War veterans extrapolated a meaning from Baldwin’s words that 
he did not fully intend. ‘I trust this Debate will have the effect of making people in 
this country realise that the Conservative Party is not out for any small points of 
party gain,’ declared Headlam, ‘but that it stands for the interests of the great 
democracy of this country.’63 But was this actually true? The party clearly stood for 
the preservation of the status quo, but whether it was prepared to go further is at 
least doubtful. 
 The flowery language which greeted the Macquisten Bill was, after all, not 
accompanied by some great change in Conservative policy. Baldwin handled the 
General Strike well in that he limited the likelihood (such as it was) of out and out 
revolution, but he certainly did not, as he claimed to be his desire, totally ‘lessen 
the misunderstandings which threaten industrial life.’64 If that had been his 
intention he would have replaced Joynson-Hicks at the Home Office and Churchill 
at Number 11.65 The former endured not altogether absurd taunts from fellow MPs 
that he was a second ‘Mussolini’ and a ‘national misfortune,’ the latter not only had 
helped precipitate the economic conditions which created the strike by returning 
to the Gold Standard, but oversaw the confrontational government organ The 
British Gazette which even Conservative backbenchers found provocative.66 
Through this paper, Churchill treated readers to headlines such as ‘Assault on the 
Rights of the Nation’ and ‘Organised Attempt to Starve the Nation,’ whilst the end of 
                                                           
62 Ibid, col.862-3. 
63 Ibid, col.870. 
64 Williamson and Baldwin (eds), Baldwin Papers, 180, Baldwin to King George V [13 May 
1926]. 
65  If Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett had been ‘dictator,’ he would have exiled Joynson Hicks to ‘St 
Halna’ [sic] and ‘never allow[ed] him to reenter the country again under any 
circumstances.’ SHL, ICS 84/C/12/3. 
66 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5 May 1926, vol.195, col.295; Anthony 
Eden Yorkshire Post Clippings, 28 February 1928, UBSC, AP 7/1/3-4; Boothby, 
Recollections, 44. 
127 
 
the strike was described as a ‘surrender.’67 Even if Baldwin was not directly 
responsible for such output, he did not directly oppose it. Indeed, for a man whose 
benevolence has essentially been sold on his pacific oratory, stating ‘the General 
Strike is a challenge to Parliament and is the road to anarchy and ruin’ seems a 
little confrontational. “The soldier” was also trotted out by Churchill to defend the 
government cause:  
 
LOYAL EX-SERVICE MEN 
 
The Devon Motor Transport Company, which employs about 400 men, 
runs motor omnibus services throughout Devon and Cornwall and in 
and around Plymouth. 98 per cent of all its employees are ex-service 
men. 
All the Muncipal omnibus and tram employees went out on strike, but 
not one of the Company’s men left their work. The Company is now 
running not only its ordinary routes, but also a considerably increased 
service.68 
 
To Boothby, May 1926 ‘was Baldwin’s hour, and his great chance of achieving the 
real peace in industry for which he longed. He did not take it.’69 If anyone, it was 
Bevin and Thomas who emerged from the strike as the great figures of conciliation 
– despite the praise he received from establishment figures like Lord Londonderry 
and the Duke of Devonshire, Baldwin’s post-box would conspicuously lack notes of 
praise from the Phoenix Generation.70 
 Perhaps Baldwin did want to introduce radical schemes to help the working 
man which would supplement his words, but one must judge him on his actions. 
Prisoner of a right wing party caucus or not, he acquiesced in policies which were 
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manifestly belligerent. Appeasing rhetoric in 1925 and rigidity against the strikers 
in 1926 were followed in 1927 by a piece of legislation clearly reactionary in 
nature. The 1927 Trade Disputes Act had many reasonable features, its most 
pressing clause was probably that which outlawed intimidation of those wishing to 
cross the picket lines. Yet at the same time it essentially enshrined the views held 
by right wing Conservatives in the previous two years. Macquisten’s bill was 
passed in all but name, and a general strike was rendered illegal. Here, in a sense, 
was Baldwin’s real genius. A whole host of causes dear to reactionary Conservative 
hearts were tacked onto the bill - for instance, civil servants were forbidden to join 
a union affiliated to the T.U.C. - and his party, even the progressive young ex-
servicemen of this study, scarcely battered an eyelid.71 No Conservative veteran MP 
voted against the bill, and few even abstained. Macmillan, Loder, Oliver Stanley, 
and Crookshank all supported Baldwin’s legislation, the first three presumably 
locating such a decision within their view that ‘the improvement of the industrial 
status of the worker’ is ‘essential.’72 These were after all still Conservatives, even of 
a leftist viewpoint. They accepted the constitutional argument almost unanimously: 
Archibald Noel Skelton believing it to be ‘impossible to order a general strike 
without ipso facto and automatically making an attack on the constitution;’ Duff 
Cooper referring to the real issue over ‘how this country is to be governed.’73 
Ultimately, as Marquand points out, ‘Conservative Keynesian social democrats 
thought of themselves as Conservatives, belonged to a self-conscious Conservative 
tradition and appealed to the myths and symbols of that tradition.’74 
3.4 Articulating Dissent 
 There however were some signs that this generation was indeed a little 
different. Conciliation with organised labour was viewed in more positive terms 
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than much of the Cabinet. Duff Cooper ‘would recommend the Government not…be 
afraid of losing dignity by accepting a new offer and entering into negotiations even 
under the menace of a general strike.’ Baldwin was also invited to parlay his 
personally sympathetic position into concrete action.75 The message from the 
young members was that the act would only be palatable if accompanied by 
progressive advances in other areas, a viewpoint best articulated by Harold 
Macmillan. Pointing out that such a bill could never have been passed before the 
conditions created by the General Strike, and whilst pledging to support it, 
Macmillan fired an early indication of the radicalism that would come to light in the 
1930s. ‘If this Bill is to be the prelude to a general swing to the right,’ he warned, ‘if 
it means the beginning of reactionary policy, then I am bound to admit it means the 
beginning of the end of this party of which I have the honour to be a member.’ For 
the electors to ‘decide that this Bill is justified,’ the party must ‘continue to deal 
with labour questions,’ render itself ‘not unwilling to adopt a bold policy with 
regard to many questions of taxation, finance, social and moral questions [sic].’76 
He concluded with a further notice of potential intent: 
 
I must also humbly inform the government that we do not regard this 
Bill as in any way a sign - we trust it is not a sign - of any attempt to set 
the clock back. We shall continue to support the Government in this Bill, 
and in its future measures according to the line its policy takes, and only 
according to that line. We shall demand, and we shall press for, the 
general forward movement which we know to be right.77 
  
So long as Baldwin was the man to deliver progress, he was the visionary to which 
the young men would look up to, and were prepared to swallow the occasional 
retrograde measure. In the mid to late 1920s rising stars such as Eden could 
believe that ‘the left wing of the party’ was, ‘in the first instance, like the Prime 
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Minister himself.’78 Like Richard Cross’s sudden disappointment upon attending 
his first cabinet meeting under Disraeli, the question was when such men would 
wake up and smell the pragmatic and static blend of the Baldwinian coffee.79 
 It is understandable why a young politician would gravitate towards an 
older figure with the glamour (and patronage) of office. Baldwin was thus the 
patron of Duff Cooper, Eden and Wood. Austen Chamberlain also aided the career 
of Eden whilst Churchill, for a while, seemed to be helping Macmillan along. ‘Like 
all young, talented and ambitious men’ Simon Ball’s Guardsmen ‘aroused their 
share of animus. Yet they always kept on the right side of the party managers.’80 
Churchill was however an odd choice, even as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
perhaps helps illustrate why Baldwin was so attractive by comparison. In 1927, 
whilst fishing around for some eye catching scheme for Budget time, he became 
interested in Macmillan’s ideas for the re-rating of industry. ‘Macmillan basked in 
the collective glory, and then – nothing. Churchill had achieved his purpose, made 
his mark, won the plaudits. He did not have much further interest in the tedious 
details of the rates.’81 Such a move also cost the future Prime Minister the good 
favour of Neville Chamberlain, who had previously had kind things to say about 
Industry and the State but became very cold after Macmillan’s dalliance with 
Churchill. One’s patron thus had to be chosen well. 
 Whilst some kind of established political sponsor was thought necessary to 
project their message, it must be noted that, in and of itself, the Phoenix 
Generation’s world view was profoundly different to that held in normal 
conservative circles – if perhaps less than they later claimed. Indeed, the young 
politicians went out of their way to make this point. Industry and the State 
proclaimed that its ideas a propos an industrial superstructure ‘would be met with 
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determined opposition in its initial stages from many Conservative quarters.’82 
Oliver Stanley went further in 1931, stating that ‘we may be, we shall be, led to take 
decisions and to make changes which will dismay the timid and affront the old-
fashioned, for the task of Conservatism to-day is not to bring back the old 
world…but on its lessons to build a new.’83 A massive shake up was required within 
the party, and, until 1929, Baldwin was seen as the man to potentially deliver that. 
From then on, Macmillan remembered ‘that among the young progressives (the so-
called Y.M.C.A. - that is my friends and I) many felt that although we would always 
get a friendly word from him we would get no action.’84 
 Action - later the name of Oswald Mosley’s fascist organ - was the creed of 
the post war progressive. A Keynes quote discussing the memorandum which led 
to Mosley’s resignation from the Labour Government springs to mind: ‘the question 
for us is not whether the signatories to the Manifesto have thought out correctly 
the details of such a plan in all their particulars; but whether or not it is desirable 
to have a plan.’85 In other words, the willingness to act was, in itself, a big step. As 
Lloyd George noted in 1929, ‘one of the most disturbing features of the present 
situation is that, as a result of years of Tory ineffectiveness, the nation is in danger 
of losing confidence in its ability to win through its present difficulties.’86 Against 
such a lethargic Conservative backdrop, it must be said the Phoenix Generation 
stood out, even to their nominal opponents. The Labour MP A.V. Alexander made 
judicious use of the ex-serviceman Conservative criticism of their leaders inaction 
in his 1935 election campaign. Thus Macmillan was quoted describing the front 
bench as ‘a few disused slag heaps,’ and Amery as claiming that ‘what we are still 
asking for, and what has not yet been furnished, is some clear statement of the 
general economic policy of the government, particularly their policy in respect of 
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the monetary situation.’87 Amery had previously gone further: ‘there are things in 
our social system which we have long been content to tolerate which we now know 
must be dealt with on a bold and comprehensive plan; a whole industrial and social 
order to be reconstructed. We have a better and a happier England to create, a land 
worthy of the sacrifices which have been made for it.’88 It was not some short term 
cosmetic changes that Britain required, but a collective change of attitude. “Safety 
First” may have been plausible, but it was not exactly inspirational. 
 Allied to this belief that only action would cure society’s ills was a steadfast 
rejection of “laissez-faire” as both an economic and political doctrine. On the 
economic side, there was not the love of free trade that had been their forefathers 
lot.  Auckland Geddes condemned ‘the materialism of the cities’ as ‘the millstone 
round the neck of democracy. The spirit of love and service is submerged in the 
waters of cynicism.’ He continued sarcastically, ‘go to the cities for the answer! 
Money! Pleasure! Power! Little civic sense! Little disinterested service!’89 In more 
rural settings it was also seen as a bad thing: Edward Wood pointing out that 
Victorian economics had essentially been to the financial blight of the ordinary 
farmer for the previous half century.90 It was therefore with some glee that 
Macmillan could label the 1932 Import Duties Act as ‘the end of a period in Britain 
both in economics and politics…From now on Protection, not Free Trade, is on 
trial.’91 By 1943, to Bob Boothby, the raison d’être of laissez-faire capitalism was 
‘not only dead but in a state of putrefaction.’ In part, such an atypically 
conservative attitude seems to stem from encountering Baldwin’s ‘hard faced men 
who had done well out of the war.’92 A glance at the memoirs of the Phoenix 
Generation shows little nostalgia for the businessman brand of backbench Tory 
MP. Charles Murchison, a special case in having served himself and losing a son in 
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combat, took great strides to gain a place on the parliamentary Wealth Select 
Committee, ensuring that from November 1919 he could take to task ‘those who 
had made fortunes during and out of the war.’93 John Buchan too abhorred those he 
considered ‘genuine reactionaries, not country gentlemen but business magnates, 
who were not much liked, and who woke to life only in the Budget season.’94 In 
some regard therefore, these were no longer their father’s sons. 
 Politically the state also came very much more into play. The Liberal 
reforms prior to 1914 had shown that it need not be left to voluntary organisations 
to guide the people, and the war had only exacerbated this trend. Though, in New 
Labour speak, Wood preferred a “hand up” to a “hand out,” he reminded ‘those who 
hold this view most strongly that war conditions will not come to an end with the 
conclusion of hostilities, and that in several instances it will certainly be necessary 
to invoke the organisation of state action to meet them.’95 The experience of Lloyd 
George’s dynamic leadership during the conflict was also not lost on the Phoenix 
Generation. As Lloyd-Greame later noted: 
 
In a life-and-death struggle the Prime Minister must have the spark of 
divine leadership and the drive that justifies dictatorship; neither 
Asquith nor Chamberlain possessed these basic, compulsive qualities, so 
they had to be pushed aside, ruthlessly and even cruelly, to make way 
for men who had the capacity to evoke the inspiration of leadership and 
nationhood.96 
 
Democracy was to be defended, but not at the absolute expense of getting things 
done. ‘There is something to be said for government by an autocrat,’ observed 
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Wood, a viewpoint Oswald Mosley - as we will see - would take to the nth degree.97 
Whereas Baldwin would attempt to educate the population politically, men such as 
Keynes believed the masses should simply be dictated to, and that the Tories were 
best placed to do this:  
 
I believe that the right solution [to the industrial crisis] will involve 
intellectual and scientific elements which must be above the heads of 
the vast mass of more or less illiterate voters…There are differences 
between the several parties in the degree to which the party machine is 
democratized…in this respect the Conservative Party is in much the best 
position. The inner ring of the party can almost dictate the details and 
the technique of policy. Traditionally the [Liberal Party] management 
was also similarly autocratic. Recently there have been ill-advised 
movements in the direction of democratising the details of the party 
programme.98 
 
For all one reads much about right wing British crackpots proclaiming “Hurrah for 
the Blackshirts” and so forth, one must acknowledge that even progressive 
Conservatives were fairly ambivalent towards the democratic process, at least in 
its present form. If Churchill’s early praise for Il Duce is well known, less 
documented perhaps is the later anti-appeaser Louis Spears’s similar comment 
that ‘Mussolini rendered the world a great service when he rescued his country 
from anarchy. He has had difficulties, and has considered it necessary to make his 
people swallow many unpalatable measures. His chief asset has been the national 
pride he has awakened and fostered.’99 Likewise, in 1930 Eden would urge his 
contemporaries to ‘make a close study of the causes of the collapse of 
parliamentary government in Europe since the war. It has not been because these 
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countries are temperamentally unfitted to work the parliamentary machine. It has 
been for a far simpler reason, because Parliament has failed.’100 These nominally 
advanced young democrats were not exactly wedded to the Westminster system 
therefore, for all that many of them would go on to lead it after 1945. 
3.5 Cross-Party Trends 
 Concurrent to this was an elevated sense that the party game was artificial, 
limiting, and preventative of action. The propensity young Conservative veterans 
had to look across the traditional party divide during this period was indeed 
surprising, even if one can find other examples in history of such feeling. Barack 
Obama, exploring Capitol Hill shortly after his election to the United States Senate 
in 2005, tells a similar story: 
 
At a reception one evening, I started a conversation with an old 
Washington hand who had served in and around the Capitol for fifty 
years. I asked him what he thought accounted for the difference in 
atmosphere between then and now. “It’s generational,” he told me 
without hesitation. “Back then, almost everybody with any power in 
Washington had served in World War II. We might’ve fought like cats 
and dogs on issues. A lot of us came from different backgrounds, 
different neighbourhoods, different political philosophies. But with the 
war, we all had something in common. That shared experience 
developed a certain trust and respect. It helped to work through our 
differences and get things done.”101 
 
As Obama realised, such a picture was a little rose tinted. ‘He had airbrushed out of 
the picture the images of the Southern Caucus denouncing proposed civil rights 
legislation from the floor of the Senate; the insidious power of McCarthyism…; the 
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absence of women and minorities in the halls of power.’102 Selective amnesia would 
mark the British parliamentary experience of the post 1918 world too – perhaps, 
indeed, the generational narrative along Mannheimian lines requires as such. To be 
sure, not every war hero became an enlightened progressive. Reginald Banks, Tory 
MP for Swindon having fought the Ottomans, would quite happily describe 
socialism as ‘our enemy’ and liberalism as a ‘plague from abroad’ akin to Russian 
Influenza and Jazz.103 Even Archibald Noel Skelton - famous exponent of a 
“property owning democracy” no less - said in 1924 that ‘it was not conceivable 
that this country could survive a five year Government if the Socialists were 
returned to power.’104 What exactly he imagined would happen is less clear. 
 Despite such anomalies, the trend towards cross-party cooperation was 
overwhelming. Edward Grigg is an interesting case in point. Awarded the D.S.O. and 
Military Cross during the war, he served as a Liberal MP with Duff Cooper in 
Oldham and then defected to the Conservative Party to become the member for 
Altrincham. His 1931 Three Parties or Two? was published prior to the formation of 
the National Government, and represented the culmination of thirteen years of an 
anti-partisan undercurrent in British politics, articulated most vehemently by ex-
soldiers.105 In part such a view was pragmatic: ‘there will be no…security for an 
adequate victory of the Right, unless the Right embarks at once upon a much 
broader appeal to the nation than it has yet attempted to make.’106 Yet there were 
far more profound reasons for such an arrangement. Grigg believed that 
 
fundamental changes in our laws require for their passage a weight of 
national opinion which transcends party and refuses to be gainsaid. The 
converse of this conclusion seems equally true, namely, that attempts at 
fundamental change, if not supported by something more than the 
opinion of a single party expressed through the organs which that party 
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commands, draw upon themselves a weight of national resistance which 
also transcends party and refuses to be gainsaid.107 
 
The circumstances of 1931 were, it is true, unique. Rising unemployment, a 
European wide credit collapse, and the imminent need for the pound to detach 
itself from the gold standard had created the conditions, to paraphrase Bob 
Boothby on any Mosleyite alternative to this, for ‘all the shits’ to climb ‘into the 
same basket.’108 
 Such a mentality, however, was longstanding. Henry Page Croft’s National 
Party was the first move in such a direction: ‘Many of us who had seen service in 
the war began in 1917 to feel great vexation at the trend of affairs on the home 
front. The duels in Parliament between Asquith and Lloyd George appeared to be 
out of place and jealousies flared up in all directions at a time when there should 
have been nothing but a common will to win the war.’109 The party - pledged to 
operate ‘a national as against a class, sectional, or sectarian policy’ - flopped at the 
ballot box in 1918.110 It was indicative of the wider trend though. A nation that had 
come together to win a great war, should not be divided in times of peace. 
 It did not take long for this to find formal expression through the formation, 
in July 1919, of the New Members Coalition Group, informally referred to in the 
press as the “Centre Party.” Like Grigg twelve years later, this was an attempt to 
transcend traditionally Conservative and Liberal boundaries and reach a common 
policy: ‘to put something permanent into temporary alliance,’ as Colin Coote put 
it.111 This was indeed to be predicated on genuine philosophical fusion rather than 
political expediency, and thus, as the Liberal veteran Joseph Kenworthy later noted, 
portended the first sign of a collapse of a Coalition built on such (lack of) 
principles.112 According to The Times, ‘it is worthy of note that the majority’ of the 
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new alignment ‘are young men who were on active service until a few months ago,’ 
including the Chairman Oscar Guest and Secretary Oswald Mosley.113 When its 
manifesto was published, the Centre Party clearly chose to portray itself in 
language at once unifying and neophilian: 
 
This movement expresses a desire among new members, who are not 
tied down by years of association with the old political shibboleths and 
who feel the urgency of the times demands political union…They feel 
that the present Coalition Party, with its system of coupons, is not 
popular…[S]ome evolution…of a really national and at the same time 
democratic party would be generally approved.114 
 
The Centre Party spirit, like Wood and Lloyd’s Great Opportunity, was that ‘the 
outbreak of war restored to its rightful place the forgotten doctrine of national 
unity and security. For years before the war politicians had with certain, rare 
exceptions, appeared to have their attention fixed rather upon the necessity of 
preaching the party rather than the nation’s gospel.’115 This needed to change: 
‘country must [now] come before party.’116 
 But, one might point out, surely the circumstances already existed for such 
an arrangement. Reactionary Conservatism was stymied by the Premiership of 
David Lloyd George, whose own propensity to half truth and chicanery would be 
controlled by the otherwise dour Andrew Bonar Law: a perfect balance for the 
Phoenix Generation seemingly. Yet when it came to the crucial Carlton Club vote to 
end the Lloyd George era, Conservative war veterans voted decisively in favour of 
doing so. The total vote was 187 (68%) to 87 (32%) to fight as a separate party, 
with veterans voting 68 (72%) to 26 (28%) to ditch “the man who won the war.”117 
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Unnecessary foreign adventure in Turkey undoubtedly precipitated his fall, but had 
Lloyd George enjoyed the long term backing of his parliamentary troops his fate 
may well have gone the route of Tony Blair in 2003-5 rather than Anthony Eden in 
1956-7, and he may have clung to office. The reasons this did not happen were 
perhaps best articulated in a letter to The Times from Philip Lloyd-Greame, later 
President of the Board of Trade. Responding to a speech from Winston Churchill, 
he agreed with his assessment 
 
that the Great War marked the close of a political epoch. So did the 
Reform Bill. But is there not a risk that the Coalition may combine the 
disadvantages of Lord Grey’s Government and the Tamworth 
Manifesto? In 1834 men wanted a National Party. I believe the majority 
of men want such a party today…Though [the coalition] might succeed 
in achieving a single agreed purpose, such as winning the war, [it] 
would be wholly unsuited to deal with far-reaching and complex 
legislative and administrative problems of reconstruction…So far as the 
Coalition has failed, it has failed because it has…attempted compromises 
in which none if its members really believe…Mr Churchill’s speech is not 
a plea for a Coalition. It is an appeal for a National Party.118 
 
All this came less than a month before he denounced the Premier to his face as 
liking to ‘keep three balls up in the air.’119 Here we may read two things. Firstly, the 
plea for action articulated ten years later by Keynes - of almost any type, so long as 
it was decisive - comes through loud and clear: something a Liberal Premier 
leading a Conservative administration would always have difficulty with. Secondly 
however, there is something of a rub. Three months after the letter to The Times 
Lloyd-Greame joined the government he had just derided at the Board of Trade. 
This illustrates a wider reaching point which our chapter on Mosley will elaborate 
upon: that the best method of achieving the radical agenda the Phoenix Generation 
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held was unclear. Should one take the Lloyd-Greame path of working within the 
system with the distinct possibility of being nullified by it, or embark upon 
Mosley’s road to political isolation? It was a difficult choice, whose implications we 
will later outline. 
3.6 Harbingers of the National Government? 
 In the shorter term, it is impossible to chart the rise of the Labour Party 
without reference to the Phoenix Generation. Mosley’s discourse with Robert Cecil 
is particularly symptomatic of progressive Conservative thought on the subject. In 
April 1921, shortly after the collapse of the Triple Alliance when the moderate 
leaders of the railway and transport unions had refused to support the miners in 
their resistance to wage reductions, Mosley saw the opportunity for political unity 
ajar: 
 
The psychological moment for an understanding with moderate Labour 
has at length arrived! They should be a very easy catch on the rebound 
from this debacle! The hour lends itself entirely to our purpose…The 
Government has cut a ludicrous figure and Labour should be in a 
peculiarly malleable frame of mind. A real opportunity presents itself 
for a confederation of reasonable men  to advance with a definite 
proposal for the reorganisation of our industrial system upon a durable 
basis.120 
 
A confederation of reasonable men including moderate Labour? What was this but 
a - one might even say “the” - national government in the making. A year later 
Cimmie Mosley would write to Lord Grey, to whom Cecil and Mosley looked to as 
the figurehead of a new reformist administration. Her husband, wrote Lord 
Curzon’s daughter, ‘view[ed] the existence of the present government with 
alarm…We are convinced that it is only by the united activity of all the stable 
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progressive elements in the country that the [present evils] can be remedied.’121 
That a future fascist could seek the cooperation of Labour and a former Liberal 
Foreign Secretary was certainly a surprising sign.122  
 One does not wish to go too far: sympathetic to cross-party ideals ex-
servicemen Conservatives may have been, but equally they hardly all became card 
carrying socialists. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the longevity of the 
trend. Most accounts describing the period - including Searle’s Country Before Party 
and Mosley’s autobiography My Life - write of the aforementioned “Centre Party” as 
a flash in the pan: a brief flirtation with political fusion before adversarial 
normality began to return in the Autumn of 1919, with a full recovery after the 
Carlton Club meeting.123 Yet this simply was not the case. There was an 
undercurrent in British politics, led by the Phoenix Generation, pre-disposed to see 
the other side of the parliamentary coin. Four of the six absolute defections of the 
1918-1922 parliament were from veterans of the Great War, a pattern which 
continued throughout the 1920s.124 This was an age when it was perfectly 
acceptable for the Duff Coopers and Mosleys to holiday together, even after the 
latter’s defection from Conservative ranks. That all three of the Chancellors of 
Attlee’s 1945 and 1950 administrations (Dalton, Cripps, and Gaitskill) were ex-
Conservatives may come as little surprise within such an atmosphere.125 
 The search for a youthful, national alternative to the status quo was a 
permanent feature of interwar British politics. Historians have thus far 
concentrated on the machinations of the old eccentrics, a pattern which is 
understandable given the amount of attention Churchill and Lloyd George’s 
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attempts to form a “National Opposition” receive in published sources such as the 
Nicolson diaries.126 This rather suggests that the Phoenix Generation were mere 
window dressing for the policies of political geriatrics however, something more 
than a little inaccurate. In actual fact, reformist Conservatives - particularly those 
who became associated with Lord Allen’s Next Five Years Group in 1935 - were 
steadfastly determined not to be ‘charmed, fascinated and eventually absorbed by 
the Welsh wizard.127 Given, as early as 1931, Baldwin’s presumptive successor 
Neville Chamberlain ‘determined to have nothing to do with Churchill’ he would 
also constitute a poor figurehead - quite apart from the fact that his views on India 
were certain to alienate men such as Irwin (Wood).128 No doubt the young men of 
this study could constitute pawns in the Cowling-esque game of “high politics,” but 
they were a viable political alternative in their own right. 
 Witness the various meetings attended by Walter Elliot, Harold Macmillan 
and Bob Boothby in late 1929. After five years of lethargic government which had 
failed to quell the unemployment problem, a coup was in the offing, and one which 
had much more ideological importance than anything later planned by Churchill or 
Chamberlain. The former would have taken the party back to 1914, the latter, 
whilst perhaps instilling greater efficiency and dynamism, would have offered little 
in the way of massively constructive policy. The Elliot-Macmillan-Boothby group 
proposed something a little different, and something much more relevant to future 
Conservative policy. Flying in the face of “Safety First,” the young men believed ‘we 
must find a policy which the mass of the Proletariat will be able to grasp at once as 
being helpful to the one great cause of their distress  - unemployment.’129 They 
continued, ‘if indeed we obtain the assistance of the best Liberals and Socialists, 
which indeed all present desired, it was quite obvious that the new party must not 
begin as a species of offshoot of the old Conservative Party.’130 The new movement 
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did not necessitate a total rejection of conservative causes - ‘that the new party 
must be Imperial was…agreed to by all’ - but did imply a negation of the political 
‘old gang with the old hide-bound fetishes, prejudices and short-sighted 
limitations.’131 
 Was the National Government an example of such ‘short-sighted 
limitations?’ Certainly in 1932, as Beaverbrook wrote to Boothby, ‘there is no 
adventurous spirit in the Government, and this is a time for daring pilots.’132 As we 
have seen however, this was no coincidence. Baldwin’s antipathy toward Lloyd 
George prevented Britain’s most prominent exponent of Keynes - barring Mosley - 
from gaining office, and curtailed the influence he could have. It says something 
about Baldwin that the man who had enjoyed unparalleled popularity in 1918, had 
proposed a viable and innovative programme economic in 1929, should be totally 
excluded from a “National” administration in 1931. Like Neville Chamberlain, who 
saw him as proceeding ‘by series of audacious bluffs’ with his ‘usual 
disingenuousness,’ Baldwin was ‘quite obsessed by’ Lloyd George and constantly 
worried himself with the question of ‘what is the Goat up to?’133 Thus once more 
Baldwin positioned himself as the negative antidote to an albeit risky positive 
force. 
3.7 Housing the Nation 
 In retrospect members of the Phoenix Generation would rather regret 
siding with the safer of the two - after all, only two young Conservatives, Macmillan 
and Boothby struck up meaningful friendships with the man pledged to conquer 
the unemployment they so often rallied against.134 There was a rather poignant 
moment in the early 1950s when, meeting Leo Amery for the last time, Boothby 
asked him whether he regretted the part he played in bringing down Lloyd George 
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and, subsequently, putting Baldwin in his place. Amery stood still for a few 
moments, and blinked. Then he looked Boothby in the eye and said simply, ‘I do.’135 
 It was not so much that the Conservative leadership between the wars was 
absolutely disastrous: certainly things could - given a General Strike, a right wing 
press disposed to see communistic machinations aplenty, and soldiers returning 
home with arguably unrealistic expectations of a post-war heaven on earth - have 
gone worse. Yet we must judge a government equally, if not more so, on what it 
does, rather than the perils it may prevent. Housing, given a political class which 
had acquiesced in the righteousness of Lloyd George’s pledge of 1918, is an 
interesting case in point. To Eden, the question of ‘slum clearing and house building 
is [Conservatism’s] most important domestic work.’136 He was writing in 1926, 
many years after the platitudes and somewhat false dawns of the Lloyd George 
administration. Part of The Great Opportunity of 1918 had indeed been the solution 
of the housing problem, ‘which stands almost alone in its potential influence upon 
the future of the nation.’137 Election addresses of the men emerging from the 
trenches to Westminster that year are full of such rhetoric: ‘better housing 
conditions for all classes’ cried Richard Colvin in Epping, whilst John Davidson in 
Fareham believed it to be ‘the greatest question before their mind. Starting with 
the birth of a child, he desired to see it properly housed…in order that it might have 
a proper start in life.’138 To be sure, veterans of other parties - Colin Coote in Ely is 
a prime example - said much the same.139 So too, it must be said, did that pioneer of 
1920s housing, Neville Chamberlain: 
 
My view was that housing was one of the most urgent of all problems to 
be solved and that unless people were shown that something really big 
was actually in preparation there would be serious trouble. I therefore 
proposed that the L[ocal] G[government] B[oard] should announce its 
                                                           
135 Ibid. 
136 Anthony Eden Saturday Review Clippings, 20 February 1926, AP 7/1/1-2. 
137 Lloyd and Wood, Great Opportunity, 81. 
138 Woodford Times, 29 November 1918; Hants and Sussex County Press, 7 December 1918. 
139 Isle of Ely and Wisbech Advertiser, 11 December 1918. 
145 
 
intention of setting aside a very large sum for state housing to be 
carried out however by the local authorities wherever possible…In this 
way you would strike popular imagination with a big scheme.140 
 
Nevertheless, one sees two distinct differences between the Phoenix Generation 
and their counterparts in the years that followed. Unlike the Conservative 
leadership, the young veterans believed positive state intervention would make 
great strides in curing the problem. There was, it is true, a certain collective 
realisation that government needed to enter the housing sphere to a greater extent 
than had previously been the case. Before 1914 the housing shortage had indeed 
been chronic, and ad hoc organisations such as the various model dwellings 
companies had provided an average solution at best.141 By the end of 1918 the 
backlog of working class houses was somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000.142 
If we assume an average family size of 4 (and working class families, to be sure, 
could be larger), this would equate to a shortage of 2,000,000, which, in a 
population scarcely over 40,000,000 constitutes a significant 5% of people denied 
their own home.143 The ‘big scheme’ of which Chamberlain talked was thus clearly 
something of a necessity. 
 To be fair to Chamberlain, his tenure as Minister of Health in the 1920s did 
involve bringing the state into play in a way inconceivable for a Conservative 
before 1914. Between 1921 and 1931, five of the seven counties building more 
municipal houses than private ones were contained within the Conservative 
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Midland Union, which was essentially the Chamberlainian fiefdom.144 Under the 
second Baldwin administration, some two thirds of all new housing, and half of that 
privately built, was directly state subsidised, prompting a form of crude qualitative 
competition between the parties which was to resurface periodically into the 
Bevan-Macmillan era and beyond.145 Eden even saw the 1924-9 record as ‘without 
parallel in the history of this or any other country,’ and pointed forward to the ’next 
great task’ of slum clearance.146 Chamberlain was of course Joseph’s son, and like 
his father saw in benevolent paternalist conservatism a chance to contest Labour’s 
claim to be the party of social reform. Despite praise even from ILP sources 
however, this was far from the case.147 Conservative policy went as far as 
encroaching upon socialist terrain, but it was always a distinct entity. To begin 
with, Conservatives saw the issue in moral rather than social terms. “The home” 
was their bastion against the kind of malaise they saw in the world after 1918. 
Even though of the younger generation, Francis Fremantle spoke in the language of 
his elders: 
 
Whereas the mental and material disadvantages of overcrowding need 
no emphasis, even more grievous is its deadly moral effect…Housing is 
an economic problem, but it is not merely. Houses are commodities, 
built and then sold or rented; but, more than that, they are houses of 
people, and in homes there is the potentiality of many things…In 
London alone, of a population of 4 ½ million, [there were in 1921] 
683,498 living more than 2 per room. What morality is possible under 
these conditions?148 
 
Conservative claims could thus be unhelpful in two ways: in the first place, the 
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paternalist and patronising attitude that had marked their pre-1914 policies had 
not completely dissipated. The working class, despite all they had done to save the 
nation between 1914 and 1918, were still something of an “other” who needed the 
type of civilizing which had provided the raison d’etre for the British Empire for 
over a century. Secondly, for all Neville Chamberlain’s 1933 espousal of those 
‘houses which have been built by the corporation, with everything that science and 
ingenuity can provide,’ and his belief ‘that we have gone a long way to carrying out 
those hopes which inspired us all during the War,’ Conservative housing policy did 
not do all it could, and certainly not all the Phoenix Generation demanded.149   
 Addison’s Scheme of 1919 to provide half a million new homes was 
denounced by the Anti-Waste crowd of Lord Rothermere and the People‘s Union 
for Economy, dented by the Geddes Axe of 1920, and finally rolled back by 
Chamberlain himself as Chancellor in 1923.150 It did however meet with great 
praise from young war veterans: understandable as it reflected their penchant for 
governmental dynamism predicated upon social reform. Fremantle eulogised thus: 
 
The number of houses built under the two Addison Acts was 
approximately 214,000...Whereas previous attempts had failed, the 
Addison scheme succeeded in slowly but surely getting the house-
building machine to move, and to good effect. While failing to reach its 
proposed objective…in five years, it tested every available factor and 
agency, aroused the whole will power and intelligence of the community 
to cope with the problem, focused the whole of the available building 
resources of the country developed fresh lines of construction, design 
and organisation.151 
 
To critics of the schemes costliness, he replied that ‘the [7 million annual] 
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expense…was indeed high. But its achievement was by no means negligible.’152 
Addison’s portrayal as governmental scapegoat, once cost cutting became de 
rigueur, Fremantle regarded as unfortunate.153 
 Addison’s scheme illustrated that, within the current framework, the state 
alone could not provide the solution to the housing problem. Yet the Phoenix 
Generation, as we have seen, were not proposing reconstructive solutions 
predicated upon the old order. Mosley was certainly something of an extremist 
with his radical views on ‘socialistic imperialism,’ but he was only the tip of the 
iceberg.154 Macmillan would denounce the ‘highly individualist economy’ which, 
‘confronted by the intricate difficulties of post-war economic situation, provided 
the opportunity for…a multitude of individual errors which resulted in collective 
ruin.’155 At the same time, the Conservative leaderships reliance upon the private 
sector to supply the “homes fit for heroes” was woefully misplaced. As McKibbin 
has argued, from 1920 British politics were marked by a deflationary mentality 
which essentially rendered Lloyd George - he of curing unemployment via Keynes 
some nine years later - essentially pointless at Number 10.156 One may go further: 
after this point, until rearmament made it necessary, state intervention per se was 
to be kept to a minimum by governing politicians of both parties. In terms of 
housing - something politicians of all creeds had promised to returning soldiers in 
1918 - this meant that by the 1930s the volume of homes built with some - any - 
form of state assistance rarely exceeded one third of the total, and in 1934-5 barely 
constituted a tenth.157 Not only did the state’s abdication of responsibility produce 
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a shortage of a million homes by 1933 - more than in 1918, plus massive regional 
discrepancies which meant that already depressed areas were afforded little 
attention by private builders seeking to make money in the more affluent south - it 
illustrated a profound psychological point. The Baldwin and Chamberlain mentality 
was prepared to intervene where there was imminent prospect of mass upheaval, 
other than that the economy could manage itself. An alternative solution to this 
was not the sole proviso of the Liberal or Labour parties however. Young 
Conservative ex-servicemen believed ‘housing is a responsibility that the nation 
must bear in partnership with the local authority. It is right that the State should 
share the financial loss, for some years inevitable, involved in action to meet a 
national necessity.’158 This was a profound breach in a nominally unitary political 
philosophy - conservatism - indeed.159 
3.8 Ex-Servicemen and Unemployment 
 If men were to be found houses, they were also to be found jobs. The extent 
to which unemployment and the war were intertwined deserves brief elaboration. 
One cannot overstress the ad hoc nature of pre-1914 welfare policy, for all Lloyd 
George had achieved. The 1911 National Insurance Act covered only two and a 
quarter million workers and five trades where employment levels were erratic: it 
was intended to provide cyclical help rather than a permanent solution. Even with 
the act’s extension in 1916 to cover munitions workers it was clear that the state 
was not prepared to intervene to permanently solve the problem.160 In 1918 
Britain was a world away from the welfare state of Beveridge, how this gap came to 
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be bridged and the degree to which this question was related to former soldiers is 
an interesting point. 
 Much has been made of the ‘returning soldiers’ who ‘felt that, rightly or not, 
the promises of the post-war world were unfulfilled.’161 Though much has been 
written about what the Lloyd George government failed to achieve in the aftermath 
of the armistice, it must also be acknowledged how far old soldiers precipitated - 
by their very image as much as their actions - that regime’s more progressive 
policies. For instance, the Out of Work Donation Scheme (OWD) of November 1918 
was born out of the desire to provide help for ex-servicemen whose long war 
service had rendered them ill equipped to immediately re-enter the job market. By 
May of the following year a policy intended to cover the 360,000 ex-soldiers it 
indeed did was also providing benefit for 650,000 non-combatants.162 As the post-
war economic boom bust in 1920, and the government faced the embarrassing 
prospect of 2,500,000 desolate heroes once the OWD payments reached their 
scheduled end, the Coalition stepped in and extended the benefits to March 1921. 
Not only that, due to the extreme poverty of former soldiers, the benefit from the 
OWD fund was uncovenanted: that is to say, that having failed to pay the requisite 
money to the state under the 1920 Unemployment Insurance Act, former soldiers 
were given access to OWD anyway.163 Thus, in a period Lowe has seen as 
‘conservative if not actually counter-revolutionary’ in terms of the relationship 
between the government and state, what action there was one can massively 
ascribe to the “the ex-serviceman.”164 This, given that of the approximately 
1,000,000 unemployed in early 1922 over 600,000 were former soldiers, is just as 
well.165 
 Not to be underestimated in the interwar period is the tacit alliance - or 
perhaps harmonisation - between the interests of ex-servicemen and the Labour 
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Party. This was understandable, the National Union of Ex-Servicemen had 
endorsed Labour in 1919, and two of its founders were members of that party.166 
In this light, Jimmy Thomas’s House of Commons statement on OWD in February 
1921 is interesting: 
 
I submit that the responsibility for this state of affairs is entirely the 
Government’s. The position of ex-servicemen and of those whose period 
of payment has now lapsed is not a new matter…we plead again with 
the Government to do their duty and we are going to use every hour and 
every minute of Parliamentary time to press upon the Government that 
that the only thing that matters…is the unemployment problem.167 
 
This then was a significant political revolution. The interests of moderate Labour 
and a group traditionally associated with the right - the soldier - had combined. By 
the 1930s, in his Labour Party in Perspective, Clement Attlee even began to see 
himself as the intellectual and physical manifestation of a total fusion between the 
two.168 Both after all desired full employment to be precipitated by state 
intervention, and were prepared to negotiate with the other to get it.169 In 1939 the 
economist Roy Harrod would write to tell one Conservative veteran MP, Louis 
Spears, that 
 
Labour has recently considerably whittled down its programme. I call 
attention in the enclosed article to an official pronouncement entitled 
Labour’s Immediate Programme. I believe there is little of substance - as 
distinguished from phraseology - here which progressive conservatives 
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need boggle at. It will not please those conservatives who are rigidly 
wedded to complete laisser-faire. But those who recognise that a great 
enlargement of state activity is destined to come willy-nilly will 
appreciate that Labour socialism of today differentiates itself in degree 
rather than in kind, and by the emphasis it places on the workers’ 
interest and on limiting the scope for profit.170 
 
When chronicling the rising “respectability” of Labour, one cannot ignore that 
party’s connection to former soldiers. Though it failed to make the most of NUX 
sympathy after 1918, as Ward points out, this mistake would not be repeated 
during and after the century’s second great conflict.171 And at the same time, that a 
left-leaning don could believe such a pro-Labour epistle had any chance of success 
with a Conservative MP, owed much to the overall cleavage that the unemployment 
question had wrought in British politics.  
 Cabinet papers reveal that whilst successive centrist governments may have 
sympathised with the unemployed ex-serviceman to a degree unseen before 1914 - 
Baldwin referred to them as ‘not the usual type of unskilled or work-shy men’ - 
they were unwilling to break with traditional policy.172 The Chancellor Baldwin of 
1922, unlike the Phoenix Generation, had seemingly not advanced beyond the 
world of Queen Victoria: ‘money taken for Government purposes is money taken 
away from trade, and borrowing will thus to depress trade increase 
unemployment.’173 His unsuccessful electoral flirtation with protection a year later 
aside, under him the Conservative Party would only with great reluctance ditch an 
outlook that, if not exactly pointing towards a yellow brick road of prosperity, 
could perhaps avoid the road to Wigan Pier. Unless, of course, there was a Wall 
Street Crash. 
 Thus, as Garside points out, interwar governments spent much of their time 
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merely containing the unemployment problem rather than seeking to solve it.174 
Such, as we have seen, was the prevailing mindset. It has however been argued by 
Williamson and McKibbin that, whilst unemployment was endemic, there was little 
the political elite could do about it. To the former, the radical schemes of Mosley 
and Lloyd George ‘did not offer…any obvious means of escape.’175 To the latter, it is 
all very well for Skidelsky to point to the deficit budgeting based achievements of 
Sweden, the US, Germany and France in reducing unemployment in the 1930s. 
Such successes however were not so clear cut. As even an exponent of Keynesian 
economics pointed out, Roosevelt’s much vaulted “New Deal” ‘was purely 
empirical; and based upon no principles whatever.’176 It achieved only moderate 
success, with 1936 constituting the single really spectacular year of growth.177 
Similarly, in Australia the finance minister Ted Theodore saw his proto-Keynesian 
scheme of expanding credit to farmers and small businesses rejected by a 
Conservative establishment (principally the upper house in this case) à la Mosley. 
Sweden’s economic and geopolitical also provided options not open to a Great 
Britain becoming increasing hostile to great trading nations like Imperial Japan and 
Nazi Germany. Thus, McKibbin points out, one cannot say alternate policies were 
ignored by - he concentrates on the MacDonald - government, and the international 
comparison certainly did not offer particularly workable solutions either.178 
3.9 Debates on Unemployment 
 Where such an argument rather falls down is in claiming that, before 1936, 
there was no vocal Keynes opposition to governmental orthodoxy. This is clearly 
questionable. McKibbin himself cites R.F. Kahn and Keynes’s own Can Lloyd George 
Do It? as evidence of an economic set in favour of public works schemes years in 
advance of the General Theory, something Garside very much agrees with.179 It is 
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likewise worth quoting Skidelsky verbatim: 
 
Keynes rejected laissez-faire as a policy before he developed a 
convincing economic theory explaining why laissez-faire would not 
work. Economists have taken this as a sign of his “institutions” running 
ahead of his theory, but this characterisation is too one-sided. From 
1924 to 1929 Keynes developed a powerful critique of laissez-faire, but 
it was not specifically economic-theoretical, though it carried a strong 
theoretical charge. It was directed to show that the presuppositions of 
laissez-faire – the psychological and organisational conditions which 
had made it work as a policy in the nineteenth century – had passed 
away.180 
 
So it was with the Phoenix Generation. Certainly there was a radical political 
alternative to the orthodoxy.181 Neither Keynes in Cambridge or, as the next 
chapter will illustrate, Mosley in Westminster were operating in a vacuum. The 
idea that high employment should be sacrificed for a sound currency was not the 
all encompassing mentality it has been presented as, nor were opponents of it 
isolated crackpots.182 
 McKibbin suggests that a demand led cure for unemployment was 
impossible within the existing system. He may be right, he may be wrong: Garside 
has offered an inconclusive estimate of the would-be effects of Lloyd George’s 
schemes to Conquer Unemployment.183 Middleton too has noted that the dirigisme 
which was possible in Hitler’s Germany could have never occurred in a democratic 
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Britain.184 These two conjectures, though accurate in and of themselves, 
profoundly miss the point however. Naturally the British system of government 
would not allow the range of options open to a Hjalmar Schacht or even Franklin 
Roosevelt, who was congratulated by none other than Adolf Hitler for his ‘historic 
efforts in the interests of the American People. The President's successful battle 
against economic distress is being followed be the entire German people with 
interest and admiration.’185 Yet, paradoxically, this view essentially makes the 
Skidelsky point more valid. The economic radicals were not economists alone. Not 
only did Keynes predicate economic reform upon political change, the Phoenix 
Generation formed a vanguard of men in precisely the political position – if only 
numerically - to enact such sweeping moves. What Baldwin and Chamberlain 
lacked was not the opportunity, nor even particularly the inclination, to help the 
poor unemployed. They simply lacked the drive. 
 War generation members certainly attempted to ginger their elders into 
action. Some, it is true, were afflicted by the modesty that often beset the new 
arrival at Westminster, Macmillan included.186 Leo Amery however was in no such 
quandary, and as Dominion’s Secretary presented a memorandum to the cabinet 
prior to the 1929 election that makes for sober reading. He began by commenting 
that 
 
no one expects us to compete with Mr Lloyd George in extravagant 
schemes for borrowing hundreds of millions in anticipation of 
speculative land dealings, or with the Socialists in similar schemes plus 
a general policy of doles based on confiscatory taxation. But we are 
expected to do something, and something much bolder than can be done 
within the ultra-conservative financial limits which we have hitherto set 
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ourselves.187 
 
If said boldness did not involve out-bidding the Liberal Party, it did entail massive 
advances in road construction. Amery continued: 
 
even if our schemes are to be on a much more modest scale than those 
put forward by our opponents, they must, if they are to produce any 
appreciable effect, or to appeal to the imagination of the public, involve 
expenditure considerably in excess of our normal Budget provision. 
 
Alas, Baldwin was not a man prone to such action. 
 In the Baldwinian negative conception of the world after war things were 
certainly bad, but they could be much worse. To the mindset which looked with 
hope to the future this would not do. ‘The problem,’ wrote Lloyd George in 1929, 
‘should be faced in the same spirit as the emergencies of the war. The suffering and 
waste caused by unemployment are as important as was the problem of the 
provision of munitions during the war.’188 Baldwin, on the other hand, explicitly 
stated in 1927 that unemployment was more than tolerable if it meant the 
prevention of an arms race which could precipitate a future war.189 Similarly, with 
the Abdication Crisis of 1936, not only did Baldwin facilitate the removal of the 
monarch who had made an albeit nominal donation to the miners after the General 
Strike a decade earlier, he had stuck a dagger to the heart of the mentality - 
articulated by Edward VIII scarcely a month before his ousting - that ‘something 
must be done.’190 Duff Cooper’s papers also reveal the fear held within Cabinet that 
Baldwin’s bluff would be called: that Edward would accept his resignation and 
send for Churchill, who in turn would launch a populist programme of rearmament 
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and mass slum clearance, roping in by turn Mosley’s fascists, the Beaverbrook-
Rothermere press, and elements of the left.191 Such paranoia was not the 
leadership the unemployment question needed. 
 Instead, Macmillan had it about right, unemployment was not ‘merely 
deplorable’ but ‘shameful and intolerable.’192 Not only was it symptomatic of a 
deeper malaise, it was the problem itself. The ‘snores of government’ which, to 
John Moore-Barbizon MC, ‘resounded through the country’ did not coincide ‘with 
the hopes some of us had for it.’193 The Gladstonian brand of liberalism, even to a 
former member of that party Edward Grigg, ‘had no place in the modern world.’194 
Instead, the great danger lay precisely in ‘inactivity and drift.’195 Whereas the sheer 
variety of schemes proposed to counter unemployment has been used by McKibbin 
to argue that there was essentially no workable solution to the problem, it seems 
much more pertinent to emphasise the underlying and widespread desire for 
reform.196 To be sure, there were differing opinions amongst veterans as to how 
best solve the issue. Page Croft, Amery and Auckland Geddes would argue strongly 
in favour of assisted emigration to the Dominions - particularly to reward ex-
servicemen.197 The latter even believed that ‘unless we can hive off something like 
five million people as quickly as possible we shall have absolute chaos in this 
country’ (though as Pugh has recently shown actually getting people to emigrate 
was another matter).198 Some, like Walter Elliot and Robert Bower, extolled the 
virtues of autarchy whilst others, most notably Macmillan, believed the best 
solution to be some form of planned Middle Way that avoided the excesses of the 
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totalitarian regimes.199 Whilst some war veterans such as Eden and Banks did not 
subscribe to the pervading ex-serviceman mentality of economic action, and 
criticised Lloyd George and Mosley’s schemes as ‘megalomaniac,’ the majority were 
divorced from the Conservative leadership in spirit.200  
 BUF era Mosley was certainly out on a limb in absolutely rejecting the 
parliamentary system as moribund and outdated, albeit less of one than one might 
assume. A massive realignment was generally called for however. As Grigg put it:  
 
the call of the nation for deliverance from the confusion of parties and 
from divided aims can be heard on every side; but only a movement 
broad enough to embrace all those who think in terms of the nation and 
not in terms of class, whose political instincts are Parliamentary and 
constitutional on traditionally British lines, and who are genuinely 
convinced of the need of fiscal reform, can respond to that call 
effectively.201 
 
Thus, whilst the required changes had to come from within the British tradition, 
there were few ex-veterans exactly sentimental for parliamentary procedure in its 
present state. ‘All over the world established systems of government are being 
challenged or have been challenged effectively,’ Grigg noted. ‘Even in England 
confusion and distress will not reign indefinitely without bringing collapse or 
revolutionary action or both.’202 Whilst his solution was a Conservative-Liberal 
alliance, the diagnosis of the problem was distinctly Mosleyite. 
3.10 Battle Lines Drawn 
 Thus, by 1929-33 we have a Britain decidedly in decline, and one where the 
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battle lines had been clearly drawn. To young radicals, Conservative policy was 
seen as ‘geared towards the bosses,’ as looking after the supply side of the market 
when demand was the great issue of the day.203 Cuts could be countenanced, and 
indeed from 1931 enacted by a Conservative dominated administration, but the 
state needed to take charge.204 Labour too had their problems. Led by a Baldwin 
with a Scottish accent, whose ‘reluctance to take positive action’ shocked even one 
of his own party’s veterans, Clement Attlee, the orthodox left also offered little.205 
‘MacDonald had no constructive ideas,’ Attlee believed, ‘while at the Treasury 
Philip Snowden had fallen completely under the spell of orthodox finance and the 
influence of Montagu Norman.’206 From across the floor Boothby was even more 
damning in declaring Labour’s Chancellor to be ‘lighted by no gleam of originality, 
and [without] a single constructive idea…Mr Snowden’s mind is like an arid desert. 
Not a single oasis jags its bleak horizon. There is nothing there but negation.’207  
 Negation is an interesting concept. The notion that contemporary leaders 
did nothing is both unhelpful and inaccurate. It suggests they were more kind 
hearted, and lethargic, than was borne out by reality. In such a conception, Baldwin 
and MacDonald almost become seen as Bertie Woosters at Number Ten, 
intellectually empty yet cuddly dullards who charm a British nation peculiarly 
amenable to such characteristics. Such a viewpoint not only ignores the two men’s 
personally unattractive and patronising sides - Baldwin with his constant talk of 
“educating the masses,” MacDonald with his astonishing vanity - but suggests they, 
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and the mentality they represented, were a mere conduit of the collective will.208 
Not so. Baldwin and MacDonald were guardians of a particular ideology which 
happened to hold the levers of power: this “orthodoxy” required constant 
protection against forces they - possibly rightly, probably otherwise - viewed as 
dangerous and foolhardy. When Baldwin enunciated the two root principles in 
judging political action as ‘[adherence to] common sense’ and ‘the preservation of 
individual freedom’ we should listen.209 Such political catenaccio was all very well 
in times of prosperity, it was however singularly ill-fitted to the interwar epoch.  
These were not times for a ‘ruminative rather than executive’ mindset.210 
 The difference may be surmised by attitudes to the following, with which a 
Chamberlain or Baldwin would have profoundly disagreed, and a Macmillan or 
Loder would have found much solace: 
 
Democracy either means that the will of the people shall be 
implemented, or it means nothing. Yet to suggest a system which can do 
what the people want done is often denounced as a denial of democracy, 
since effective action is regarded as a danger to liberty. In the name of 
freedom, for example, people are condemned to live in slums for fear 
that a government  powerful enough to rebuild the slums might misuse 
its power and put them in prison. Consequently we live in a State of 
universal negation within a system of individual inhibition.211 
 
These are the words of a man absolutely beyond the mainstream pale by the late 
1930s, and imprisoned as an enemy of the state in 1940. Oswald Mosley may have 
been many things, but in a world where the leaders of left and right were offering 
little beyond Victorian economics, he was not the pariah he would later become. 
How he went his way, and the other members of the Phoenix Generation went 
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another, is a question one cannot adequately answer by deriding Mosley as mad or 
hubristic. For much of the period of this study, young Conservatives held more in 
common with a future fascist than their erstwhile leaders.212 Why they did not 
follow his path is a more complex question than one might think, and goes beyond 
the widespread post-1945 view that totalitarian ideals are inherently wrong. As we 
will see, such a belief is a more teleological construct than one might think.
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4: A ‘logical Tory’? Reflecting on Mosley’s Break with the Democratic 
Establishment 
 
Well, whatever happens, we will keep out the Welshman. 
- Ramsay MacDonald to Stanley Baldwin, concurrent to Lloyd George‘s 
expansionist programme at the 1929 election.1 
 
A Fascist is a logical Tory. 
- Aneurin Bevan, during the debate on Mosley’s Olympia Meeting.2 
4.1 Mosley in History 
 ‘With the exception of Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (1961), excellent within 
its limits, none of the recent writers have that indispensable quality of sympathy. 
They write to condemn, and the result is they fail to understand.’3 So wrote Oswald 
Mosley’s most credible sympathetic biographer, Robert Skidelsky, whose 
otherwise stellar rise through academia was momentarily checked by his unduly 
benign account of the fascist leader. Skidelsky, no doubt influenced by his ‘healthier 
obsession’ with John Maynard Keynes, later admitted to accepting ‘too readily the 
“Locust Years” theory of the interwar period, with its corollary that the 
mediocrities in charge of the party machines kept the great and talented “in the 
wilderness”, to the great detriment of the country.’ Thus he went looking for the 
place of ‘heroic values in politics,’ minimised the undoubtedly abhorrent nature of 
Mosley’s anti-Semitism - before and during his fascist days - and cost himself an 
Oxford fellowship in the process.4 Skidelsky has of course gone on to have a 
distinguished career as member of the House of Lords and political commentator, 
particularly as the economic downturn from the autumn of 2008 brought Keynes 
and his ideas back into the mainstream, but his association with Mosley will 
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probably cost him an arguably deserved reputation as one of the top historians of 
his epoch. 
 Mosley’s BUF years do not especially interest us, in and of themselves. The 
extent to which the British Union of Fascists held sway over the general populous 
has been widely discussed in recent times, presumably a debate riding on the back 
of a televisual obsession with Hitler’s Germany.5 The arguments involving it are 
often of a purely academic nature (in both senses): whether fascist support was at 
20,000 or 40,000 people by the outbreak of war is irrelevant in the grand scheme 
of things. On the other hand, Mosley the political operator - even after his adoption 
of the fascist label in 1932 - is of the outmost relevance to an accurate 
understanding of interwar Britain. ‘One hears Mosley talking and one hears Mr 
Skidelsky talking,’ noted one reviewer of the 1975 biography, ‘but talking in a room 
without people.’6 Skidelsky found this criticism shrewd, and so it seems to be.7 
Aside from complaints of undue leniency, his book presents Sir Oswald too much as 
a unique, isolated, figure, rather than as part of the political system. Mosley 
misread the zeitgeist by calling himself a fascist, but by less than we might imagine. 
For as even a prominent contemporary critic, Elie Halévy, noted, there was little in 
this era dividing men as seemingly diverse as Mosley, Stafford Cripps, and Lord 
Eustace Percy.8 
 Mosleyite violence, together with the baiting of East London Jewry, could 
never have been countenanced by the majority of the Phoenix Generation. Yet the 
ideas that informed his fascist turn were by no means uniquely his. As Stephen 
Cullen has shown, the BUF stressed three ideas - hyper-patriotism, the ethos of the 
ex-servicemen of the Great War, and the use of modern, dynamic methods to defeat 
the economic crisis - that, as the preceding chapters have shown, were not so far 
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removed from the views of many on the left of the Conservative Party.9 Unlike 
Hitler, Mosley did not believe democracy could never work, but that advances in 
science had made it obsolete and outmoded. Many, as we will see, agreed in part.10 
 It is no exaggeration to say that Oswald Mosley was the British politician 
most profoundly affected by the First World War. His claim that he decided to go 
into politics on Armistice Night is, as our first chapter noted, post facto hokum. 
Nevertheless, his statement that ‘we of the war generation’ were radicalised upon 
realising that ‘the old world could not or would not give a decent home and living 
for our companions’ is beyond dispute.11 His son later commented that, ‘there is 
something unfulfilled about Tom in the war…He had flown bravely in the RFC; but 
it is evident that when in the trenches he was involved in no attack, and seems 
unlikely that he had to undergo a large-scale attack.’12 Perhaps this is true, perhaps 
not: Mosley did refer in My Life to ‘going over the top’ but this could be dramatic 
license.13 Regardless, if one wants to castigate a British politician for his war 
service Winston Churchill seems a far better bet: wangling his way to becoming a 
battalion commander, spending the majority of his time away from the trenches 
catching up on political gossip, and denouncing ‘his corps commander as a “villain” 
when he refused him leave (on the very sound grounds that if a battalion was in the 
trenches then its commanding officer should be there too).’14 What matters most is 
what Mosley perceived himself to be: a man baptised by the fire of trench warfare, 
imbued with the determination to change the world for the better, a world only he 
and his comrades truly understood. Even if George Mosse has posited that such self 
perceptions were, in reality, self constructions, Mosley and his contemporaries at 
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the very least posit an interesting manifestation of this phenomenon.15  
Unlike the would-be saviour of 1940, Mosley had got most of the major 
decisions in his career right. His crossing of the floor over Black and Tan brutality 
in Ireland led T.P. O’Connor to regard ‘him as the man who really began the break-
up of the Black and Tan savagery.’ Upon his adoption of the Labour cause in 1924, 
Beatrice Webb regarded him as ‘the perfect politician’ as well as ‘the perfect 
gentleman,’ whilst Ramsay MacDonald was much impressed with his young 
recruit.16 Though he would fall out with the MacDonald-Snowden leadership 
almost as soon as he was appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1929, 
this a position many understood, and even agreed with. Josiah Wedgwood, a 
Labour MP wounded at the Dardanelles, responded to Mosley’s much praised 28 
May 1930 resignation speech thus: 
 
We have listened to one of the most eloquent and one of the most 
dangerous speeches I have ever heard in this House…[N]o-one who 
listened to it can deny that as he spoke he was converting Member after 
Member in this House to his views. I watched the Liberal party, with the 
exception of the four strong men from Cornwall. I watched the 
Conservative party. Man after man was saying to himself: “that is our 
leader.”17 
 
Wedgwood was a critic, in no way inclined towards a Mosleyite agenda. If even he 
could acknowledge the cross party appeal the man could have - he also ignores the 
penchant Labour men like Strachey and Forgan must have had for him - it is surely 
time to take Mosley more seriously. To judge Mosley purely on his dark side would 
be akin to writing a history of Churchill by skirting over 1940 and purely 
concentrating on the Sterilisation Clause of the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act or the 
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dead ANZACs of Gallipoli. We should not ignore the abhorrent Mosley that emerges 
from the late 1930s, but his whole career should not be judged in these terms. 
 With the notable exception of Bob Boothby who recalled events with 
trademark rebelliousness, it was in the interest of Mosley’s contemporaries to 
portray him operating on a different plane altogether. This was simply not the case: 
Mosley may have operated on a different point on the spectrum to men like 
Macmillan, but it was still the same spectrum.18 Here then is the truth this chapter 
intends to get at. For the most part, Mosley had a point in prophesying national 
regression that most men of his generation agreed with. Not only that. Extra-
parliamentarianism, seen as his sole preserve in a world post-1945 which rejects 
such tactics, was a solution many would have countenanced, even recommended. 
The nature of Mosley’s later semi-respectable fellow travellers - stuffy old men like 
Lord Rothermere - serve to obscure the fact that, before 1932, most of his chief 
political collaborators were veterans from the centre ground, even progressive left 
(as something of a curio, President-elect Roosevelt replied to Cynthia Mosley’s 
congratulations at his victory praising ‘that fine [by then fascist] husband of yours,’ 
and expressing the hope that they would repeat ’that jolly [fishing] trip soon’).19 
We must begin to turn this period on its head. From the perspective of a reformist 
young Tory MP of the war generation, who was the best man to lead Britain? 
Stanley Baldwin, whom we have just seen had failed to deliver upon the nature of 
his rhetoric, and would offer very little in the way of the dynamism the nation 
appeared to require? Or Sir Oswald Mosley? A gamble yes, but one with an 
interventionist policy not without adherents (Lloyd George and Keynes), who 
claimed, with arguably more credence than Baldwin, to be the voice of the post-
1918 world. Mosley must hold total responsibility for his actions whilst in the 
political wilderness, but his journey there was not his choice alone. If “the system” 
had failed to provide both adequate leaders, and forceful enough protest to such 
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lethargy, to try and escape it was entirely logical, as Ward has argued.20 
 Skidelsky attempted to justify Mosley’s fascist conversion by reference to 
the incompetence of the nation’s leaders. This chapter is not an attempt to do that. 
Instead, it seeks to illustrate that he was not alone. Desperate times call for 
desperate measures: whether Mosley would have made a better national leader 
than Baldwin or MacDonald is impossible to say. What the following will show is 
that one cannot, by reference to his BUF or Union Movement days, claim 
conclusively that he would not have done. The perceived wisdom, conceived along 
the lines of the Whig interpretation of history, obviously sides with the status quo. 
This is a teleology. Macmillan, Stanley and the like did not ultimately align 
themselves with the man they had much in common with, and the rest, as they say, 
is history. The righteousness of that decision, given their viewpoints, is at least 
open to interpretation. For if, as Amery acknowledged, ‘the rank and file of the 
Conservative Party, in Parliament and in the country, which chafed under the 
inertia of recent years, would have responded with enthusiasm to a bold lead,’ we 
should view the potentiality of a Mosley led Britain with more credence than 
hitherto.21 David Howell has suggested that Mosley had burnt his bridges with the 
Labour Party by 1930-1, possessing no base within the party to back up his 
agenda.22 Certainly he did not play his hand as best he might. Yet, as we will see, he 
had potential allies outside that party’s structure.  
4.2 Moving Beyond the Ephemera 
 His controversial political views aside, it is important at the outset to clear 
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up that other potential source of Mosley’s undoing: his philandering. His witty 
slogan ‘Vote Labour, sleep Tory’ apart, his bed hopping led to Baldwin to regard 
him as a ‘wrong ‘un’,’ whilst Birkenhead dubbed him a ‘perfumed popinjay of 
scented boudoirs.’23 The Phoenix Generation on the other hand could scarcely have 
cared less. How could it be otherwise: Duff Cooper was ‘incapable of restraining his 
carnal appetites’ after marrying Diana Manners, whilst Boothby and Macmillan 
maintained a co-operative, if strained, relationship throughout the decades of the 
former cuckolding the latter.24 Macmillan, it is true, constitutes a slightly special 
case. The mental breakdown he suffered in 1931, months after the birth of Sarah 
(the daughter more likely to be Boothby’s than his), left him ‘[un]willing to sacrifice 
any more of his established relationships when so many were already in tatters.’25 
The buccaneering swagger required to carry off the New Party project was thus a 
little beyond a man only just emerging from a sanatorium, whom a friend had 
found banging his head against the wall of a railway compartment in sheer 
frustration at his lot.26 Doubtless there were reasons to personally dislike Mosley. 
Duff Cooper saw him and his wife as ‘worse than foreigners.’27 Yet in the upper 
class milieu of interwar Britain, provided one stuck to ‘rules-of-the-game about 
what was acceptable,’ one could share wives as well as politics.28 
 There were, after all, much more important questions, such as what on 
earth British democracy actually stood for. AJP Taylor saw the fall of Mosley in 
1930-1 as ‘a decisive, though negative, event in British history: the moment when 
the British people resolved unwittingly to stand on the ancient ways.’29 Perhaps the 
best indication of this lies in Harold Nicolson’s diary entries during the period of 
the Second World War when British democracy stood alone. Nicolson, a former 
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associate of Mosley’s now back within the establishment fold at the Ministry of 
Information, documented thus: 
 
3 July 1940: [Attlee] also feels that we should before the country a 
definite pronouncement on Government policy for the future. The 
Germans are fighting a revolutionary war for very definite objectives. 
We are fighting a conservative war and our objectives are purely 
negative. We must put forward a positive and revolutionary aim 
admitting that the old order has collapsed and asking people to fight for 
the new order. 
 
22 Jan 1941: Winston refuses to make a statement on war aims. The 
reason given in Cabinet is that precise aims would be compromising, 
whereas vague principles would disappoint. Thus all those days of work 
have led to nothing.30 
  
By the 1940s then, as Mazower notes, ‘the power of Nazi dreams contrasted…with 
the ideological timidity of the British.’31 The Wehrmacht were fighting for clear 
objectives, albeit odious. The British, by contrast, were not fighting for the Poles, 
the Jews or because Hitler was an evil man. Instead, as Corrigan is at pains to point 
out, ‘Britain went to war in 1939 for the reasons that great powers always go to 
war: because it was in her interests to do so.’32 That Mosley was operating within 
an environment where British democracy lacked the romantic language - “fight 
them on the beaches” et al - and the totems - the horrors of Auschwitz - to defend 
itself is a crucial point. 
 In recent years there has been a shift away from the traditionally 
pessimistic picture of interwar Britain.33 Far from being crushed by poverty, it is 
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pointed out, Britons of all classes enjoyed both rising expectations and higher 
living standards to match. In a sense all this rather goes against the grain. Whilst 
not ignoring the extensive revision that historians have made to the traditional 
picture, ours is a story which partially eschews such arguments. Instead of asking 
whether the democratic system succeeded within its prescribed limits or not, the 
question is over the very nature of those limits. Veneration for totalitarian regimes 
which acted more decisively than Westminster was by no means Mosley’s sole 
preserve during this period. Nor was such praise limited to dictatorships of the 
right. Putting Bolshevism in Perspective John Loder argued it had been ‘distorted in 
the western mind,’ believing it instead offered ‘hope’ and ‘lessons’ to be learned.34 
Returning from Russia in 1933, Macmillan remarked to Thomas Jones that he 
similarly had been impressed with what he saw.35 
 For all democracy appeared triumphant in 1945, by 1929 British 
‘parliamentary government appeared to be unstable government,’ and was met by 
‘a high tide of criticism.’36 As we have seen, much of this lay at the feet of the 
‘boneless wonders,’ Baldwin and MacDonald.37 Yet the problem was 
philosophically wider ranging than simply two individuals. Indeed, Mosley and 
Baldwin essentially voiced the same problem: how could modern technology, 
advancing at a pace incomprehensible to the average voter, be reconciled with a 
mass democracy. Baldwin placed his faith in his own educative powers, Mosley 
believed the system itself needed overhauling - and he was not alone. Aside from 
the youthful Phoenix Generation, thinkers of left and right were not adverse to 
tearing up centuries of tradition. On the one hand, Stafford Cripps doubted whether 
a Socialist Government could ‘maintain its position of control without adopting 
some exceptional means, such as the prolongation of the life of Parliament for a 
further term without an election.’38 Even George Lansbury spoke in quasi-fascistic 
language that under him ‘the House of Commons shall function as a House of 
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Action, and not as a decaying institution.’39 H.G. Wells’s call for a ‘liberal fascism’ is 
also well known.40 Concurrently from the right, Winston Churchill sympathised 
with those ‘doubting whether institutions based on adult suffrage could possibly 
arrive at the right decisions upon the intricate propositions of modern business 
and finance.’41 Whilst, then, the British do tend to get a little pious about their 
stability of parliamentary democracy, we must be careful not to misrepresent or 
overplay the nature of this. 
4.3 The Example of Anthony Eden 
 Nominally the old parliamentary system withstood, but the cracks were 
noticeable, if one looked hard enough. The problem with some men of this epoch is 
that, having been raised in a staid, placid existence, they were too eager to mind 
their language. Anthony Eden, seemingly in his earliest guise a Baldwinian 
Conservative par excellence, is one such example, and had almost imperceptibly 
begun to waver in his faith. In a 1929 article in The Yorkshire Post he opined that 
‘Conservatism is not static. It is indeed essential if we are to appreciate the policy 
and purpose of the Conservative party in this generation that we should never 
overlook its progressiveness in essentials.’42 By the mid 1930s he was declaring 
that ‘the Conservative party does not exist merely to make a Socialist govt 
impossible…[Its] purpose is positive and not negative.’43 Were these just warning 
shots across the lethargic Baldwin’s bow, or a sign of something deeper? Certainly 
Eden did not break with the established order, and for all his claims of being a 
progressive seems the least likely high profile former soldier to do so. He seems 
not to have understood the economic complexities grasped by Mosley and 
Macmillan, and in any case was primarily devoted to matters of foreign policy. 
 Eden constitutes an interesting case. Mosley later recounted that it always 
remained a mystery to him why he was so assiduously groomed for leadership by 
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the Conservative Party, eventually suggesting it owed much to his ‘fine war record, 
good looks, and…generally distinguished appearance.’44 From the perspective of 
the backbenches, his appointment to the Foreign Office in 1935 was tellingly seen 
by Walter Elliot as ‘grand news!…This is the first victory of any of the younger men 
since the financial policy began to show such startling victories for the Old Boys.’45 
Congratulations had previously flooded in from scores of ex-servicemen such as 
Macmillan, Loder and Douglas Hacking.46 Quite why the younger men flocked to 
him is something of a mystery, for Mosley was correct in ascribing vastly superior 
talent to Macmillan and Stanley, men who also had greater interest in the domestic 
issues of the day. One cannot of course overlook his connections, for the darling of 
Baldwin was not to be trifled with. Yet - as with Baldwin’s benevolent rhetoric - the 
blame probably lies at the misunderstanding, whether deliberately cultivated by 
Eden or not, that he was “one of them.” His Military Cross was the mark of a brave 
man. Whether it qualified him - as he was dubbed upon receipt of a 40,000 strong 
pro-disarmament petition in 1932 - to be ‘representative of the ordinary people 
[who] filled the trenches…and filled nearly a million graves’ is a completely 
different issue.47 A man who, after his resignation in 1938, ‘intend[ed] to make a 
few big speeches on such general topics as Democracy and Young England, in 
which (while avoiding current topics in Foreign Affairs) he will clearly indicate that 
he stands for postwar England against the old men’ should really have known a 
little bit more about the Jarrow poor and East London slums than he did. Then 
again, his erstwhile fellow travellers should have seen this too.48 
  Eden, like the earlier illustration of Lloyd-Greame in 1920, was a veteran 
suspicious of the system who chose to work within it. In terms of his own personal 
gain, one cannot question this decision. Foreign Secretary at the age of 38 and 
eventual Prime Minister are accolades not to be sniffed at. Whether they were 
worth cow-towing to a Westminster system that presided over 3 million 
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unemployed and appeared moribund by 1940 is another issue. Aside from youthful 
vigour, Eden was not the ‘substitute Mosley’ the National Government presented 
him as.49 His doubts about the status quo never resulted in concrete action. For all 
his wartime bravery, he seemed to lack political decisiveness, illustrated as we will 
see by the restrained nature of his (perhaps surprisingly sporadic) protests at 
Chamberlain’s foreign policy. In many senses he constituted a man with an agenda, 
but with neither the concrete policies nor the will to do anything about it. 
4.4 Planning 
 The same cannot be said however for the Phoenix Generation as a whole. As 
Mosley later wrote, ‘the failure to secure a consensus in 1930 was a tragedy, 
because nearly all the ablest men in British public life had in varying degree 
foreseen the coming crisis.’50 This was not mere retrospective self-justification. For 
‘the consensus for national action,’ of which Mosley spoke, begat to Friedrich 
Hayek an inevitable Road to Serfdom: 
 
We still believe that until quite recently we were governed by what are 
vaguely called nineteenth-century ideas or the principle of laissez-faire. 
Compared with some other countries…there may be some justification 
for such belief. But although till 1931 this country had followed only 
slowly on the path which others had led, even by then we had moved so 
far that only those whose memory goes back to the years before the last 
war know what a liberal world has been like.51 
 
Hayek was admittedly on a McCarthy like quest to find ‘the totalitarians in our 
midst,’ those to whom planning per se was a way of political life.52 Yet his 
acknowledgement, even critically, that ‘veneration for the state,’ ‘the enthusiasm 
for “organisation” of everything, and that inability to leave anything to the simple 
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power of organic growth,’ had become ‘marked in this country,’ is a vital point.53 
Here the Phoenix Generation provided the intellectual foundation - through a glut 
of books calling for industrial reconstruction - for the anti-Hayekian position.54 
 ‘Nothing but intellectual confusion can result from a failure to realize that 
Planning and Socialism are fundamentally the same.’55 So noted Hayek and Lionel 
Robbins in response to Harold Macmillan’s 1933 Reconstruction. That a future 
Prime Minister should write a tract described by a leading economist as a 
‘blueprint for the destruction of liberty’ seems, at first glance, a little strange, even 
given previous references to Macmillan‘s radicalism.56 Yet, from their perspective, 
the LSE economists had a point. Consider the viewpoint espoused in 1927 by the 
ex-servicemen Macmillan, Loder and Stanley: 
 
It cannot be claimed that the industrial machinery suggested in the 
foregoing pages is a panacea. But, like the League of Nations machinery 
in the realm of international disputes, it is at least a machinery. Those 
who have most hopes of the League have their optimism not so much in 
the value of the machinery itself for the purpose of dealing with a grave 
crisis when it may arise, as on the psychological fact that long years of 
joint action and joint conciliation…will create understanding among the 
statesmen of the world which will be of value when the crisis does 
appear.57 
 
Such a philosophy bares striking relation to Hayek’s later denunciation of the 
mania in British political society for ‘planning for planning’s sake.’58 Taking control 
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was thus an ends as well as a means for the state envisaged by the Phoenix 
Generation, a viewpoint shared by elders like Lloyd George and Keynes. Rab Butler 
- a man chronologically similar to a Mosley, but personably in the Baldwin mould - 
put it well: ‘this is an era of planning, because it is an era of crisis. If it be taken for 
granted that our age is a building age, then it is refreshing to feel that change, 
reconstruction or revolution, whatever you may call it, may come from the Right in 
politics.’59 In an era where Victor Cazalet could compare Henry Ford to the genius 
of Albert Einstein, seemingly the Phoenix Generation constituted the impetus for 
just such a change.60 
  Whilst the “political outsider” historiography of the period concentrates on 
the big name eccentrics - Churchill and Lloyd George - and the essentially 
irrelevant hedonistic social world of the smaller fry - bon vivants like Duff Cooper - 
one should not ignore the important meetings that were taking place amongst the 
young men. Faith in the Baldwin-Chamberlain leadership was, by 1929, on the 
wane, and understandably so. Talking to Macmillan in July 1930, Harold Nicolson 
found him at the end of his tether with ‘the old party machines.’ Hinting at a future 
Pitt-like Ministry of young men, Macmillan believed ‘the economic situation is so 
serious that it will lead to a breakdown of the whole party system.’61 Throughout 
1929, 1930 and 1931 the radical ex-servicemen politicians of this study were in 
constant contact. The Elliot-Macmillan-Boothby meeting of November 1929 
referred to in the previous chapter was but indicative of a trend whereby the 
young men were becoming increasingly disillusioned with their leader’s 
negativity.62 Mosley did not take the leap into the New Party wilderness without 
thought. Seventeen Labour MPs signed the Mosley Memorandum of December 
1930 - including Nye Bevan - and his social schedule of the 1929-31 parliament 
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reads like a Who’s Who of young talented politicians.63 In November 1930 he dined 
with Duff Cooper, Stanley, Macmillan, Bracken and Boothby. Later, Stanley, 
Macmillan and the future Conservative Whip David Margesson came to stay at his 
house in Denham, whilst in May 1931 he attempted to woo John Moore-Brabazon 
to his cause.64 Baldwin even began to talk of people hunting ‘with packs other than 
their own.’65 Mosley’s jump into the unknown was not made without some 
consideration therefore. 
 He had, after all, every reason to suppose he would gain followers from both 
left and right. Keynes did ‘not see what practical socialism can mean for our 
generation in England, unless it makes much of the [Mosley] manifesto its own.’66 
Its insulation and demand led solutions to curb unemployment, ‘will shock the 
many good citizens of this country who have laissez-faire in their craniums, their 
consciences, and their homes…but how anyone professing and calling himself a 
socialist can keep away from the Manifesto is a more obscure matter.’67 From our 
perspective, why he did not gain followers from the right is just as important. 
Boothby has ascribed it to a single speech of Lloyd George’s, made immediately 
following ‘the most dramatic scene I witnessed during my fifty years in Parliament,’ 
Mosley’s resignation from the Labour Government. Instead of praising the 
departing Chancellor the Duchy of Lancaster, ‘[Lloyd George] described his 
memorandum - similar, but distinct from the later “manifesto” - as ‘an injudicious 
mixture of Karl Marx and Lord Rothermere.’68 Whilst after Mosley ‘sat down, it was 
clear he had the support not only of the great majority of the Labour Party, but 
many other members,’ Lloyd George completely killed any united progressive 
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opposition stone dead.69 In such a milieu, taking the safe root within the existing 
parties was made all the more attractive for the Phoenix Generation, many of 
whom were situated in marginal constituencies. 
4.5 The Choice 
 Be that as it may, one cannot dismiss the notion that whilst such men may 
have bravely served during the war, they essentially took the cowardly route out of 
the economic turmoil Britain found herself in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
Boothby’s letters to Mosley are illuminating on this point. Citing the example of 
Randolph Churchill - he might equally have picked Joseph Chamberlain - Boothby 
told Mosley he cared about his ‘political future far more than about any single 
factor in public affairs.’ He could ‘conceive of no greater tragedy than that you 
should take a step which might wreck your chances, or at any rate postpone the 
opportunity of carrying through constructive work.’ Yet he knew to his ‘cost the 
limitations of the existing young conservatives. They are charming and sympathetic 
at dinner. But there is not one of them who has either the character of the courage 
to do anything big.’70 Perhaps, it is true, Boothby should have looked in the mirror 
a little. Here was a man who believed the system of laissez-faire capitalism ‘could 
no longer work,’ that Mosley ‘was right and almost everyone else was wrong,’ yet 
did not follow his instinct.71 Boothby instead counselled in favour of trying ‘to 
collar one or other of the [party] machines, and not ruin yourself by beating against 
them with a tool.’72 Once Mosley had clearly decided in favour of a break with the 
old order however, was he still not the better option, regardless of the risk, than a 
political establishment unable to break the contemporary impasse? 
 Mosley’s problem, as the Conservative Boothby noted, was that ‘our chaps 
won’t play, and it’s no use deluding yourself that they will.’73 In a way, for all we 
have come to see Mosley as a controlling megalomaniac, there was a real sense in 
which power did not interest him. The assertion of absolute rationality, as his son 
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noted, was more his driving motivation: people would either believe his case or 
they would not.74 Thus, a little surprisingly, it was with the Macmillans and 
Stanleys that one finds the greater degree of Machiavellianism. Walter Elliot would 
have proved most useful to Mosley in Scotland, ‘but [he] has spent the last twelve 
months consolidating his position in the Conservative party, won for himself a 
good deal of rank-and-file support’ and ‘won’t give it up unless he’s sure he’s going 
to win.’75 Oliver Stanley, as Cuthbert Headlam jealously lamented, had also been 
earmarked by Baldwin for an eventual rise.76 The perceived key to personal 
success, as Headlam articulated Boothby had singularly failed to do, was not to 
offend too many people.77 Whether this was good for a nation manifestly requiring 
a different style of leadership to the status quo is an entirely different matter. 
 There was of course one major move against Baldwin, in March 1931. The 
Business Committee (with a firm prod from Lord Beaverbrook), containing a few of 
the more senior Phoenix Generation MPs such as Amery, Lloyd-Greame and Hoare, 
appear to have hatched a plan whereby a Chamberlain-Hailsham combination 
would unseat the incumbent. It all fizzled out rather quickly: Duff Cooper’s victory 
at the Westminster by-election ending any real hope of a Beaverbrookian coup.78 In 
any case this move, as Butler scorned, had come from Baldwin’s ‘nearest - the Old 
Gang,’ not the rank and file.79 It was also at the behest of a traditional Tory agenda - 
the Empire - that, as chapter five will outline, the average ex-serviceman MP was 
conflicted over.80 Certainly the Phoenix Generation did not, as the party agenda 
Topping stated of the parliamentary caucus as a whole, ‘lean much more towards 
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the views of Mr Churchill than to those expressed by Mr Baldwin.’81 Perhaps this 
influenced the decision of that other veteran spoken of as a second Mosley, George 
Lloyd (who threatened to jump ship over India with the finance of Lady Houston), 
to stay within the Conservative fold.82  
 If there was one man who most epitomised the safer route Mosley could 
have taken it was Harold Macmillan. The two men’s intellectual similarity was 
certainly striking. 1927’s Industry and the State was but indicative of a mind that in 
1932-3 - with ‘The State and Industry’ and Reconstruction - was thinking on virtual 
Mosleyite lines. This was hardly shocking: both employed Allan Young as an 
intellectual collaborator, in Mosley’s case as a New Party parliamentary candidate, 
in Macmillan’s as co-author of Reconstruction and The Middle Way. Consequently, 
free traders which Mosley saw as living in the nineteenth century were similarly 
denounced by the Stockton MP as peddling ‘old, negative arguments.’83 Mosley’s 
penchant for imperial insulation was likewise replicated by Macmillan’s praise for 
‘reciprocal trading arrangements within the Empire.’ ‘If this policy is ever to get 
beyond the stage of theoretical discussion,’ he continued, ‘there will be required 
not only an Imperial Secretariat, but some machinery’ which would put ‘internal 
development on lines with the general policy of economic unity.’84 In broad terms, 
when Macmillan believed ‘we must realise the essential contradictions of laissez-
faire even while we may appreciate the energy and drive of a rugged 
individualism,’ Mosley concurred with a plea to ‘harmonise individual initiative 
with the wider interests of the nation.’85 They were, even linguistically with 
Hegelian concepts such as a ‘middle way’ and a ‘synthesis,’ like two peas in a pod.86 
 But, the argument often goes, Mosley was fundamentally beyond the pale. 
Men from Bevan to Macmillan may have concurred with elements of his political 
philosophy, but would baulk at the prospect of concrete association. This is true, 
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but only to a certain degree. Certainly both sought intellectual solace in the same 
source, John Maynard Keynes. Indeed, the Cambridge economist was perfectly 
happy to endorse Mosley’s New Party Election manifesto: ‘I find it rather difficult to 
criticise the enclosed.’87 His only criticisms were, probably surprisingly for such a 
neophilian politician like Mosley, that ‘it sometimes has an air putting forward 
something new, but in fact what is being said is something which we have got tired 
of hearing, however sound it may be in fact. I feel the document dates rather - that 
it is perhaps a year old in feeling.’88 Similar chides were reserved for Macmillan. 
Commenting on an early draft of Reconstruction, Keynes noted that whilst  
 
I like the enclosed very much. My criticisms are really due I expect to 
the sort of middle position you occupy. My main feeling is that you are 
not nearly bold enough with your proposals for developing the 
investment functions of the state. You are trying to minimise the part 
the State must play and you endeavour to get your results by a sort of 
combination of private enterprise and subsidy; and I doubt the 
feasibility of this at any rate in present times.89 
 
Thus, rather than the image we might expect of Mosley the extremist, by the early 
1930s both he and Macmillan were operating on remarkably similar lines, and 
were being urged to go further. 
 Macmillan’s reaction to Mosley’s resignation from the Labour Government 
is well known but emphatically deserves repetition at length. Writing to The Times 
on 27 May 1930, he remarked that 
 
faced with a startling and even spectacular calamity [the doubling of 
unemployment since Labour took office] Sir Oswald seems to have 
conceived a novel, and no doubt according the accepted political 
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standards of what are called “respectable statesmen”, incredibly naïve 
idea. He drew up, and actually went as far as to present to his chief, a 
memorandum which suggested an attempt should be made to carry out 
at least some, if not all, of the pledges and promises by the exploitation 
of which the Socialist Party obtained power… 
Is it to be the accepted rule in our politics that a political programme is 
to be discarded as soon as it has served its electoral purpose?…Must a 
programme always sink to the level of a fraudulent prospectus? 
I suspect that this is the real way that the game ought to be played. Only, 
if the rules are to be permanently enforced, perhaps a good many of us 
will feel it hardly worth while bothering to play at all. Sir Oswald Mosley 
thinks that the rules should be altered. I hope some of my friends will 
have the courage to support and applaud his protest.90 
 
This produced a snippy repost from Rab Butler - unlike Macmillan too young to 
fight in the war - the next day: ‘when a player starts complaining [about] the game, 
it is surely the player, and not the game, which is at fault.’91 Yet it was arguably the 
game where the fault lay. By sticking his neck out so publicly Macmillan showed 
not only political bravery - he was of course out of parliament in 1930 - but an 
appreciation of the spirit of the times.92 As Butt points out, true democracy had 
arrived as recently as 1918 with the extension of the franchise, and by the late 
1920s and early 1930s the system had failed to adapt to the realities of such a new 
political culture.93 The five giants of disease, ignorance, squalor, idleness and want, 
that by 1942 Beveridge believed needed slaying through ‘social insurance and 
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allied services,’ were abundant - for all the later revision - in a nation whose 
political ruling class were unable to prevent them.94 Playing the game was a 
needless distraction from preventing the ‘needless scandal’ of poverty which 
Beveridge, and post 1945 administrations of left and right, would arguably tackle 
rather better.95 
 Until then, progressive politicians would rather duck the issue. Macmillan’s 
letter was a step in the right direction but he should have gone further. Whilst 
Simon Ball implicitly lauds The Guardsmen (Macmillan, Salisbury, Lyttelton and 
Crookshank) being repelled by the far right, Mosley’s breach was not, initially, of 
this sort.96  Mosley could be wildly overoptimistic about his chances: the £250,000 
and support of Beaverbrook which he claimed in November 1930 was all he 
needed to ‘sweep the country’ was Panglossian in the extreme.97 Yet his plan was 
essentially sound. As Nicolson commented, 
 
unless the economic situation can be dealt with on undemocratic lines, 
I.e. independent of votes, we shall go smash. Not even Holland, but 
worse than Holland… Tom Mosley tells me that he will shortly launch 
his manifesto practically creating the National Party. He hopes to get 
Morris of Oxford to finance him. He hopes to get Keynes and similar 
experts to sign his manifesto. He hopes that Stanley and Macmillan will 
also join. 
 
All seemingly went swimmingly from his viewpoint. The economy continued to 
tumble, William Morris stumped up £50,000 a couple of months later, and Keynes, 
as we have seen, was very sympathetic to the Mosley of this era.98 All that was 
missing was that final ingredient: the adherence of his youthful intellectual fellow 
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travellers. 
 As Boothby predicted, those from the right shied away when the moment 
came. Meeting Macmillan on the train, Nicolson - who had ditched Lord 
Beaverbrsook’s warm embrace at the Evening Standard for Mosley - found him 
putting forth ‘the usual young Tory view that his heart is entirely with the New 
Party but [arguing] that he can help us better by remaining in the Conservative 
ranks.’99 The honesty of this claim was at least doubtful, for Macmillan did ‘not 
hesitate to admit that if we could obtain a certain number of seats in Parliament, 
most of the young Tories, all the Liberals and a large proportion of the youngish 
Labour people would come over to us.’100 What was required was not a more 
effective ginger group with Toryism, but a definable break - even if one not ruling 
out a later reconciliation. Whilst Macmillan saw the great New Party opportunity as 
being five years away, the time for action was 1929-31: the time he himself would 
later dub, ‘the great divide.’101  For after then Baldwin would begin to regain 
control over his party, and slowly start to address, albeit in his usual negative 
manner, national issues like India rather than press barons. 
4.6 The New Party in Context 
 For all his later aping of the continental regimes, Mosley’s New Party was an 
authentically British reaction to the trauma engendered by the Great War. Whilst 
rejecting fascism as ‘excessive,’ Mosley lauded ‘the new generation of men who are 
weary of words and have learned the harsh dictates of action are challenging the 
men of words and their systems of paper with a new and victorious reality…May 
the present movement find in this country an expression of its dynamic purpose 
not unworthy of the peculiar contribution of the English people to history.’102 
Pointing towards the achievements of Soviet planning, he believed that ‘it is 
essential not to deal with those out of Insurance by methods with a Poor Law taint 
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- they are a national problem and should be nationally treated.’103 This was almost 
the exact rhetoric spouted by Macmillan as the 1930s marched on. Finally 
resigning the Conservative whip in June 1936 on the grounds that that party was 
unable to produce the ‘things for which many of our comrades died,’ he had long 
taken the Mosleyite line that Baldwin and MacDonald had ‘shirked the social and 
economic problems…they have applied no strong and forceful direction to our 
policy. They have elevated inactivity into a principle and feebleness into a 
virtue.’104 Thus, Macmillan and Amery could both later describe Mosley’s fall as ‘a 
tragedy,’ with the former even judging his own political timidity to be ‘poor stuff of 
which I am now ashamed.’105 At the time, Amery had also praised the Mosleyite 
‘fireworks,’ and his ability to ‘make the speech I should have liked to make.’106 We 
should therefore take Mosley’s later claim that ‘within all political parties potential 
fascists are to be found - among men who are well known in party politics, and still 
more among the rank and file,’ perhaps more seriously than one might imagine.107 
 The main source of the breach with Mosley was the fact that Macmillan and 
company were not prepared to join the economic to the political dots, whereas he 
was. As Marquand notes, adherents of Keynesian social democracy ‘rejected the 
classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, but they never quite broke with the 
utilitarian conception of man and society which lay behind it.’108 The private 
sphere was sacrosanct to most of the Phoenix Generation, whereas Mosley believed 
it possible to be encroached upon for the greater good.  As the New Party manifesto 
outlined: 
 
Organisation is necessary to the life of the community and involves 
discipline, but organisation should bring a higher standard of life and 
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greater opportunity for individual enjoyment and development. In the 
last resort the right to live is preferable to the right to blether. Modern 
democracy may have to choose in some degree between these two 
rights.109 
 
Evidently Mosley’s contemporaries preferred, as he would see it, blether and 
indolence to the organised rigidity he was offering. Given the severe handicaps 
inherent in the Westminster system to deliver Marquand’s ‘developmental state,’ 
and the collapse of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s under external pressures, 
it is far from certain Mosley was wrong.110 If nothing else, he at least articulated a 
problem which arguably even Keynes himself ignored: to what would Keynesian 
economics lead - contraction of political liberty or the “stop-go” Britain of the 
1950s and 60s?  
4.7 After 1931 
Though in November 1931 Nicolson had confidently predicted fascism not to be 
suited to English sensibilities - to be ‘doomed to failure and ridicule’ - as the slump 
showed only minor signs of improvement over the next eighteen months political 
figures ceased to be so blasé.111 By late 1932 Lloyd George was ‘not so sure it may 
not be possible.’ “I do not know what our condition really is. On the surface all 
seems right enough. But what is happening at this moment underneath?”112 In a 
sense then, Mosley was a little unlucky. A large body of men believed in the 
viability of a ‘transition between a battered capitalism and the organized State,’ 
saw that the old gang ‘rule of fourteen years has…reduced this country, at home 
and abroad, to a low and dangerous condition,’ yet resolutely pinned their hopes 
on some kind of deus ex machina.113 This was the most vital potential “underneath” 
of which Lloyd George spoke: men of some influence, possessing a politico-moral 
importance (engendered by their war service), who constituted to the New Party 
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‘the main response which we are getting,…which is very encouraging, com[ing] 
from the younger Conservative group [which] is distinctly fascist in character.’114 
Like the post-facto underplayed split between the Eden and Churchill views on 
anti-appeasement, the various anti-establishment factions were unwilling to co-
operate. Before 1931 the young war generation members seemed held back, both 
by some residual notions of party loyalty and their own timidity. After then, Mosley 
had been deemed an unacceptable ideological bed-fellow, and Lloyd George’s 
Council of Action which appeared in 1935 too much of a vehicle for the Liberal 
Party, even if its aims largely coincided with The Next Five Years Group of which 
Macmillan and four other veteran MPs were members.115 
 The counter argument in defending the Phoenix Generation against 
accusations of cowardice, aside from the portrayal of Mosley as some kind of 
isolated lunatic, is twofold. Firstly, as with foreign policy, the war generation MP 
seeks to blame the leadership. Baldwin, as we have seen, is deserving of some 
scorn. Yet the idea that a Chamberlain premiership would ride to the progressive 
rescue was clearly fanciful. No doubt, Neville had been a decent Minister of Health 
and Mayor of Birmingham, he was also his father’s son. Yet he had proved a 
spendthrift Chancellor who, as we have seen, had taken a completely different 
lesson from the Great War to the veteran. One example here will suffice. In March 
1934 a series of well-argued and moving articles appeared in The Times on 
conditions in Durham. With the aim ‘of carrying the message from the north to the 
south’ - a divide the Stockton MP Macmillan could appreciate - The Times told of 
‘desolation’ and ‘plight,’ and of ‘places without a future.’116 A commission was 
subsequently sent to discover Scotland, Durham and South Wales: though how 
places like Blackburn (with an unemployment rate of 32%) and Birkenhead (38%) 
were left out was a little mysterious. Oliver Stanley, as Minister of Labour 
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hampered by office from forwarding the radicalism seen in Industry and the State, 
was somewhat critical. Euan Wallace, in government as Civil Lord of the Admiralty 
and a member of said commission, was more forthright in urging the capitalist 
system to justify itself by investing its surplus in public schemes.117 Macmillan, 
bound by no position and about to temporarily jettison the Conservative whip, was 
furious. Firstly, in language typical of his generation, he semi-sarcastically 
denounced the commission: 
 
War is the not the only operation in which it is sometimes an advantage 
to have a visitation from general headquarters to the front line trenches. 
I am glad that there has been on this occasion a visit from Whitehall to 
the Passchendaele of Durham and South Wales.118 
 
 He then took square aim at Stanley, who though essentially on the fence, 
had failed to espouse the verve that had marked their previous years of 
collaboration. After denouncing the 2 million pounds of funding the government 
had proposed for such areas as ‘in comparison with the problems before us…a 
mouse,’ he let fly on his former co-author: 
 
As my right hon. Friend knows well, the most skilful jockey needs the 
help of whip and spur, especially if he was to deal with a somewhat 
obstinate and lethargic mount, and I like to feel that I am perhaps of 
some service to him in that capacity even if he has to disown me and try 
to conceal, what he does not always conceal successfully, his obvious 
impatience with the policy of his present owner and trainer. However, 
he has got one great advantage. Instead of the crude and immature 
alliance he had then [with Macmillan], he has now the Members of a 
Cabinet as the inspiring source of his work. Fastidious eaters consider 
not only their fare but their company, and, if he is satisfied with his, I am 
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quite content with mine.119 
 
Comparing Cabinet to ‘a prison without bars,’ he concluded that ‘a great 
responsibility lies upon members of a Government who remain in that Government 
if they are dissatisfied with the scope of its policy.’120 Yet in light of this, as with 
Boothby calling the other young men not to side with Mosley in 1930-1 cowards, 
Macmillan’s insistence that his return to the Conservative ranks was due to the 
belief that a Chamberlain premiership would pursue a much more robust policy is 
hard to fathom. Throughout this period, Chamberlain had bemoaned responses like 
his as ‘the continual nagging and carping by the young Tory intellectuals,’ and been 
tight with the treasury purse strings.121 As Macmillan later wrote, ‘if [Chamberlain] 
had none of Baldwin’s lethargy, he had little of Baldwin’s imagination.’122 Put 
simply, he made the wrong call – as, vis-à-vis foreign policy, so would Eden who 
had similarly envisaged a more dynamic form of leadership under Neville (he 
certainly received that).123 To paraphrase Lyndon Johnson then, for the Tory 
leadership it was better to have a Macmillan on the inside pissing out, than on the 
outside pissing in, and they successfully manipulated him – something 
contemporary Tories younger than Macmillan suggested in the Commons.124 
Mosley and Macmillan essentially both accomplished nothing in terms of social 
policy during the 1930s. At least the former showed a degree of consistency in 
totally rejecting the status quo. 
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 The second defence of the lack of war generation rebellion is that it was 
impossible for them to get what they wanted in the short term, and at least post 
1945 Britain bore the hallmark of what they had fought for. This seems difficult to 
swallow on two levels. Firstly, only with the coming of war did Beveridge and 
others begin to win the argument: ‘a revolutionary moment in the world’s history 
is a time for revolutions, not for patching’ and so forth.125 This could hardly have 
been banked upon. It also assumes that the conditions in interwar Britain were in 
any way tolerable. For all one does not want to subscribe to the old “locust years” 
theory wholesale, the situation certainly was bleak. The north was riddled with 
unemployment, with areas ‘in a pit of permanent local worklessness.’126 London, 
particularly its east and north, was full of ‘Special Areas’ - that contemporary 
euphemism for slums - which successive governments, as Baldwin actually 
admitted, had failed to defeat.127 Mosley may have misdiagnosed the solution to the 
crisis, but he did appreciate its urgency. There was hardly time to wait for Hitler to 
ride to the rescue. 
 It also assumes that nothing could have been done. Modern British politics, 
it is true, does appear a little inert by continental comparison. Not for us the 
continual governmental changes seen in Italy, the never ending industrial militancy 
of France, or the various uprisings of eastern Europe. All seems stable enough. The 
notion that political outsiders have no power is a fantasy however. In a recent 
study, Lynne Olson has argued that the Churchillian and Edenite anti-appeasement 
MPs ‘demonstrated how a small band of men, lacking much political power or 
influence, could change the course of history by standing up for what they believed 
in.’128 Her arguments for such, as the next chapter will illustrate, are perhaps over 
simplistic. Nevertheless, the idea that we should look beyond the Cowling-esque 
preoccupation with the political big hitters is an important one. By the late 1930s 
there were over 200 ex-serviceman MPs. This, no doubt, was an eclectic group: 
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ranging from George Lloyd’s opposition to Indian Home Rule to Edward Wood’s 
Round Table approach, and from Churchill’s dogmatic belief in laissez-faire to John 
Buchan’s call for ‘an honourable opportunism,’ and Stanley‘s assertion that such 
questions were ‘irrelevant.’129 Yet they were united by a common experience, and 
even allowing for certain discrepancies of ideology, were of such number that some 
significant form of consensus was almost inevitable. Recent British history has 
provided examples of leaders surrounded by their potential enemies - Blair and 
Brown, Thatcher and Heseltine - the question always remains whether the 
challenger is prepared to play Brutus. ‘Treason doth never prosper,’ wrote John 
Harington. Why? ‘For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.’ Ultimately however 
much might like to think otherwise, we condemn Mosley because he lost, not on 
moral grounds. 
4.8 Avoiding Teleology 
 The problem thus, as chapter six will expand upon, is that we judge the 
interwar period by modern sensibilities. As Richard Law sagely put it, ‘there is a 
permanent disposition in the mind of man to forget the past and discount the 
future, and to assume the present is the grand climacteric to which the whole of 
history has been tending.’130 This is a grave danger. There is a pervasive 
Fukayamian veneration of democracy in the current world that simply did not exist 
in the interwar period, particularly in Great Britain. For all we see groups such as 
Harry Pollitt’s Communist Party and Mosley’s Fascists as isolated in mistrusting the 
democratic system, this was not so. To be sure, the political culture was not as rife 
with such contempt as Weimar Germany - the British democratic state had, after 
all, delivered victory in 1918. Equally however, there was nothing approaching 
“faith” in democracy: Mussolini was by no means absurd in comparing it to a 
deserted temple with no followers.131 For a recent historian like Adrian Gregory 
has gone as far to suggest, that in the event of an Italian style nominal victory in 
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1918, it was even likely that an opportunistic populist would have seized power in 
Britain à la Il Duce.132 
 Democracy was on the ropes, having failed its most deserving citizen, the 
ex-soldier. The hopes and promises espoused by the Phoenix Generation in 1918 - 
availability of jobs, clean housing, stable government - had been proven every bit 
as false as the similar words of Lloyd George. War generation politicians were 
clearly not myopic to the problem. Stanley demanded that ‘democracy may be 
made the instrument of progress, and not only be the prelude of decline,’ whilst 
Elliot believed that ‘government, citizenship itself, all have to be recast, or restated 
in the idiom of our own time.’ He continued, urging that ‘the re-moulding that other 
lands have undertaken has been decreed for us also.’133 Manifestly Baldwin and 
MacDonald were not the men to deliver the promised Jerusalem. Yet the 
acknowledged failure of the current political culture - gradualism and “safety first” 
- apparently did not augur a failure of the politics per se. If Headlam was prepared 
to acknowledge that his impoverished voters ‘will only be human to vote against 
me’ in 1931, he proved unwilling to take such dissent to its logical conclusion.134 
 The question was not free trade versus protection, world markets against 
imperial insulation, but whether one prioritised the reduction of unemployment or 
political liberty. Whitehall, as Garside points out, favoured the latter, Mosley the 
former.135 Confidence and the lack of reserves to spend when the economy 
“inevitably” picked up were issues trotted out by the Treasury to justify inaction, 
but they were not the key issue at hand. As the Macmillan report noted, much to 
Hayek’s chagrin, by 1931 parliament found ‘itself increasingly engaged in 
legislation which has for its conscious aim the regulation of the day-to-day affairs 
of the community.’ It ‘now intervenes in matters formerly thought to be entirely 
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outside its scope.’136 This worried a significant body of people beyond the LSE 
intelligentsia. Thus, despite unemployment having become even more of a ‘moral’ 
problem than before 1914, despite Keynes having essentially worked out a demand 
led alternative of public spending by 1929, the expansion of executive power which 
could have curbed the issue was rejected.137 Mosley’s point, essentially, came down 
to too many cooks spoiling the broth. In response Treasury memorandum 
dismissively noted, ‘if...delays are to be obviated, not only the rights of Local 
Authorities and the whole machinery of local government will have to be 
overridden, but a very dramatic policy would be necessary in dealing with the 
rights of private individuals.’138 One might disagree with Mosley, but his argument 
was certainly potent, and the questions perennial. Even if one accepts Daniel 
Ritschel’s contention that planning could mean different things to different people, 
the consensus that did form – for non-Mosleyite groups like Political and Economic 
Planning illustrate the broad nature of such feeling – was at least akin to Baldwin’s 
imprecise appeal to the political centre.139 
 The muddling that resulted eventually produced a Keynesian state, but one 
that emerged into the world somewhat premature. Mosley had lost in his gamble to 
inaugurate a form of government controlling economic and political spheres, whilst 
Macmillan had gained some ground on the former, but proved unable to bring 
either himself or many others to believe in the latter until an improving economy 
removed the focus on such issues.  After 1932 Mosley moved further and further 
into the arms of extremists. Ignoring Habeas Corpus or not, his incarceration in the 
summer of 1940 was understandable in the atmosphere of the time. He had goaded 
Jews, incited violence and consorted with those wishing both Hitler and Hitlerism 
would be seen in the British Isles. Nevertheless, if one traces the story back to 
1930-31, some balance may be reached – his tale, as Matthew Worley recently 
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noted, equally indicative of the problems of translating ideas into action.140  What 
followed after 1945, our sixth chapter will outline. In terms of the interwar years it 
was representative of the confusion that, as we will see, would also mark British 
diplomacy.
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5: Guilty Young Men? Foreign and Imperial Policy from the Armistice to the 
ousting of Chamberlain 
 
It was not such folly as it may now appear, to have believed at that period (1926-29) 
that the League of Nations might succeed in the purpose for which it was created. The 
First World War had profoundly shocked the conscience of mankind…There existed in 
1919 a sentiment, which it would hardly be an exaggeration to call universal, that 
such a thing must never be allowed to happen again. 
- Alfred Duff Cooper, who would break with Chamberlain over Munich, writing in 
1953.1 
 
One of the most striking features of this Debate is the rather disquieting fact that 
there obviously exists a profound division, not only of opinion, but of feeling, between 
men who feel the same politically. 
- Edward Grigg, during the parliamentary debate on the Munich Agreement.2 
5.1 The twists of the historiography 
Scarcely is there a dirtier word in modern politics than “appeasement.”3 The image 
of Neville Chamberlain waving his piece of paper at Heston has become indicative 
of surrender, cowardice and, even betrayal. Even with subsequent adventurous 
military action by western powers in Suez, Vietnam and Iraq meeting with varying 
degrees of failure, liberal democratic opinion still views the “wait and see” nature 
of the British path to war in 1939 as ignoble. Thus we have our interwar diplomacy 
divided into two camps in the popular mind: Guilty Men of the Chamberlain, 
Edward Wood (as Lord Halifax) and Stanley Baldwin type, and those who recognise 
The Gathering Storm of Hitler’s Germany like Churchill and Eden.4 The former, as 
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Kershaw unwittingly points out was generally an old aristocrat at the heart of the 
establishment.5 By contrast, as Olson gleefully notes, ‘most of the MPs who opposed 
appeasement in the 1930s, including Churchill, had fought in the war. (The 
exceptions, like Ronald Cartland, Bob Boothby, and Dick Law, had been too young).’ 
Whereas ‘most of the government ministers responsible for appeasement had 
never been in the trenches,’ the anti-Chamberlainite was generally a 
swashbuckling, handsome, and brave renegade, for which Eden and Duff Cooper 
provided very public examples.6 
 This however is the historiography of appeasement told at its simplest. In 
fact, its twists and turns could well take up a PhD thesis on their own – and with 
Andrew Stedman’s recent offering, they essentially have.7 Guilty Men of course 
kicked it off, and the Chamberlain bashing continued virtually unabated through 
the 1940s and 1950s with John Wheeler Bennett and Lewis Namier adding to what 
“Cato” had started.8 By the 1960s however, things began to change. The opening up 
of papers – both governmental and personal – together with an increasing 
abhorrence to war symbolized by the CND and Alan Clark’s Lions Led by Donkeys 
gave rise to the question, put most explicitly by Donald Cameron Watt, of whether a 
revisionist school had emerged on the subject.9 Even Martin Gilbert, who had 
previously savaged The Appeasers, began to see the course as ‘never a coward’s 
creed.’10 For differing reasons, academics began to converge on the idea that, 
sensibly enough, whilst Chamberlain had ‘hoped for the best’ he also ‘expected the 
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worse.’11 What else, begged Paul Kennedy in 1983, could a small nation losing its 
place in world affairs, and with little to gain from any war, do but appease?12 Thus 
by 1989, John Charmley – building upon his hero Maurice Cowling – could speak of 
Chamberlain’s Lost Peace: whose architects ‘reputation stands better now than it 
has ever done.’13 
 Charmley would be rather swimming against the tide however. By the late 
1980s, academics were beginning to return to the Guilty Men thesis. R.A.C. Parker’s 
Chamberlain and Appeasement portrayed a Prime Minister by no means the victim 
of circumstance who consciously chose conciliation, and never wavered even after 
Hitler’s absorption of the rump Czech state had rendered any realpolitik 
explanation predicated on German self-determination evidently fallacious.14 These 
post-revisionists also alleged that, if Chamberlain was perhaps not the aloof and 
arrogant ignorer of official advice the critics of the 1940s and 1950s had suggested, 
he put such a negative spin on the intelligence coming out of Germany that he 
talked both his cabinet and people into a policy they might not otherwise have 
swallowed. In other words, he deceived others willingly in order to appease. In 
such a tale, as Olson has noted, it is feasible – even necessary – to return to old 
notion’s of a myopic PM and visionary Churchillian outsiders.15 
 This most recent picture is however a little hard to digest. Churchill, after 
all, claimed to be speaking for the best of England: ‘the grand old British race that 
had done so much for men, and had yet some more to give.’16 Such deeply 
ingrained moral convictions, such a chivalrous heritage, could surely never stand 
for Chamberlain’s peace with dishonour. Yet even if we ignore the pragmatic rather 
than moral nature of previous British diplomacy (Salisbury’s “Splendid Isolation” 
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and Beaconsfieldism spring to mind), it is clear Churchill’s line makes no sense.17 
Though by 1939 Duff Cooper could conclude that ‘[Chamberlain’s] is an unbroken 
record of failure in foreign policy,’ prior to Hitler’s march into Prague the exact 
opposite was true in the public mind.18 The Britain to which Churchill appealed 
was, not for the first time, unrepresentative of the contemporary reality.  
 As even a critic noted, ‘to say that all the blame must rest on the shoulders 
of Neville Chamberlain or of Stanley Baldwin is to overlook the obvious… Given the 
conditions of democratic government, a free press, public elections and a cabinet 
responsible to Parliament and thus to the people, given rule by the majority, it is 
unreasonable to blame the entire situation on one man or group.’19 This is true in 
two regards. Firstly, as this chapter will show, parliamentary attitudes towards 
Hitler’s Germany were indecisive at best. Men - even those, like Eden, later 
eulogised as the ‘one strong figure standing up against…surrender…and feeble 
impulses’ - could trade positions at the drop of a hat, or movement of a Wehrmacht 
division.20 Secondly, the prevailing mentality in Britain between the two wars was 
that 3 September 1939 should never have happened, that is to say for Britain to 
engage in another war, per se, was a horror beyond horrors. This point can scarcely 
be made more emphatically. Neville Chamberlain was not somehow hijacking 
public opinion for his own cowardly ends. Though he clearly enjoyed lapping up 
the plaudits as the man of peace, as for a while did Mussolini, he was also merely 
reflecting his electorate. Much has been written about Chamberlain manipulating 
the press, through his minion Joseph Ball or the pliability of Geoffrey Dawson’s 
editorship of The Times, but the crowds that greeted his return from Munich could 
not be fabricated.21 
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 The Phoenix Generation had played their part in this the moment they 
opened their political mouths. Concurrent to the unsubtle brandishing of their 
military records come election time was a vocal determination that 1918 should 
indeed “end all wars.” As one ex-serviceman candidate put it: ‘the one great and 
universal heirloom of all times and generations should be the memory of the past 
four and a half years, so that they may never be repeated. For only if they never are 
repeated will they not have been in vain.’22 ‘War,’ Mosley concurred, ‘must never 
happen again.’23 Such ‘pervasive representation of the war dead as martyrs for 
peace,’ as Alex King notes, was undoubtedly a powerful determinant of the 
widespread support for appeasement.24 A culture that could generate the 
Cenotaph, a raft of anti-war literature too numerous to list, and even - in 
admittedly rare and bizarre circles - sustain stories that somehow Kitchener had 
survived, laying in wait like King Arthur to someday return as the nation’s saviour, 
was not one exactly geared for war.25 This chapter will illustrate the effect of 
throwing veteran politicians into just such a heady atmosphere, charting their 
outlook on foreign affairs from victory in the first war to the onset of the second. 
 Foreign affairs must, of course, include the Empire. For years British 
historians have entrenched themselves into an arguably artificial divide between 
diplomatic and imperial history. Accounts of this period almost treat Colonial and 
Dominion opinion as something British leaders could waft away like some 
annoying insect: A.J.P. Taylor, for example, chose to not even mention Canada, 
Australia, South Africa (save two references to Smuts’s opinion of the peace 
treaties) or New Zealand throughout his Origins of the Second World War.26 The 
independence movements in Ireland, India and Egypt naturally cannot be left out 
of any story of Britain between the wars, but the effect has often been to minimise 
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the relation between imperial and foreign policy. One can study both Michael 
Collins and Benito Mussolini, but never shall the two meet in any form of narrative. 
The unhelpfulness of this technique can be surmised in two words: Winston 
Churchill. For the divisive atmosphere in which he met the appeasement years was, 
as is well documented in the memoirs of contemporaries, a path allegedly augured 
by his belligerent views on India.27 Other than the general fear of war, if one wants 
to explain why men such as Churchill and Amery were initially seen as wrong 
about Hitler, and Halifax and Baldwin right, it is as well to study their previous 
approaches to Mahatma Gandhi, as contemporary estimates of German military 
strength. The view that Churchill’s opinions on India begat a chasm amongst 
radical conservatives that even the threat of Hitler could not overcome should not 
be swallowed wholesale however, as we will see. 
 At the same time, British decolonisation has a historiography which perhaps 
requires a little revision.28 Economics, of course, has been an ever present 
analytical tool. 1930s John Strachey - before his reinvention as post-war Labour 
Minister - took the Leninist position that colonial exploitation would augur mass 
protest against the British.29 From the opposite perspective, Niall Ferguson has 
pointed to an ‘empire for sale’ after the financially draining effects of the second 
world war.30 As these two positions illustrate, the argument has essentially come 
down to whether decolonisation occurred as a result of the weakness of the ruling 
power - Britannia Overruled - or was forced, as Mansergh asserted, by the bravery 
and cunning of the nationalist uprising.31 Gibbon and Kennedy, it is true, offer a 
wider debate about the nature of empire - inevitable ‘decline and fall’ versus peaks 
and troughs - but, in British terms, academics have been stuck on the question of 
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“did they jump or were they pushed?”32 There is nothing necessarily wrong with 
this. Gandhi, Nehru, Collins and de Valera were all compelling figures whose tactics 
- such as the latter two manipulating Irish-American opinion - were astute.33 
Likewise, war had clearly left its mark upon a ravaged Britain, whose imperial 
overstretch was now at breaking point. 
 As with appeasement however, the historiography leaves something to be 
desired. To be blunt, it is somewhat unclear what actually happens in imperial 
terms between the wars. Attitudes towards the Dominions, Egypt and India, to 
Darwin, serve as indicators of a ‘powerful trend towards self government in British 
policy’ in this period.34 Yet, at the same time, ‘for all the piety of its new principles, 
postwar imperial policy seemed strangely reluctant to liberate Britain’s 
dependencies or hold out firm promises of independence.’35 British leaders, 
Darwin continues, retained confidence in their ability to rule, and any antagonisms 
between ruler and the ruled were seen as both temporary and curable: ‘if the lion 
had ceased to roar, it was not ready to lie down with the lambs.’36 Such confusion 
presumably arises from the general preoccupation with the road to 1939: all that is 
necessary to understand the British position in the world between the wars is their 
relationship with Hitler. If the historian chooses to discuss the Empire, it is 
generally either in terms of which chunk of Africa Britain could dangle in front of 
Germany and Italy, or the pyrrhic nature of the decision to fight on in 1940.37 Thus 
we content ourselves with the simplistic story of British imperial strength slowly 
being eroded by external factors, the second war exacerbating the trend, before the 
“Winds of Change” were at last acknowledged in the 1950s and 1960s.38 
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 Just as the third chapter did not accept the widely held image of an inert 
Stanley Baldwin as definitive, this one will not sit upon old laurels. Imperial decline 
cannot be divorced from general diplomacy. Both are symptomatic of a wider 
adjustment in the way Britain perceived herself in the post 1918 world. Though 
this is not a study of individual policy makers (to be sure Lloyd, Halifax, Churchill 
and so on will naturally crop up), it is an analysis of collective thought, and in such 
terms will Britain abroad be viewed. We will consider the development of attitudes 
amongst the Phoenix Generation to Germany and the colonies as one story. How 
former soldiers viewed the decline of an empire they had risked their lives to 
protect, how they reacted to British military excesses in the colonies, and how they 
viewed the prospect of another war are complex issues, and ones not best served 
by simply pointing to set pieces such as the resignation of Duff Cooper and Amery 
yelling ‘in the name of God, go!’ Opinions changed gradually and sometimes 
ambiguously, and thus need to be sketched over the (relatively) longue durée. 
Three pillars of policy - foreign, imperial and League of Nations intertwined to a 
large degree. It is one long narrative which needs to be teased out, and will be 
treated as such. First then, to the victorious days of 1918. 
5.2 Early Attitudes to Germany 
When Major Jack Cohen made his way to the stage to address the Liverpudlian 
electorate in December 1918, the respectful audience stood in unison. He however 
did not, his legs having been blown off in combat. To hammer home his patriotism - 
the Conservative electoral machine evidently not one for poignant subtlety at this 
time - patriotic songs enlivened the Sun Hall before the speech making began, 
which was followed by a fife and drum band marching as a preliminary to the 
Major himself.39 Having been helped onto the stage, Cohen let fly with an anti-
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German tirade that must have constituted catharsis for both himself, and many in 
the audience who had directly or indirectly experienced something similar to his 
fate. ‘With the Kaiser he bracketed the whole German nation,’ reported the 
Liverpool Post and Mercury. Germans were to be excluded from Britain, restrictions 
were to be placed to prevent her from waging war again, the Kaiser himself was to 
be put on trial and ‘there should be no Peace Conference, but merely an acceptance 
of the Allied terms.’40 Such views were, perhaps unsurprisingly, by no means 
unique amongst victorious candidates. Richard Barnett in St Pancras demanded the 
Kaiser be ‘brought to punishment.’41 ‘We must make them pay to the last farthing,’ 
argued Christopher Lowther, ‘even if they were beggared for a hundred years.’42 
The Norfolk public were similarly reminded by Michael Falcon to ‘look at the 
conditions they imposed on Romania. Do you mean to say that they would not have 
done the same to us?’43 Somewhere in Pasewalk Military Hospital, Adolf Hitler was 
probably seething. 
 The conditions of 1918 were however a little artificial – as John Ramsden 
recently noted.44 It was, after all, hardly the time to voice pro-German sentiment. 
Yet the notion, which would resurface in the 1930s, of appealing to Germany’s 
better side was by no means novel. For all the twentieth century has been defined 
on such terms, the concept of Britain, with France by her side, going to war against 
Germany took a little getting used to. When, at the start of the war, The Times 
brought up Haldane’s pre-1914 sympathies toward the Germans, Lord Milner 
                                                           
40 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 14 December 1918. 
41 St Pancras Guardian, 6 December 1918. 
42 Cumberland Times, 7 December 1918. 
43 Norfolk News, 7 December 1918. 
44 J. Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War: Britain and the Germans Since 1890, (London, 2006), 
passim argues that, throughout the adversarial history of the Anglo-German relationship in 
said period, there has often been a countervailing sense that a meeting of minds was 
possible. When, in 1965, the Queen made the first state visit to Germany since the time of 
the Kaiser, a German journalist wrote: 'No relations between peoples have been more 
deeply disturbed ... and this precisely because there was so much sympathy, so much 
wooing, willingness to understand, even admiration involved on both sides. The pain of 
disappointment corresponded to the degree of previously nurtured expectations.' Football 
only became an issue since England’s post 1966 malaise, and Beckenbauer’s ruthlessly 
effective leadership over the next two and half decades (as World Cup winning Captain and 
then Manager). 
203 
 
fumed that ‘if it is necessary for good and effective patriotism to hate the nation to 
which your country happens to be opposed, I am afraid I don’t possess that 
virtue.’45 Months later, in a similar vein, Amery replied that ‘all this harping on 
Prussian militarism as something that must be rooted out, as in itself criminal and 
opposed to the interests of an imaginary virtuous and pacific entity called Europe, 
in which we are included, is wholly mischievous.’46 Likewise, Victor Cazalet was not 
alone amongst his cohort in being impressed at the arguments of Norman Angell. It 
was difficult, he concluded, to summon up the supposedly necessary reservoirs of 
patriotism: particularly against a nation which had produced such talented artists 
and musicians.47 Rhetoric espoused in the aftermath of triumph should not blind us 
to the longer term, relatively benign perceptions of Germany. The sonderweg of 
German history, the particular Course of which A.J.P. Taylor wrote, can only - if 
indeed at all - be sustained in retrospect. Neither Chamberlain from one 
perspective nor the anti-appeasers from another operated in the shadow of 
Auschwitz and Treblinka.48 After these horrors, it must also be said, (West) 
Germany was very brought back into the European fold and permitted - for the 
Allies still had some say - to experience its “economic miracle” of the 1950s. Anti-
Germanism, so vividly expressed in 1918, was in actual fact a rather transient 
phenomenon.49 
5.3 Internationalism 
‘The Conservative is wrong,’ noted a young Edward Wood, who believed that ‘in 
each of the cardinal instances that presents themselves to mind - Ireland, India, 
Egypt, the general treatment of domestic questions - the source of the trouble lies 
solely or even mainly in excessive “liberalism”, that a full blooded Conservative 
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would be any more successful in prescribing remedies.’50 We have hitherto seen 
the prevalence of a leftist viewpoint vis-à-vis domestic policy, and it certainly was 
sometimes little different concerning diplomatic affairs. ‘Many of us who fought in 
the Great War,’ wrote an Eden months away from becoming Foreign Secretary, 
‘must then have felt that if ever we survived we must devote out energies to 
establishing in international affairs some rule of law and justice, without which 
peace can never be assured.’51 Here he was but reflecting the long held position of 
his contemporaries, that the League of Nations was the path to solving the world’s 
ills. For all the retrospective condemnation, the League provided a constant hope of 
salvation for the Phoenix Generation. The 1938 By-Election in Ipswich is an 
interesting case in point. Henry Willink’s Election Pamphlet at once linked the 
supposedly special insight of the ex-serviceman with the pro-League position: 
 
Since the General Election of 1935, the international situation has been 
anxious and critical. We have in Mr Eden a Foreign Secretary who 
knows, as I do, at first hand what war means, and who is a whole-
hearted supporter of the League of Nations. I support without 
qualification his declaration of foreign policy:- 
 
“We will embark upon no action which would be contrary to the text or 
the spirit of the Covenant… While we recognise that the League is at 
present seriously handicapped by incomplete membership, we believe 
it still provides the best means for obtaining that [peaceful] result.”52 
 
Eden, of course, was soon to resign. Yet the ideas that informed his time as Foreign 
Secretary were longstanding. 
 From the 1918 declaration of Cyril Entwistle - campaigning in Hull - that 
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‘nothing should be allowed to impede the League of Nations,’ veterans fully 
associated themselves with the cause.53 Alfred Duff Cooper was a particularly 
strong advocate, progressing from a position of ‘sceptical benevolence’ to a belief 
that ‘either the League of Nations must triumph or there must be another war.’54 
Between January 1928 and April 1929 alone he spoke at 19 meetings of the League 
of Nations Union.55 This same organisation, let it be noted, could also count upon 
the donations of Victor Cazalet, and contained John Loder within their executive 
committee.56 At one such event, revealed in the lengthy correspondence between 
him and Gilbert Murray (then Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League 
of Nations Union) Duff’s ‘splendid contribution’ contributed to an ‘astonishingly 
successful’ gathering: ‘six hundred new members were roped in there and then.’57 
Whilst placing the success of this meeting solely on Duff’s shoulders would 
presumably be an exaggeration, his speeches certainly bear the hallmarks of a 
fervent belief combined with reasoned argument which the observer could find 
attractive. To the question, ‘do you really believe in the League?’ Duff 
 
would retort, “Do you believe in the fire brigade? I disapprove of houses 
on fire and I know of no organisation for putting them out other than 
the fire brigade. It may be badly managed, it may be inefficient, but none 
the less if I could help it I would certainly do so. I also disapprove of 
war. I know of no mechanism that exists for preventing it other than the 
League of Nations. The League may fail…But so long as there is the 
faintest chance of its succeeding I believe that we should give it all the 
help we can.58 
 
Duff, by his advocacy of the League, represented to world a certain type of Tory. 
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The Attorney General Lord Hailsham, would write to him to request that he speak 
at, rather than chair, a Marylebone meeting of the Union as ‘it has the great 
advantage of giving…my people a bit of a change and letting them hear from one of 
the younger Conservative Members the true Conservative doctrine.’59 From the 
Liberal perspective, Murray also deigned to put Duff on last at a meeting ‘so that 
you will have more freedom in making it clear that good Conservatives can be good 
Leaguers and good members of the L.N.U.’60 To some Tories this was oxymoronic. 
Even Austen Chamberlain - lauded with the Nobel Prize for Locarno but seven 
years earlier - scorned ‘oh! These peace lovers. They are far worse than the men of 
war.’61 To be sure, such ardent belief in the League could sometimes be sui generis 
to the war generation. Men like Lord Birkenhead, as Duff informed Murray, could 
hardly be relied upon to sing the League’s praises.62 
As Bonar Law denounced Britain acting alone as ‘the policeman of the world’ 
and Ataturk successfully challenged the Versailles system by force of arms in the 
early 1920s, so the Phoenix Generation responded.63 Collective security would 
certainly become a vocal concern to such men in the 1930s, yet it should be 
remembered that for the previous decade they had been known to voice opinions 
diametrically opposed to such belligerence. Auckland Geddes, speaking in 1920 
upon his appointment as Ambassador to Washington, noted that ‘[England] has 
changed enormously during the war. Her people, the English people, as I know 
them, are intensely anti-militarist; they are seeking peace, they are liberal, 
democratic, they wish prosperity restored to Europe.’64 This, then, was hardly the 
time for unnecessary foreign adventure. Writing decades later, after widespread 
denouncement of appeasement, Lloyd-Greame’s account of the autumn of 1922 
reflects such a spirit:  
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What finally precipitated Lloyd George’s downfall was his impetuous 
account of the Greeks in the post-war clash between Greece and Turkey, 
known as the Chanak crisis… The Greek army had been overwhelmed in 
Asia Minor and massacred in Smyrna and the victorious Turkish army 
[had] advanced to the Dardanelles. Lloyd-George’s encouragement of 
the Greeks in their campaign in Asia Minor was as unpopular as it was 
disastrous.65  
 
Chamberlain and Halifax did not thus invent the notion of diplomatic conciliation. 
Taylor’s comment that Munich ‘was a triumph for British policy,…a triumph for all 
that was best and most enlightened in British life;…a triumph for those who had 
courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles,’ was 
not the mischief making it appeared to be.66 Men from all spectrums had preached 
the necessity of European unity and reconciliation.67  The reactions to the Genoa 
Conference -  from two figures later to denounce appeasement deserve repetition: 
‘had Genoa succeeded, there might perhaps have been no…Second World War,’ ‘the 
conference crashed, and with it all the hopes of a generation.’68 Whilst such 
retrospective views are couched in the assumption that the conference would have 
nipped Hitler in the bud, they also reflect the notion that a solution to the German 
problem was both workable and desirable. The question of Versailles’s moral 
validity is essentially irrelevant, what mattered was that there was a clear German 
grievance, and one, given the attitudes of Gustav Stressmann, Franz von Papen and 
essentially most German statesmen, which was not limited to the Nazis. Dealing 
with it without the use of force was not the outrageous idea it would later come to 
be seen as, as evidenced by reactions to Genoa and Locarno. ‘Blessed are the 
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Peacemakers, they shall be labelled the children of God‘ was hardly Chamberlain’s 
sole preserve.69 
5.4 A Case Study of Imperialism: Ireland 
Concurrent to a rather confused attitude regarding the Germans and the 
application of force was a growing division over the nation’s imperial position. 
Dean Acheson famously espoused in 1962 that ‘Britain has lost an empire, and yet 
to find a role.’ Yet the very losing of the Empire was itself accompanied by a 
pervading national confusion. In some sense 1919 constituted a global assertion of 
the French Revolutionary concepts of ‘liberté, égalité, et fraternité.’ The Wilsonian 
world, with the notable exception of Germany, was predicated on national self-
determination. The difficultly for the British was explaining how this might not 
always apply to 400 million Indians or the Irish Republican Army. Some of course, 
like Churchill, had no such preconceptions: Gandhi was but a ‘seditious fakir of a 
type well known in the east,’ and attitudes towards Britain’s closest colony often 
did not, as Bridgeman noted, progress beyond ‘the old narrow, bigoted hatred of 
Roman Catholics and refusal to believe that any good can come out of Southern 
Ireland.’70 The Indian Defence Committee - whose first meeting was attended by 64 
MPs - undoubtedly represented a significant body of Conservative Party thought. 
As, one such veteran supporter, Henry Page Croft noted in bellicose language: 
 
Those of us who believe that British rule in India is vital for the welfare 
of Indians and the safeguarding of British interests may be driven… to 
show that we place the safety of India and the preservation of the 
Empire before any considerations. We are reinforced in the belief that 
we represent ninety-five per cent of the Conservative Party in the 
country.71 
 
                                                           
69 Matthew 5:9. 
70   P. Williamson (ed), The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of 
William Bridgeman 1904-1935, (London, 1988), 154 [17 December 1921]. 
71 H. Page Croft, My Life of Strife, (London, 1972), 232. 
209 
 
Such viewpoints were not merely the preserve of stuffy old men. George Lloyd had 
fought in the war and returned to pen the radical - within Conservative thought - 
Great Opportunity with that upholder of precisely the opposite view on India, 
Edward Wood. To men such as Lloyd, the great sacrifices of British manhood had 
not been given merely to toss away the jewel in the imperial crown within a 
decade. A New Party pamphlet from the 1931 General Election espoused this view 
perfectly: 
 
Even now, from a hundred platforms adorned with Union Jacks Tory 
orators are mouthing with pompous insolence the platitudes of Empire. 
The British Empire means nothing to these well-fed mongers of the 
stocks and shares of all the markets of the world. It was not built by 
such as they, but by the sweat and blood and tears of millions of 
unknown men and women, who have worked and died under every sun, 
and sailed and fought over all the seas.72 
  
To Conservatives of the Churchill and Lloyd type, the war had been about the 
preservation of the Empire, not its dissolution. To do so was almost to sully the 
heroism of the dead. 
 Whilst the Die Hards were not isolated mavericks however, they did go 
against the evolving trend in Conservative thought towards slow decolonisation. 
One must be clear, there were very few - if any - on the political right who believed 
the Empire was per se a bad thing: Lloyd was by no means fanciful in believing he 
could carry the Conservative rank and file with him on the subject (witness the 
ambivalent reactions to his grandstanding at the October 1932 Party 
Conference).73 Yet, due to the violent nature of British rule, the Empire was clearly 
losing something of its raison d’être. Though maintained by force majeur, the 
imperial role was justified on a more ephemeral notion of a certain moral 
benevolence. The natives needed the British, and thus they stayed. Holes began to 
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appear in this façade almost immediately after the war. Amritsar proved a shock to 
British sensibilities, yet it was Ireland where the idea of empire truly began to be 
questioned: perhaps a little surprisingly since, their white skin side, they were 
often deemed innately less useful subjects than the Indians and Egyptians whose 
war service met with praise amongst men normally prejudiced against them on 
racial grounds. Ireland is indeed a significant example, and it is worth examining at 
some length. 
With the passage of the Third Home Rule Bill in 1914, its subsequent 
suspension due to the war, and the Easter Rising of 1916, Ireland was always likely 
to become a contentious issue for politicians at the conflict’s conclusion. The 
Coalition manifesto in 1918 treated the issue in decidedly ambiguous terms. Whilst 
pledging to deliver ‘self government,’ the secession of Ireland from the British 
Empire and the forced inclusion of Ulster into a Dublin parliament were declared to 
be ‘two paths which are closed.’74 According to the Coalition‘s leaders, ‘the main 
body of Irish opinion’ was also ‘seldom…less disposed to compromise than it is at 
the present moment.’75 With a few exceptions, the Phoenix Generation placed less 
emphasis on Ireland in getting elected in 1918 than they did on issues like 
reconstruction. Where they did comment, most were broadly more sympathetic to 
the nationalist position than non-veteran Coalition candidates. Of the latter, one 
might highlight Neville Jodrell - standing in Ely - who viewed Ireland as a place 
‘where German poison had been insidiously spread…[and where] they had division 
and disloyalty, all the result of German intrigue.’76 Similarly, Leo Amery attended a 
meeting where one Tory advocated Home Rule, but only because during the war 
‘the Irish were the worst soldiers in the field.’77 Into such an atmosphere did the 
Phoenix Generation enter. 
 The Irish question took two forms in British politics in the period 
immediately after 1918 - a low road and a high road. The first was represented by 
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the use of Black and Tan troops to terrorise the Irish countryside - a policy most, 
including the Bishop of Ardagh, felt to be ‘connived at, if not originated, by the 
British Government.’78 The second concerned the attempt to move beyond such 
violence, and create a workable Irish Government. Before the summer of 1920, 
British politicians had yet to consent to the former, and had managed little 
concerning the latter. Between the election and May 1920 only (a relative word) 14 
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) Officers had been murdered by the Irish rebels, and 
this had been met with no widespread indiscipline in response.79 Republican 
hunger strikes at Wormwood Scrubs Prison in the Spring of 1920 had also passed 
without major incident.80 Ireland was not a pleasant place to be in first eighteen 
months after the Great War, but it was at least tolerable. Then both sides raised the 
stakes, violence ensued, and the Phoenix Generation produced arguably their most 
righteous early stand. 
 Were one wishing to point to a date when attitudes to the Irish question 
intensified, the Sack of Balbriggan on 20 September 1920 would be as reasonable 
as any other. The levels of British auxiliary troops in Ireland had increased 
dramatically that summer - between 1 May and 31 July 1920 556 Irishmen had 
resigned from the RIC, being replaced by 800 Black and Tans - and the ‘destruction 
of property’ seen in Balbriggan as ‘vengeance for the death of [RIC] comrades’ 
would be a pattern that would only continue.81 For our purposes however, it marks 
the date that parliamentary perspectives concerning Ireland began to change. 
Before then, as Boyce notes, attitudes had ‘developed along fairly orthodox - not to 
say predictable lines.’82 The Liberals disliked the repressive violence, 
Conservatives giving varying degrees of support. From September 1920 on 
however, both the conservative press and the Phoenix Generation made a dramatic 
move against the government. The word reprisals began to appear with 
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increasingly regularity in conservative newspapers - The Times printing 7 
headlines containing the word in September, and 14 in October, compared to just 3 
in August.83 With a more rebellious spirit in the air, the Phoenix Generation were 
not about to disappointment, and would help shape, rather than just reflect, 
contemporary feeling. 
 On 4 November 1920 
 
Mr Mosley asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether, in view of his 
discovery that certain Irish assassins never sleep more than one night 
running in the same place, he has yet devised a more efficient system of 
bringing these murderers to justice than…burning the next day houses 
of other people in the vicinity of the outrages.84 
 
Greenwood could only reply that he was satisfied that all was well. Aside from 
sarcasm, Mosley’s question reflected two other parts of his makeup. One was the 
obsession he would have with efficiency, which would mark his whole career from 
the Birmingham Proposals of 1925 through to his plan for an allegedly more 
equitable Eur-Africa imperial system in the 1950s.85 The other was his view of how 
a war should be fought, which he had undoubtedly gained from the trenches. 
Mosley was not opposed to violence per se - as those attending the Olympia 
meeting would discover in 1934 - but he believed there was a certain way one 
should undertake it, and the Black and Tans were alien to this notion. Veterans of 
all parties broadly agreed. Kenworthy, in comparing the events in Ireland with 
German atrocities committed in Belgium during the war, provided an eloquent 
condemnation: 
 
If we do not condemn it, we shall be as guilty as the German people and 
worse. This house may not condemn it, but I hope the people outside 
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will. If not, then Germany will have won the war. The Prussian spirit will 
have entered into us. The Prussian spirit at last will be triumphant, and 
the 800,000, the flower of our race, who lie buried in a score of 
battlefields will really have died in vain.86 
 
Interestingly most of those generally critical of the government‘s Irish policy, as 
Robert Cecil articulated, ‘did not agree with the kind of speech with which we have 
heard. I cannot accept a view…which almost ignores the outrages on the police, and 
is confined entirely to a condemnation of…reprisals.’87 Yet the Phoenix Generation 
apparently did. Mosley criticised Kenworthy, but only for not going far enough. The 
German ‘method is not our method,’ he cried, ‘our method is far more reminiscent 
of the pogrom of the more barbarous Slav, and represents a far greater breakdown 
of law and order and justice than did the German method in Belgium.’88 War 
veterans did not condemn the violence primarily because it was unacceptable in a 
traditionally moral sense however (though this was not an insignificant part of 
their arsenal), but because it was unacceptable to the type of chivalrous war they 
believed themselves to have fought a few years earlier. 
 Their outrage was very specifically targeted, both against individual Black 
and Tan battalions and the government which condoned their actions. The official 
army troops, the Phoenix Generation were keen to stress, would never have 
condoned such behaviour. Mosley, as he himself acknowledged, was not speaking 
for the poor Irish peasant but 
 
largely on behalf of the troops stationed in Ireland, whom I believe to be 
entirely innocent of anything of the nature described this afternoon, 
[and for whom] I wish to see the demand for an inquiry pressed. 
Famous regiments that for generations past have performed most 
magnificent services to this country, are today labouring under certain 
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imputations - imputations which I have every reason to believe are 
unjust. They are shouldering the guilt of others.89 
 
The ‘others’ of which Mosley spoke were plainly Lloyd George and Greenwood, 
men who had ‘surrendered something which I, at any rate, believe to be more 
important in this world even than the outrages in Ireland…[Namely,] the very root 
principle of British justice.’90 One should perhaps not go too far. Not every member 
of the Phoenix Generation was a critic of government policy. Arthur Henderson’s 
20 October 1920 vote of censure against the government was heavily rejected by 
our war veterans, who initially by and large remained loyal to the government 
line.91 Nevertheless, when one charts the development of what Boyce has dubbed 
‘the English Conscience’ concerning Ireland, the Phoenix Generation would play an 
important role.92  
 From a constitutional standpoint, their stand was also significant. Let us not 
forget the dangers to British democracy in this period of which Baldwin so often 
warned. Official sources, both military and political, were greatly worried about 
what the Black and Tan whirlwind might augur on British soil. A mob of wild, 
rampaging young men armed to the teeth was but a freikorps in the making, even if 
one temporarily located across the Irish sea. The army had visions of their own 
disintegration, Lloyd George the potential for strife at home.93 That veterans did 
not side automatically with their former comrades, particularly in the light of 
Mosley’s later overt adoption of militaristic regalia, is an important point. 
5.5 The Domestic Consequences of Empire  
 Criticism for government policy - as ever - was most vocally seen from the 
opposition benches. After Henderson’s request for an inquiry was refused, the 
Labour Party set up a commission of its own to investigate the state of affairs in 
Ireland. When the commission finally left Dublin on 14 December 1920 after taking 
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in Cork, Killarney and Limerick, it returned with ‘evidence…more than sufficient to 
justify the strongest condemnation of the policy of the British Government.’94 Yet 
running parallel to the party political game was the hitherto somewhat ignored 
case of the Phoenix Generation, pledged to support the Bonar Law-Lloyd George 
leadership. The two members who crossed the floor over the issue - Mosley and 
Henry Cavendish Bentinck - were ex-servicemen, and became co-founders of the 
Peace with Ireland Council at the same time, as Irish documents reveal, as meeting 
with representatives of the rebels.95 Important to the Council’s allure, as Boyce 
states, was that it ‘was a non-party organisation and could not be suspected of 
working for mere political advantage at the expense of the government.’96 Its stated 
aim of an honourable solution to the Irish problem received the backing of various 
veteran MPs including Walter Elliot, who had previously broken with the Coalition 
line over the ignominious Restoration of Order in Ireland Bill.97 
 Just as important as condemning the violence however, war veteran 
politicians seemed to place a greater importance in drafting an equitable and 
workable political solution for the island of Ireland. On 20 October 1920 the House 
of Commons had been packed - the issue under discussion, reprisals. Two days 
later, when the time came to debate the Government for Ireland Bill the Liberal 
Kenworthy expressed anger at the empty chamber - ‘look at the benches now, my 
own benches as well as any others. That alone shows the whole farce of 
proceedings.’98 Kenworthy’s point was entirely valid - what was the point of 
condemning (and eventually eliminating) the troubles in Ireland if, ultimately, it 
did not achieve a peaceful and lasting political solution? The war veteran politician 
as a whole seems to have given greater thought to the eventual composition of an 
Irish state - and been more sympathetic to its very existence - than the average 
Unionist backbencher, who as Mosley later noted, could be ‘fanatical on the Irish 
                                                           
94      Ibid, p62. 
95      Art O’Brien to Arthur Griffith, 2 December 1920, NAI, UCDA P150/1900. 
96      Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, 65. 
97      Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6 August 1920, vol.132, cc.2961-2964. 
98      Ibid, 22 October 1920, vol. 133, col.1265. 
216 
 
question.’99 Edward Hilton Young believed it was necessary to hand over 
widespread economic control to Dublin ‘in order to enable them to construct a 
fiscal, revenue, and economic system which is suitable to the needs of their own 
country.’100 Before crossing the floor, Mosley himself was advocating a ‘Cuban 
solution’ - complete internal independence, with certain safeguards for foreign and 
defence policy.101 The key, as Edward Wood noted, was that both sides should talk: 
‘Let us recognise that just as in the war the purely military effort was just a 
percentage of the whole national task, so in Ireland the matter is in by the far larger 
proportion a question of political amelioration rather than of firm 
administration.’102 In a similar vein, Cyril Enwistle had immediately challenged 
Lloyd George’s assertion that, unlike in Ulster, those claiming to speak for southern 
Ireland would not be prepared to settle for anything less than a republic, asking 
‘will you at least try them?’ Lloyd George stated he would not.103 One cannot 
describe Phoenix Generation opposition to Black and Tan violence as purely 
calculative, given that whilst condemning the low road of British policy they were 
also contributing much to a high road solution. 
 Veterans seemed to have their collective finger more on the pulse than the 
government. As late as June 1922 Lloyd George would write to Churchill claiming 
that ‘if the Free-Staters insisted on a constitution which repudiated Crown and 
Empire and practically set up a Republic we could carry the whole world with us 
on any action we took.’104 Any action? What American president could have 
supported a re-conquest of Ireland with that nation’s large Irish electorate? For as 
Carroll has stated, ‘the Irish question was an important issue in American public 
life for nearly two decades during the early twentieth century.’105 Eamon de Valera 
knew this, and his tour to the United States in 1919 was undeniably an astute 
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move.106 In Westminster such tactics were acknowledged to be prudent by 
Kenworthy who pointed to ‘people abroad’ having ‘the greatest sympathy with a 
nationality struggling for freedom against what is represented to be a tyrant power 
over them.’107 Mosley too spoke of the possibly negative consequences the 
American Commission’s findings in Ireland that ‘Imperial British Government has 
incited their agents to slay, burn and loot’ could bring.108 That Lloyd George 
refused to acknowledge the fact that world opinion might not automatically be pro-
British - even after the Black and Tan violence had reached its crescendo - points to 
his over reliance on “Die-Hard” Conservatism to retain power. As Beaverbrook 
later noted, ‘few people stopped to think on the amazing…position of Lloyd 
George…a Prime Minister without a Party.’109 This precarious position seems to 
have influenced the nominally Liberal Prime Minster to an extraordinary extent 
during the Irish affair: for, as Edward Wood noted, ‘he can make no…offer unless 
assured of its acceptance.’110 Thus whilst it was certainly easier for a lowly 
backbencher to revolt against the traditionally Unionist position than a cabinet 
minister (notably a man like Philip Lloyd-Greame did not resign from the Board of 
Trade over the issue), one must acknowledge that the war brought the Phoenix 
Generation a moralistic perspective others did not, or could not, possess.  
 If the Irish question was indeed on everyone’s lips in 1920 and 1921 - 
Charlie Chaplin remembered the first question he was asked when arriving in 
France to promote The Kid was on the subject - it was but symptomatic of a greater 
struggle.111 Ireland was simply one of the battlegrounds in the ideological struggle 
over the future of empire within British Conservatism. In the centre stood the 
Coalition, with its “carrot and stick” approach to diplomacy - Irish rebellion would 
be quashed with the one hand whilst the other greeted Eamon de Valera at 
                                                           
106      Ibid, 149-151. 
107      Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 20 October 1920, vol. 133, col.960. 
108      Ibid, 6 July 1921, vol. 142, col.1505. 
109      M. Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George: And Great Was the Fall Thereof, 
(London, 1963), 9. 
110      Evening Standard, 10 August 1920. 
111      C. Chaplin, My Autobiography, (London, 2003), 262. 
218 
 
Chequers.112 To the right of this had emerged a group of reactionary zealots such as 
Leo Maxse, editor of the Morning Post, Page Croft, and Bottomley, who saw 
potential threats to British interest at every corner. To such men, any threat to the 
Empire needed elimination: ‘socialism’ was a ‘grave danger’ to ‘the maintenance of 
law and social order’; trade unions needed to be stripped of their Bolshevik 
elements; the Bolshevik revolution itself needed overturning by continued 
intervention in Russia;  a new treaty was required to ‘adequately’ punish Germany; 
India, Ireland and Egypt were not isolated occurrences but part of widespread 
conspiracy to cripple Britain.113 Behind this ‘international conspiracy,’ however 
obliquely put, lurked ‘international Jewry.’114 The empire such men envisioned was 
far more representative of Seeley’s Expansion of England - a bellicose “Greater 
Britain” where those of English blood proclaimed the greatness of their race above 
all others - than the more liberal texts that had begun to appear in the pre-war 
period, most notably Angell’s Great Illusion and Brailsford’s War of Steel of Gold 
which rejected such irrational discourse.115 
 Opposed to these points of view were leftist conservatives, of whom the 
Phoenix Geneation formed a significant part. We have already noted the opposition 
of Mosley and Elliot to the events in Ireland. Such opposition went beyond House of 
Commons debates however. Under the tutorship of his mentor Robert Cecil, Mosley 
sought to bring Lord Grey back to politics as the figurehead of a new government 
as we saw. When the Irish question looked likely to destroy the Coalition in 
November 1921 Cecil advised the King to make Grey Prime Minister instead of 
Clynes, Asquith, or Law.116 The potential for a Cecil-Mosley inspired coup d’état 
lasted months, and profoundly involved the Phoenix Generation. On 5 March and 
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15 April 1922 Gallipoli veteran Henry Cavendish-Bentinck (who had crossed the 
floor with Mosley) hosted meetings attended by around twenty people, including 
several ex-servicemen politicians such as Godfrey Locker-Lampson, William 
Ormsby-Gore, Aubrey Herbert and Mosley.117 At the meeting it was decided that 
Cecil himself would lead any movement against Lloyd George. Such men were 
advocates of an Irish, and indeed broad foreign, policy widely opposed to that of 
Maxse’s set. This was certainly good for the ordinary Irishman or Indian, but 
whether the diminution of such bellicosity was helpful when it would come to 
resist the confident powers of Japan, Italy and Germany is certainly questionable. 
 For the meantime, ‘there [was] widespread distrust and suspicion between 
the wage earning classes and the government’ noted Cecil in a letter to Mosley.118 
Though conceding that ‘doubtless the war is the chief cause of many…misfortunes’ 
he denounced ‘the vacillating foreign policy of the government…[who had] 
squandered millions in futile attempts at a forcible reconstruction of Europe.’119 
The Black and Tans had constituted ‘a policy which not only failed in its purpose 
but [sullied] the reputation and honour of our country.’120 Whilst the Phoenix 
Generation was by no means unanimous in supporting such views - for instance, 
politicians such as Charles Foxcroft and Archibald Boyd-Carpenter rarely diverged 
from the governmental line - one can certainly say their experience of the war 
helped shape such moralistic opinions. In many ways the seeds such men laid 
down would only germinate in the 1930s. The ex-serviceman Liberal MP 
Wedgwood Benn’s vote for German reparations to be suspended until a more 
equitable system be found in July 1921 was too soon for most to countenance. But 
he raised several interesting points: that the issuing of Coupons in 1918 had 
produced a House designed ‘to make Germany pay,’ and that the Reparations Bill 
had been passed in an atmosphere whereby objection might equal treachery. 
Certainly the latter point seems accurate - Neville Chamberlain writing in 1919 that 
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Kenworthy’s Keynesian rejection of Versailles was ‘egregious.’121 Ironically of 
course it would fall to just that man to build upon the more conciliatory foreign 
policy the Phoenix Generation had first propagated in the 1918-1922 parliament.  
In the short term, the British withdrawal from Ireland may seem at first 
glance a little strange. As Kautt states, in Ireland ‘there was no Jominian decisive 
battle, no high body count, no campaign of manoeuvre.’122 Collins fought a clever 
war, but with incredibly limited resources. Negotiating the ceasefire he remarked 
to Greenwood that ‘you had us dead beat…when we were told of the offer of a truce 
we were astounded.’123 Yet when the truce came on 21 July 1921, and the Anglo-
Irish treaty was ratified on 7 December that year, no-one was in the least surprised. 
The reason for such acceptance lay more in depleted national self confidence than 
military woes. As the United States found in Vietnam fifty years later, an army is 
only as strong as its home front. Whereas pre-1914 Conservatism had been typified 
by Lord Randolph Churchill’s assertion that ‘Ulster will fight and Ulster will be 
right,’ the Phoenix Generation brought with them to Westminster a less 
dogmatically unionist position. The ‘bigots’ Bridgeman denounced in the 
Conservative Party were, whilst not exactly a dying breed, having to face an 
alternative world view.124 The new foreign policy of the Phoenix Generation was 
not exactly Gladstonian, yet morality rather than naked self interest was indeed the 
new order of the day. In a sense then, the First World War produced the absolute 
opposite effect to that argued in Louis Menand’s recent Metaphysical Club, whereby 
the American doctrine of diplomatic pragmatism stemmed from a few men’s 
experience of the Civil War.125 War imbued within the Phoenix Generation an 
abundant need to do “the right thing.” Clearly British policy in Ireland was 
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illegitimate, and they were prepared to say as such.  
 No doubt this alternate, somewhat pacifist, imperial-foreign policy was not 
always divorced from expediency - Mosley would protest the intervention in 
Russia in 1919 not for moral reasons, but because it went to his ‘heart to think of 
£100,000,000 being spent…supporting a mere adventure while the unemployed 
are trying to keep a family on 15s a week.’126 Nevertheless, by chipping away at 
Lloyd George’s legitimacy, by focusing on British reprisals rather than issues such 
as the plight of ‘the Protestant population in Cork’ - as Unionist backbenchers were 
prone to do - veteran Conservatives did not give the Prime Minister room to 
manoeuvre.127 When Greenwood tried to justify his policy by reference to British 
troops ‘who served in the late war’ being led by officers who wore ‘badges of 
valour and courage,’ he crucially did not receive the support of those best placed to 
legitimise his argument, the Phoenix Generation.128 The Great War was potentially 
a powerful rhetorical weapon, but one of limited currency to those who had not 
served themselves. 
5.6 What Should Empire Be?  
That the British had begun to question their own moral righteousness was a 
profound step in both foreign and imperial terms. Lord Halifax in particular has 
been indirectly condemned for this, even by a sympathetic biographer: ‘every view 
[he] held in India - that ninety percent of the problem was psychological, that 
everything should be done not to slight the Indian amour-propre; that short-term 
humiliations were to be endured in the expectation of a general settlement… 
worked well in the context of India. When Halifax went to on to apply [this] to his 
dealings with Nazi Germany, everyone of these assumptions was to prove 
catastrophic.’129 Yet these were not his assumptions alone: a significant proportion 
of his generation agreed. A Leo Amery speech concerning the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster - which codified Balfour’s 1926 Declaration that the Dominions had 
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reached virtual equality with the mother country - deserves quotation at length. 
Following a Churchillian oration of the usual sonorous and imperialist type, Amery 
replied that 
 
we have just listened to one of the most powerful and most impressive 
speeches which has been delivered in this House for a long time, and yet 
it was a speech which I feel was based upon a conception of the British 
Empire utterly different from that which I hold. I do not believe that this 
Empire can be held on the foundations of old legislative supremacy, but 
only on the foundations of free co-operation… 
 
Let us go forward. We have come to the end of one great chapter in 
British history, a chapter to which we can look back with immense pride 
and satisfaction. If that chapter were all, then its inevitable end in this 
Statute would be the end of the British Empire. But I accept the closing 
of this chapter only because I believe that it is the prelude to a new 
chapter. On that new chapter we ought to enter with courage, with 
confidence, with the forward view.130 
 
We may note two points here. Firstly, Amery, like many of his ilk, did not believe 
reform of the Empire to be a prelude to its end. Page Croft and the like were not 
alone in believing in its essential righteousness, even if they rejected large scale 
readjustment to its nature. More importantly however, there once again can be 
gleamed a divergence of opinion between conceptions of the British position 
amongst the Phoenix Generation. In part this was a matter of age: those veterans 
born in the 1870s and earlier, like Lloyd, were more prone to take a traditional 
‘Britannia Rules the Waves’ view than younger men like Macmillan or Mosley. 
Nevertheless, amongst a group who had shown real unity over domestic issues 
such as unemployment and housing, foreign and imperial policy marked the start 
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of a divergence that, as the impact of Hitler became more felt, would prove crucial. 
Such dividing lines however, could be remarkably blurred. 
Reactions to the Black and Tans in Ireland had, at times, illustrated the 
Phoenix Generation at their progressive best. Coercion as the sole measure of 
control had been rejected, and the notion of consent had moved beyond flowery 
19th century concepts that somehow the British were needed, to a more concrete 
and realistic idea of an ongoing dialogue between ruler and subject. One can thus 
draw a relatively straight line between Mosleyite attitudes towards the Black and 
Tans, through Irwinism in India, to Macmillan’s Winds of Change in the 1950s and 
1960s. Yet whilst Phoenix Generation progressivism can be seen at every point, so 
too can the reactionary counterpunch. Churchill is an easy and crucial reference 
point: Irwin’s 1929 Declaration was ‘unfortunate,’ Gandhi negotiating with the 
Viceroy was a ‘spectacle,’ and so forth.131 He was hardly isolated in his views 
however. 
 The traditional picture of the 1930s is of Churchill as a lone wolf, eventually 
joined by brave young men like Eden and Duff Cooper. That India alienated him 
from others within his party is indeed a crucial point. The extent of his isolation is 
however questionable. Clearly, as the Gathering Storm documented, it begat 
Churchill’s breach from pseudo-Baldwinites like Eden and Halifax.132 Yet, in part 
(as chapter three outlined) due to the younger men’s frustration with the party 
leadership, coupled with a mixed view on how the war should effect the nature of 
empire hitherto shown, Churchill was not the renegade he later appeared: most in 
the party often regarding him as ‘mischievous’ rather than dangerous.133 
Conservative attitudes in the early 1930s, later spun by both sides as almost a 
90%/10% split between liberal progressive and Churchillian outcast, were divided 
into two much more equal camps than one might suspect. Take Colonel Gretton’s 
1931 amendment to the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which proposed banning the 
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Irish Free State from repealing legislation pertaining to its constitutional status on 
the grounds of national security (i.e. naval concerns). Whilst a solid 69% (360 MPs) 
of Baldwin supporters rejected the motion, only 53% (94 MPs) of Conservative war 
veterans did the same.134 Similarly, a Labour amendment to the 1935 Government 
of India Act arguing that it ‘imposes undue restrictions on the exercise of self-
government’ was rejected by the Conservative Phoenix Generation to a lesser 
extent than the average Tory MP, but only marginally (74% compared to 71%).135 
The Black and Tans had proved a liberal streak within the Phoenix Generation, but 
they, after all, were still Conservatives, as was Churchill. One might label Halifax 
wrong about Hitler and Churchill wrong about Gandhi, but these were not opinions 
held in a vacuum, from which their contemporaries were somehow immune. 
5.7 Resultant Confusion  
The galling historiographical point about Britain’s international position between 
the wars is the idea that she could be absolutely certain what her next move should 
be. How on earth could this be the case? As the Phoenix Generation illustrate, a 
group of men of similar social outlook, having gone through a similar experience of 
warfare, could reach many different conclusions, sometimes complimentary, often 
contradictory. If parliament was just restricted to war veterans, the average foreign 
secretary would still have to reconcile the internationalist pro-League of Nations 
Duff Cooper of the 1920s, the bellicose imperialism of Page Croft, men like Elliot 
who opposed the use of oppressive force, overtly pro-Germans such as Archibald 
Ramsay, and sometime anti-Italians such as Eden, to name but a few. Britain’s 
world role between the wars was in constant flux, to pretend otherwise is to fail to 
do justice to either side, denying the anti-appeaser the credit they are due over 
Hitler, and the more conciliatory men the understanding their attempts at peace 
deserve. Sam Hoare, as Secretary of State for India, articulated the point well: 
 
I look back with regret to the golden age of my predecessors…In India 
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there was no Press, and there very few educated people taking an 
interest in what was happening. The Viceroy had a glorious time. The 
British Administration was a benevolent despotism unquestioned by 
the people it was administering, and everything went on just as I should 
have desired that it should go on to-day. Unfortunately you and I have 
lived in a time when all these things have changed.136 
 
Just as the Phoenix Generation - for which Hoare, despite the latter’s chagrin at the 
prospect, was as much a part as Duff Cooper - had denounced the lack of dynamism 
in domestic policy, there was a real determination that Britain’s world position 
should be resolved one way or another.137 To do something was again very much 
an idée fixe: but there were differing perspectives on what that something should 
be. 
 The most pressing question was naturally who would Britain fight, and who 
could be relied upon to provide support. Francophiles such as Eden and Spears 
could be relied upon to take an anti-Italian line. In a 1940 essay, the latter opined 
‘that the present war would have been avoided if the French and ourselves had 
followed a common policy in the post-war years. Why did we not do so? Although 
both nations were loyal to each other as allies in the last war, they never really 
understood each other.’138 Such words were tailor-made for 1940, when Churchill 
had proposed an Anglo-French Union and Alan Crosland Graham could speak of 
‘the twin upholders of the temple of European Civilisation.’139 Realistically 
however, understanding or not, no common policy was possible with a France 
which swung so repeatedly from Blumist left to conservative right.140 As Thomas 
Jones commented of Munich, ‘had the French Parliament been summoned not more 
than ten Senators would have voted for war,’ a view which even a later anti-
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appeaser like the veteran Mark Patrick could subscribe.141  Opposing Mussolini, 
with a real chance it would be single handed, was thus a risky business. Yet, as 
Peters points out, Eden’s colleagues often saw his policies as based on little more 
than outright hostility to Italy, a point Charmley suggests had some validity.142 
Even younger men like Stanley, Ormsby-Gore and Duff Cooper were reluctant to 
align themselves too closely with him early in his tenure.143  
 For a man later to resign over the very principle of negotiations with Il Duce, 
Eden’s views in fact seem uncoordinated at best. The journalist Leo Kennedy found 
him ‘rather more pro-League and anti-Italian than I am,’ yet an earlier conversation 
between the two revealed an Eden closer to his predecessor at the Foreign Office, 
Sam Hoare, than he would perhaps later like to admit: 
 
At any rate, his policy for the moment, he indicated, would be to give the 
Italians the choice of “either…or”; by which he meant getting France and 
ourselves to say to Italy: “Now here you have the chance of considerable 
economic expansion in and around Abyssinia, and a tacit admission that 
your interests are very great if not predominant there. You can have 
that without a fight. [He] preferred the idea of making concessions to 
Italy now to making them after a victory: but he did admit that they 
might be more ready to accept them in a couple of months time, if they 
had had their victory, than they are now.144 
 
For a man who would gain prestigious office essentially on behalf of his 
predecessor’s perceived cowardliness, this was not the call to arms one might 
expect, even at this early stage of diplomatic proceedings. 
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5.8 The Impact of Hitler 
 If attitudes towards Mussolini were fuzzy at best, much the same can be said 
of Hitler. There has been much praising of the so-called ‘foreign office’ mindset - 
that of young men like Eden, and his minions such as Bobbety Cranborne.145 Clearly 
there was a divide between the views of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 
and Eden emerged triumphant in 1940. Yet, concurrent to the former being more 
perceptive than his critics allow, the latter was by no means an accurate, or even 
consistent, soothsayer. As Alec Cadogan icily commented in December 1941, ‘does 
A. realise that he is responsible for the great and tragic appeasement – not reacting 
to German occupation of the Rhineland? How lucky he is – no one has ever 
mentioned that! And that was the turning point.’146 Motivated by his driving aim to 
avert another German war - words which, in Mosley’s hands would be considered 
treacherous - Eden was indeed ‘prepared to make great concessions to German 
appetites’ prior to Hitler’s first great diplomatic coup.147 Thus he was ‘not in the 
least concerned’ when Hitler remilitarised the German sections of the Rhine river 
in November 1936, and as late as December 1937 was taking ‘the line that we must 
make every effort to make an agreement, but that it must be a general agreement 
and not one of “sops.”’148 Even his departure from high office in February 1938 was 
anodyne in the extreme. Having received a note from Lloyd George that ‘the 
country is on the look-out for a young man who has ideals as well as brains and 
courage…if [you] take a strong line now [you are] made,’ Eden resigned with a 
whimper, leaving Harold Nicolson perplexed.149 
 Similarly, Munich - where Duff Cooper was glorified by Churchill as the ‘one 
minister alone [who] stood forth’ - was hardly the black and white story it later 
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seemed.150 In language reminiscent of Chamberlain’s much criticised ‘faraway 
people of whom we know nothing,’ Duff recorded in late August 1938 that ‘nobody 
wanted to fight for Czechoslovakia.’151 Having then let off much hot air in Cabinet 
on 25 September about the Prime Minister betraying ‘the honour and soul of 
England,’ Duff toadied up to Chamberlain the very next day, expressing his sorrow 
at having ‘expressed my opinions too frequently and too forcibly.’ Even on the 
brink of resignation, he thought Chamberlain’s ‘a very good Government and I 
don’t want to thwart it.’152 Once out of office, he wrote to Winterton glad that ‘my 
resignation was made easier for me by the fact that the Prime Minister agreed it 
was best that I should go’ – ‘the last thing’ Duff wanted was to ‘injure the 
government.’153 If Halifax, as Roberts sagely points out, has been too readily 
dubbed an appeaser to the very end, Duff Cooper has been similarly miscast.154 He, 
like many, was conflicted.155 Hitler was a member of the front generation, and such 
men, as Eden attempted to outline in their first meeting, ‘should be the last to ever 
wish for another war.’156 Germany was a nation with whom many felt they could do 
business.157 
 The key, as Mosley articulated, was that a decision had to be made, one way 
or the other. BUF foreign policy has been widely seen as kowtowing to Hitler. This 
undoubtedly has some credence. Yet Mosley was above all a realist. As he wrote in 
his New Party days: 
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A case exists for progress on the lines of the Protocol towards a 
universal underwriting of world peace in company with powerful 
colleagues on a precisely defined international organisation. A case also 
exists for complete isolation from any continental entanglement which 
may drag this country into war in which it has no interest. No case, 
however, exists for partial, ill-defined and therefore dangerous 
obligations which involve this country in European entanglements 
without any of the advantages or offsetting security of comprehensive 
world organisation.158 
 
This was precisely the point. Chamberlain’s view that individual negotiations with 
the dictators, backed up by steady if sluggish rearmament, may have proved 
incorrect. Crucially however, as Cowling and Charmley have noted, such a strategy 
was never allowed to be played out in its entirety.159 Chamberlain may have been 
wrong, but prior to September 1938 he was consistent. After that he became 
prisoner of forces - the desire for action - that rendered him inconsistent and a 
instigator of policies - guarantees of national frontiers - that were not his own. Like 
Lloyd George after 1920, prisoner of a Tory agenda, Chamberlain after Munich was 
vastly inhibited by Churchillian pressures. These vastly contradictory influences - 
even a relatively monolithic body like the Phoenix Generation could not agree on 
the right course - augured a diplomacy that played into Hitler’s hands. If that was in 
part Chamberlain’s fault, it was also a result of the diversity and incoherence of his 
critics. 
 Nor in May 1940 was it “Churchill to the rescue,” for all the later rhetoric. 
Just as his isolation in the early 1930s has been overplayed, one cannot deem the 
response to his assumption of the Premiership as exactly euphoric, even amongst 
that group which had allegedly catapulted him into high office. Moore-Brabazon 
wrote to console Sam Hoare with the thought that ‘this is not the last war 
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administration by a long way,’ whilst another veteran Maurice Hely-Hutchison 
compared anti-Chamberlainites to ‘parachutist troops who had descended beyond 
the lines in Conservative uniform.’160 Oliver Stanley - son of Lord Derby and author 
of Industry and the State, no less - even refused to serve under Churchill, and wrote 
to Chamberlain hoping ‘to serve under you again’ someday.’161 These were 
complicated times. 
5.9 The Statistics of Appeasement 
It is only through detailed examination that one can challenge widely held 
assumptions, and pick through the myths and counter myths. This is as true vis-à-
vis appeasement as anything else. Winston Churchill has presented us with a 
Chamberlain ‘blameworthy before history,’ whose ‘own angle of vision’ was proved 
decisively wrong.162 In corollary to this, we have the image of young against old - 
baring remarkable similarity to Alan Clark’s thesis of the first war that lions were 
led by donkeys - whereby youthful MPs had some special vision of foreign policy, 
that they alone recognised the threat of Hitler. Here, the Edens and Duff Coopers 
masterminded a shift in attitudes which eventually led to the toppling of the 
treacherous Chamberlain, his replacement with the oracle like Churchill, and 
victory was thus assured. 
 The Phoenix Generation of this study were manifestly well placed to make a 
difference to proceedings. At the time of Munich there were 168 Conservative 
members who had served in the first war, some 45% of the 377 total. By the fall of 
Chamberlain in May 1940 their representation had slightly decreased to 161, 43% 
of the total. Suffice to say, they were in a real position to influence events, and any 
block vote against appeasement from them would presumably have unseated the 
Prime Minister. These numbers begat a clear problem with the ‘troublesome young 
men’ thesis. In the decisive vote on Norway, there were 42 Conservative ‘noes.’ 42 
men was not a massive number. If a quarter of the Phoenix Generation had voted 
against the British Foreign Policy of the late 1930s, a shift in course would have 
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been possible. That they did not do so perhaps invites us looking at the period with 
views that go beyond the black of Guilty Men and white of Edenite heroes. 
 To do so, it seems sensible to look at how men actually voted in House of 
Commons, rather than rely on later myths and legends. Thus, the following 
represents data tallied from seven parliamentary divisions from 1935 to 1940. The 
only editorial decision by the author was to select votes that contained a dimension 
reviewing the overall nature of British Foreign Policy, and a reasonable 
chronological progression. The 1939 votes on the creation of a Ministry of Supply, 
and introducing conscription, are indeed interesting, but are excluded; in the first 
case that it gets bogged down in minor clauses, in the second that the debate is 
conducted more over libertarian issues of coercion than general diplomacy. To the 
charge that Labour Amendments were bound to produce a negative response from 
Conservatives, there is no dispute. Certainly the peaks and troughs of the numbers 
should not be taken too seriously in this light: more of interest are the comparison 
between the sets of figures, not the numbers themselves. Similarly, Conservative 
Amendments that led to votes on the nature of Government policy would have 
been used, but they are few and far between. 
 The divisions under analysis are as follows. Firstly, the 11 March 1935 
motion raised by Clement Attlee condemning the publication of a Government 
White Paper identifying Germany as the clearest threat to British interest.163 
Following this is a vote held immediately after Hitler’s incursion into the Rhineland 
on Command Paper 5107 (10 March 1936), and a Labour Amendment (25 
February 1937) to the Defence Loans Bill that the £400,000,000 proposed to be 
borrowed should be viewed with misgiving ‘without any constructive foreign 
policy based upon collective security under the League of Nations.’164 Next comes 
Arthur Greenwood’s motion to condemn Anthony Eden’s departure from the 
Foreign Office (22 February 1938), and the vote on Munich (6 October 1938).165 
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Lastly we will outline the responses to the 27 February 1939 attempt to extend the 
1937 Defence Loans Bill to £580,000,000, and the vote on Norway which cost 
Chamberlain the Premiership on 7 May 1940.166 Obviously, given the slight 
variations that by-elections wrought parliamentary numbers, figures are 
contemporary percentages rather than directly indicative. 
 We may deal with one preconception straight away. Olson in particular has 
painted a picture of uniformed veterans overthrowing Chamberlain in May 1940. 
Roger Keyes ‘hero of the Great War,’ Spears who ‘served…in the Great War,’ join 
Eden, Churchill and the rest in an ex-serviceman band of brothers determined to 
restore righteousness to British policy.167 To be sure, men yet to fight (and die) in 
the second war itself, such as Ronald Cartland, constitute a significant strand to 
such a thesis - yet it is one that undoubtedly derives its main moral thrust from 
veterans of the first war. Chamberlain’s political assassination is not only right 
because he has been proven wrong, but because those cast as Brutus are more 
qualified than him to judge matters. Statistically, this point does not stand up 
however. Olson gleefully notes that forty-two Tory MPs rejected Chamberlain and 
what he stood for in the Norway vote.168 That over 11% of his party voted against 
him was a clear indictment, no question, but it was not one that came exclusively, 
or even particularly, from veterans. In actual fact, only 6% (11) of the 161 strong 
Conservative Phoenix Generation MPs entered the No lobby. Numbers, rather than 
myths, do not lie. 
 Put simply, Chamberlain and Halifax did not act alone. Their foreign policy 
was broadly backed not only in the country, but in parliament: 
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% of National Government, Conservative Phoenix Generation, and All National 
Government Supporting War Veterans (Total Phoenix Generation) Who Back the 
Government on Foreign Policy 
 
 Average National 
Government MP 
Conservative PG Total PG 1875-1900 
Control 
March 1935 78 81 77 75 
March 1936 87 86 91 89 
February 1937 72 78 73 67 
February 1938 79 85 80 79 
October 1938 87 84 86 90 
February 1939 55 64 59 65 
May 1940 68 69 68 66 
 
As this illustrates, there was barely a hair’s breadth between the average 
Conservative MP and men of the supposedly renegade younger generation. 84% of 
those Tory members who had fought in the last war were presumably overjoyed at 
‘peace for our time’ in October 1938, or did not have the gumption to oppose 
Chamberlain’s popularity. Almost seven out of ten veteran Conservatives were 
even prepared to support him in his last stand, scarcely different from either the 
control or average Tory MP. 
 There have been various explanations for this. “Cato” opined thus: 
 
During the whole period in which rearmament was alleged to be taking 
place, there was no serious revolt among the massed legion of the Tory 
back-benchers. This remarkable situation was due to the efforts of one 
man, Captain David Margesson. He was, and is, Government Chief 
Whip…The Captain exactly resembles a thoroughly efficient Sixth Form 
prefect who enjoys and earns the esteem of the Headmaster in 
managing the rest of the school. The Captain applies to the House of 
Commons Old School Tie Brigade the methods of a public school. If one 
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of the “boys” has erred, or strayed into the wrong lobby, the rest of them 
will quickly be notified that the fellow is a bit of an outsider. And the 
friends of outsiders, in the public school code, are of course to be 
regarded as outsiders themselves.169 
 
Whilst, given the educational upbringing of the Phoenix Generation, this seems a 
nice metaphor, it is not one that should be accepted to any great degree. Margesson 
was certainly a ruthless operator, telling the rebellious John Profumo on 8 May 
1940 that ‘I can tell you this you contemptible little shit, on every morning you 
wake up for the rest of your life you will be ashamed of what you did last night.’170 
Men who had faced the bullets and shrapnel of the Great War trench had however 
presumably seen much worse and, in any case, many like Eden and Duff Cooper 
had earlier written to Margesson expressing joy at his rise to prominence.171 Had 
the Phoenix Generation opposed Chamberlain en bloc earlier, their political lives 
would certainly have been at risk. Yet Duff Cooper allegedly resigned in 1938 to 
‘retain something which is to me of great value…[to] walk about the world with my 
head erect.’172 Likewise, Bobbety Cranborne believed Munich to have achieved 
peace, ‘but where is honour? I have looked and looked and I cannot see it. It seems 
to me to be a wicked mockery to describe by so noble a name the agreement which 
has been reached.’173 This then, was not just a question of what Britain could or 
could not do to the Phoenix Generation, but one posited on moral grounds. To not 
oppose in greater numbers what they did not believe, pressure from Margesson or 
not, must constitute something of a failure, if only in the terms they themselves set. 
If Chamberlain was supposed to stand up to Hitler, they could perhaps have stood 
up to the Chief Whip a little more.  
 Doing something, in the terms of opposing government policy, could be 
                                                           
169  “Cato”, Guilty Men, 91-92. 
170  Olson, Troublesome Young Men, 305. 
171  See the letters congratulating him on his appointment as Privy Councillor, 19 
December 1932-16 February 1933, CAC, MRGN 1/2. Other correspondents included Lloyd-
Greame, Euan Wallace and John Moore-Brabazon. 
172  Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 3 October 1938, vol. 339, col.40 
173  Ibid, 4 October 1938, vol. 339, col.232 
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achieved two ways. Obviously one could enter the opposition lobby, but there was 
a second option. As Harold Nicolson recorded, ‘our group decide that it is better for 
us all to abstain, than for some to abstain and some to vote against. We therefore 
sit in our seats, which must enrage the Government, since it is not our numbers 
that matter but our reputation.’174 Abstention, to the anti-appeaser, was seemingly 
a de-facto no vote. Such a view does make sense: Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper, 
Macmillan, Keyes, and many others who ‘look none too good on any list’ did indeed 
abstain on many occasions from supporting Chamberlain.175 Abstentions are 
naturally hard to judge. Whilst the anti-appeaser might like to think of them as a 
rejection of governmental policy, they could equally represent a member 
undecided on the issue, or just absent through illness, holiday or prior 
commitment. Churchill later claimed that ‘the thirty or forty dissident 
Conservatives could do no more than register their disapproval by abstention.’176 
Aside from the obvious retort that Margesson had not yet successfully bricked up 
the “no” door of the Commons, it may be of greater interest to take Churchill at his 
word, and to compare the Phoenix Generation’s record to both that of their ex-
servicemen counterparts in Labour and the Liberal Party, and the average National 
Government supporter. Over the page we do just that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
174  Nicolson (ed), Nicolson Diaries and Letters, 375 [6 October 1938] 
175  Ibid 
176  Churchill, Gathering Storm, 270. 
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% of National Government Supporters, Conservative Phoenix Generation, and 
Combined Opposition Labour-Liberal ex-servicemen who oppose - vote against or 
abstain - the official party line 
 
 Average National 
Government MP 
Conservative 
PG 
Ex-Servicemen 
in Lib-Lab 
Parties 
1875-1900 
Control 
Sample 
Mar 1935 23 19 36 25 
Mar 1936 13 14 11 11 
Feb 1937 28 22 23 33 
Feb 1938 21 15 16 21 
Oct 1938 13 16 30 10 
Feb 1939 45 36 16 35 
May 1940 32 31 25 34 
 
Despite a slightly imperfect comparison given the difference in parliamentary 
support, the abstention picture was manifestly not a one way street. Opposition 
veterans were in a quandary concerning Munich (one Liberal even supported 
Chamberlain) and, aside from February 1939 - a Labour Party amendment - one 
notices no massively disproportionate difference between the figures. Viewing an 
abstention as a ‘no’ vote is thus by no means a certainty. Nor indeed did veterans 
oppose their leader with particularly greater vigour than the other Conservatives 
born between 1875 and 1900. 
 As a brief coda to this overtly statistical section, it might also be of interest 
to note that, whilst Conservative support for Chamberlain held, one can detect a 
waning in his “national appeal” from 1939: dangerous for a wartime leader. Whilst 
it is true that National, National Labour and National Liberal numbers in the 
nominal coalition were low, it was clearly a positive for any leader to have a war 
veteran, not of his party, pledge to support him. That this began to diminish over 
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time, compared to Conservative figures, is worthy of acknowledgement in seeking 
to explain Chamberlain’s downfall.   
% of National Ex-Serviceman Support for Foreign Policy 
 National Ex-Servicemen Conservative PG 
March 1935 82 81 
March 1936 83 86 
February 1937 62 78 
February 1938 92 85 
October 1938 91 84 
February 1939 36 64 
May 1940 50 69 
 
The notion of some monolithic voting pattern regarding appeasement is thus a 
fallacy. John Sewell Courtauld could abstain from the Munich vote, but back 
Chamberlain in 1940, whilst Robert Bower could reject the motion condemning 
Eden’s demise but vote against the Prime Minister over Norway. Foreign Policy 
was a rich and complex tapestry, any analysis on the late 1930s must be predicated 
on such an assumption. As Cowling noted, the vast majority all parties and 
ideological persuasions, ultimately, danced to Hitler’s tune.177 
5.10 Concluding Thoughts 
Rather than the traditional notion that foreign and imperial policy produced a 
group of young men steadfast in the former and liberal in the latter, the picture was 
much more ambiguous. It seems that differing notions of Britain’s international 
position after 1918 served to divide opinion amongst a cohort who had shown 
relative consistency over the meaning of the trenches and the need for a 
progressive domestic policy. If the failure to support a Lloyd George or Mosley 
break with the establishment marked the first nail in the Phoenix Generation’s 
coffin (as a monolithic entity), Hitler constituted the second. There clearly was a 
liberal streak in their contemporary dialogue - Mosley on Ireland, Duff Cooper and 
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Eden’s advocacy of the League, Amery‘s new form of imperialism, and so on. Yet 
running parallel to this was an uneasy feeling that traditional conservative notions 
of British strength were no longer sustainable - such men were not myopic to, for 
example, the lack of reliable allies. Condemning the Black and Tans was right, 
standing up to Hitler with every sinew the country could muster likewise. Within 
the boundaries of the British system however, there were limits to what could be 
achieved. The moralistic tone which worked so well with the former, made no 
sense with the latter. 
 There was a link between foreign and imperial policy, but not the simplistic 
one often forwarded. Churchill saw his star dim as a result of India, and this had 
consequences concerning Germany. Halifax applied similar tactics to Hitler as he 
had to Gandhi, and this also impacted upon events. Yet these ‘great men’ were but 
indicative of wider mentalités. Had Churchill been the lonely windbag he appeared, 
he would not have been in a position to make the comeback he did. Clearly his 
support had to come from within Westminster, for even Chamberlain’s critics 
acknowledge the support appeasement had in the nation as a whole. Thus we must 
be extremely careful with the post-facto accounts of the period. It suited the Edens 
to portray Churchill as isolated over imperial issues, because then they can explain 
away their reticence to stand fully square with him over Germany. The story only 
works this way and, for all the post-1945 construction by surviving members of the 
Phoenix Generation writing self congratulatory epistles to one another, the 
ambiguities should not be forgotten.178  
 Chamberlain could only do what was possible, and, as Francis Fremantle 
wrote in 1938, ‘there is no practical alternative.’179 Signing away foreign lands to 
keep the peace was perhaps ignoble, but clearly practical. By 1944-5 Eden and 
Churchill were preparing to do exactly the same with Poland.180 Indeed, as Liddell 
                                                           
178 See Duff Cooper to Emrys-Evans, 3 December 1953, BL, EE, Add. 58247, f.12. Eden and 
Emrys-Evans correspondence, 26-28 May 1962, ff.64-5, Attlee to Emrys-Evans, 31 
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179 Fremantle to Osborn, 3 October 1938, HALS, FJO/B66. 
180 For all his later diary references to Munich (for example, 598, 13 September 1956 and 
601, 20 September 1956), Macmillan would later worry that Winston Churchill was twice 
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Hart noted in that regard, ‘it would seem that the situation into which we are 
getting is even more crazy than that of 1938-39.’181 There are questions one can 
ask about the long term decline of British influence but by the late 1930s, as 
Stedman asks, ‘what could Chamberlain do, other than what Chamberlain did?’182 If 
force was morally repugnant to suppress an Irish Republic, how could it be used to 
prevent the Sudeten Germans from joining their fellow countrymen? For all the 
sometime criticism of Halifax and his Prime Minister, the Phoenix Generation never 
solved this conundrum satisfactorily. The resulting confusion saw Britain stumble 
into war in 1939 not knowing for what they fighting. The domestic consequences of 
this, we will now address. Even as the Reich collapsed, we will see, Hitlerism would 
continue to have consequences for the Phoenix Generation.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
prepared to sell Poland short . 1944-5 as we have noted, but also on 12 May 1953, 232, 
‘Does Churchill know what he wants as a settlement with Russia? Will Central and Eastern 
Europe be sold out in a super-Munich? All these things are very worrying. At present I can 
do nothing in the Cabinet. But I shall not stay if we are now to seek ‘appeasement’ and call 
it Peace.’ P. Catterall (ed), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957, 
(Basingstoke, 2003). 
181 Liddell Hart to Eden, 10 January 1944, KCL, LH 1/258/24.  
182 Stedman, ‘What could Chamberlain do,’ passim. 
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6: Victory through Butskellism? 
 
It is the spirit of progressive conservatism which arises from something lying deep in 
the mind and character of our people…It makes them distrustful of dictators and 
suspicious of political programmes. 
- Rab Butler, October 1941.1 
 
Professor Hayek’s book, The Road to Serfdom…tells the naked TRUTH. The Truth 
alone can make us FREE. We are fighting this awful war to be FREE. Let us make 
certain we do not lose the battle to the bureaucrats on the Home Front. 
- Waldron Smithers, Socialism Offers Slavery, 1945.2 
 
6.1 1940 and the Domestic “What If?” 
10 May 1940 stands as a landmark day in British history. As German Panzers 
prepared to strike in the west, Neville Chamberlain, despite his best efforts to hang 
on, ceded the office of Prime Minister to Winston Churchill. The change that 
followed was of course not merely one of personality, but of ethos. Unlike 
Chamberlain, Churchill saw no future for his country - perhaps, just as importantly, 
for himself - in a negotiated peace, thus all the talk of never surrendering. Just as 
importantly however was the domestic dimension. As Chamberlain’s health waned, 
Churchill became Conservative Party leader on 9 October 1940, an office he would 
not relinquish for almost 15 years: much to the chagrin of younger (increasingly 
middle-aged) men like Anthony Eden. Five days later the Carlton Club was 
destroyed by a German bomb, perhaps a fitting metaphor for the destruction of 
pre-war Conservatism. Almost unthinkingly, Tories had handed power to a former 
Liberal, and one - with the exception of those policies outlined in the previous 
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2/28/3 
2 W. Smithers, Socialism Offers Slavery, (London, 1945), 7. 
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chapter - who had enjoyed no meaningful connection with the party caucus at all.3 
The impact of this, due to the necessity to concentrate on the war, would not be 
seen until 1945 and beyond. 
 Historians are loath to indulge in questions of ‘what if?’ 10 May 1940 is an 
occasion when such considerations should be put aside however. The previous 
day’s gathering of Chamberlain, Margesson, Churchill and Halifax has been well 
chronicled. For whatever reason - lack of military knowledge, the feeling that the 
chance would come again on better terms, constitutional difficulties or simple 
intuition - Halifax did not grab the Premiership that was his for the taking.4 
Churchill became war leader by default, and the consequences remain with us to 
this day. Yet such consequences were not limited to the war against Nazism. As we 
have seen, the pre-1940 differences between Halifax - as Edward Wood and Lord 
Irwin - and Churchill could scarcely have been more marked. Whereas Wood saw 
1918 as a Great Opportunity, Churchill took profoundly negative lessons from the 
war. Whilst Churchill was a liberal in terms of economics, Wood believed liberalism 
should be applied to human relations. Thus the events of 9-10 May and 9 October 
1940, if marking a new course in foreign policy, saw the Conservative Party take a 
very retrograde step domestically. Back, one might contend, to neo-liberal ideas 
espoused in the party between 1906 and the outbreak of the Great War.5 
 The war years are often seen as shifting both the country, and the Tories, 
leftwards. Mass Observation reported that by December 1942 about two people 
out of five had changed their political outlook since the beginning of hostilities.6 
There were numerous explanations for this. Labour could no longer be labelled as 
                                                           
3 As Michael Bentley asks, after 1940 should we really see Churchill as a ‘displaced 
Marlborough, seeking his Blenheim’? M. Bentley, ‘1931-1945: National Government and 
Churchill Coalition,’ in A. Seldon (ed), How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power 
Since 1783, (London, 1996), 285-314, 287.   
4 A. Roberts, The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax, 203. One might argue that, as had 
proved the case in 1923, it would have been too difficult for a peer to assume the 
Premiership in the democratic age. Certainly hoops had to be jumped through to get 
Douglas-Home into office in 1963 yet, in the midst of wartime, would this have mattered so 
much? It is impossible to say with absolute certainty. 
5 H. Kopsch, The Approach of the Conservative Party to Social Policy During World War II, 
University of London PhD Thesis, 1970, 30. 
6 ‘Mass Observation,’ Social Security and Parliament,’ Political Quarterly, 14 (1943), 246. 
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unpatriotic traitors in underhand league with the Soviet Union, for the party was 
serving, in broad terms, loyally enough under Churchill whilst the USSR was taking 
the brunt of German aggression. National institutions like the BBC and the Army 
Education Corps, much to the chagrin of Conservatives like Henry Page Croft, were 
also home to numerous leftist intellectuals bringing something approaching guild 
socialism to the masses.7 Most importantly, as Addison has pointed out, the 
difference between the first and second wars was one of respective raison d‘être. 
The Great War, fought in the conditions before the 1918 Reform Act, did not need 
to be justified to the masses. It did not, beyond patriotic hot air, need to be 
predicated on much (though the National War Aims Committee in 1917 indicated 
that reform was on its way).8 The Second World War, fought in a truly democratic 
age, could not be sustained in terms of national survival once the imminent threat 
of German invasion had subsided. As Alan Crosland Graham MP noted in January 
1940, whilst the first war could merely be fought ’to stop Kaiser Bill from bossing 
the world,’ during the second ‘class divisions, through the spread of education and 
the leveling out of wealth, will gradually almost entirely disappear.’9 Thus, the 
story goes, in the search for meaning and with electoral pragmatism very much in 
mind, the Conservative Party adapted itself to modern conditions as it is often 
prone to do. 
 Perhaps because of this the eleven year period when the party, unusually, 
did not hold sole power is seen in somewhat benign terms – particularly in its 
participant’s memoirs.10 Conservative acquiescence to the principle, if not always 
the details, of Beveridge’s schemes, together with the progressivism of acts like 
                                                           
7 Croft to James Stuart, 13 April 1942, CAC, CRFT 1/19. 
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Butler’s reforms of the education system, seemed to suggest the war had reformed 
patterns of thought.11 After 1945, as Phoenix Generation members such as 
Macmillan and Eden not only assumed greater national prominence, but jockeyed 
for the leadership, it seemed that a new broom had swept clean. Churchill may 
have been nominally in charge, but the young men were able to convince an old 
man increasingly ready to adopt anything to remain leader. This was no longer a 
discourse held on Baldwinian terms - where the leader paid lip service to but did 
not adopt his minion’s ideas - but one where leftist ideas were allowed to flourish. 
There is, it is true, something in all of this. Conservatism did adapt. The Phoenix 
Generation did help set the political agenda. Yet this is not the whole story. 
 Historians have long argued over the nature of the post 1945 consensus. 
Few - Ben Pimlott is a partial exception - dispute that there was, to some degree, an 
increasing homogeneity between the two parties engendered by the experience of 
wartime coalition.12 The degree of this homogeneity is open to question however. 
Kevin Jeffreys and Rodney Lowe have been pointed out the limitations of any 
perceived bi-partisanship, whilst Paul Addison later suggested that The Road to 
1945 he hypothesised prior to the advent of Thatcher would perhaps have to be 
modified somewhat.13 That the 1947 Industrial Charter was a change for a party led 
by Neville Chamberlain - he who could regard Labour’s leaders and their ideas as 
‘dirt’ - seven years earlier seems difficult to dispute. Whether the party actually 
believed its own rhetoric is a more complex affair, and something this chapter 
intends to sketch out. To be sure, as Ira Zweiniger-Bargielowska has shown, the 
                                                           
11 An assumption outlined in J. Ramsden, ‘A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners? How 
Far Did the British Conservative Party Really Change After 1945?’ Transactions of the Royal 
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Journal, 30 (1987), 123-144; R. Lowe, ‘The Second World War, consensus and the 
foundation of the welfare state,’ Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1990), 152-83; P. 
Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, (London, 1994), 279. 
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idea the Tories could repudiate the welfare state after 1945 was impossible.14 Yet 
even though interwar progressives began to assume positions of real influence, the 
radical agenda many espoused before 1939 was arguably put to one side. To 
succeed in the post-war era, the Conservative had to speak the language of Hayek 
as much as that of Macmillan’s Middle Way, and probably more. The war diverted 
the path of interwar conservatism off course. As the following will outline, this was 
not necessarily towards the progressive Valhalla Anthony Eden harped on about 
during the early 1940s, or the Phoenix Generation had envisaged in the 1930s. For 
as Michael Bentley notes, ‘it seems striking how little the Tory Party moved into the 
centre when beckoned there [in 1943-4].’15  
6.2 The Boat  
 One should not begin too negatively. There is much one can say in praise of 
the type of Conservatism that emerged from the fall of Chamberlain. Though 
Churchill’s appointments could be occasionally idiosyncratic, the war years at least 
kept the old boys from enjoying a monopoly on office. Chamberlain had, it must be 
said, become ever more contemptuous of informed opinion when filling key 
positions. Chatfield as Minister for the Co-ordination for Defence (January 1939), 
Burgin as Minister of Supply (July 1939) and Gilmour at Shipping (October 1939) 
were evidence of a mind increasingly divorced from contemporary feeling, and the 
young men. With Churchill possessing - indeed predicating his leadership upon - 
the ability to change personnel after the turbulent summer of 1940, Tories of the 
post-1918 generation finally reached positions of prominence.   
 There is a sense that the Phoenix Generation missed the boat however. 
Henry Willink - whose 1944 White Paper laid some of the foundations for the NHS - 
at the Health Ministry is something of a successful exception.  Whilst Oliver Stanley, 
Harold Macmillan and others within our cohort were indeed apportioned office, 
they were leaven with members just too young to have served in the first war, who 
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did not share the optimism of their immediate elders in either the utility or 
righteousness of interventionist government. Men in the Butler bracket were 
regarded as suspicious from the outset. Harold Macmillan, as we saw, later wrote 
that he ‘always felt a certain contempt for those “gentlemen in England now abed”, 
whether in the First War or the Second, who voluntarily missed their chance or 
chose to avoid danger by seeking positions of security.’16 Euan Wallace’s diary in 
November 1939 recorded similar: 
 
It still remains difficult to explain why completely inexperienced people 
of the type of “The Idealist” should be employed in the War Office 
instead of at the front, while their elders who have already 
demonstrated their intelligence as well as their courage, are obliged to 
remain in idleness.17 
 
Such jealously was understandable.  Having served bravely and anonymously in 
the first war, the chance to help decide the overall fate of the second was not to be 
passed up easily. Yet their reluctance to challenge Baldwin and Chamberlain had 
come back to haunt them. Euan Wallace, Oliver Stanley and others were still 
marked as “coming men,” but that pool was swelling by the day. Men like Richard 
Law, Rab Butler and Geoffrey Lloyd had rather jumped the queue in joining the 
government. There were also those like Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, Richard 
Pilkington and Quinton Hogg who had missed out on 1914-18, but gone on to serve 
both in interwar Westminster and on the battlefield against Hitler. There was a real 
danger that the Phoenix Generation would be leapfrogged into high office. This was 
true in both a literal, and ideological, sense. 
 
6.3 The Importance of Butler 
 With an already doddering Winston Churchill at the helm, and figures such 
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as Max Beaverbrook whispering in his ear, the Conservative manifesto in 1945 
could have been more right wing - indeed proto-Thatcherite free market - than it in 
fact was.18 That the party did not swing completely to the right - and thus, 
probably, avoided an even heavier defeat - was to a great extent the work of the 
Butler generation. There was a real danger that Tory policy - lacking a notionally 
sympathetic leader like Baldwin, or even ruthless technocrat like Chamberlain - 
could fall under the spell of the party’s occasionally ultra-right caucus. Baldwin has 
come in for much criticism throughout this account, yet it cannot be denied he 
prevented the forces of extremism from taking hold within the party. The idea that 
the war moved all Tories left is a fallacy. The language of Joynson Hicks and 
Birkenhead had to be modified for a post-Dunkirk age, but the harsher elements of 
Toryism were by no means swept aside by some kind of progressive deluge, for all 
the consensual talk.   
 The Catering Wages Bill is an interesting example. Seemingly an 
uncontentious piece of legislation to be introduced a few days before the 
publication of the Beveridge Report in 1943, it in fact brought about the biggest 
Tory vote against the Coalition Government during the conflict. At issue was 
control: the government’s ability to regulate employee wages. Of the 365 
Conservative MPs, 110 voted against the Bill, and a further 148 members 
(including 9 ministers) were absent from proceedings. Thus, 68% of Conservative 
members were not prepared to support increased state control – even during war 
time. The Phoenix Generation were little different: of the members present in the 
Commons, 46 voted for the bill, 48 against.19 Neither the Conservative Party nor 
conservatism per se died during the war. Traditionally prejudices still abounded. 
Thus the importance of the Rab Butler type. 
 ‘If the world is to be convinced that we are the nation whose lead can be 
followed in any post war reconstruction, we must make people understand that we 
                                                           
18 Though J.D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1945-51 (London, 1964) 269, 
takes a decidedly mixed view of Tory ‘evolution’ over the 1945-51, he does credit men like 
Oliver Stanley for holding Churchill and the men of the right back. 
19 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 9 February 1943, vol. 386, cc.1277-1282. 
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are determined to maintain the present national unity and to create better 
conditions.’20 So wrote Butler in his wartime pamphlet A Future to Work For. 
Indeed, the title of this epistle is as relevant as its content. As we have seen, by 
1940 Nicolson, Attlee and others within the administration were questioning the 
very point of the war: why die to defend an essentially moribund capitalism? 
Therefore, such statements not only represented a reinvigoration of Conservatism 
after the lethargic age of Baldwin, but a fourth arm in the fight against Hitler. The 
virtually unbroken series of Conservative led reconstructive bodies, from the War 
Aims Committee - set up 10 days after the start of the Battle of Britain - to the last 
meeting of the Principal Reconstruction Committee in May 1945, represented a 
profound step indeed. This war had to be about something, or, at least sold to the 
people along such lines. 
 Butler was the driving force, most obviously in the field of education.21 
Though the framework for the division of the scholastic system into primary, 
secondary and further brackets had essentially been enshrined through the Hadow 
and Spens Reports in the 1920s and 1930s, this did not necessarily augur any 
action.22 Reports, as those concerning electoral reform in the interwar period had 
shown, did not mean policy. It was then to Butler’s great credit that, unlike the pre-
war Phoenix Generation, he knew how to finesse his leader’s seeming indifference. 
Churchill, busy playing the role of world statesman, was not a particularly 
sympathetic patron – even if Butler later eulogised his supposedly reformist 
leanings on education.23 After a letter from Rab merely floating the notion of a Joint 
Select Committee, Churchill replied on 13 September 1941 thus:  
 
I certainly cannot contemplate a new Educational Bill…No one can 
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possibly tell what the financial and economic state of the country will be 
when the war is over. Your main task at present is to get the schools 
working as well as possible under all the difficulties of air attack, 
evacuation etc.24 
 
This was a recurring theme. Conservatives who had little constructive to say - 
Churchill and Kingsley Wood were the prime examples - used the war quite adeptly 
as an excuse for saying nothing. The trick, as the Phoenix Generation seemingly 
missed, was to ignore such talk and simply act. William Beveridge was clearly the 
yardstick here - particularly given how the Tories later tried to portray Butler as a 
more effective version. Both men’s success lay in their ability to circumvent the 
staid nature of the governmental machine. After the setting up of an 
interdepartmental committee to look at insurance schemes in May 1941, and 
months of fairly vapid talk, Beveridge simply submitted his own proposals and 
awaited the reaction.25  Similarly, whilst taking the Churchillian line that ‘it would 
be unwise to dogmatise or to theorise as to what reconstruction will be necessary 
after the war,’ Butler ploughed on regardless with his education reforms. 26 
Wartime conditions were obviously a more opportune moment to put forth 
changes, yet perhaps something else was at work. Perhaps the regimented nature 
of the Phoenix Generation’s formative experience - the war - was at odds with the 
freer, more liberal, Oxbridge upbringing of Butler, Law and that younger cohort. 
Their minds, one might suggest, were more open to challenging authority. 
6.4 A New Conservatism? 
Arguably the most obvious concern with the notion that Conservatism 
changed to accommodate a new consensus is the very fact that the party pushed 
this line so hard. There seems a real risk that “the lady doth protest too much.” At 
the 1945 election, Butler wrote, ‘we were shaken out of our lethargy and impelled 
to re-think our philosophy and re-form our ranks with a thoroughness unmatched 
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for a century.’27 Earlier Eden had similarly spoken of the defeat as a ‘blessing, 
because it gives us the opportunity to redefine our faith and our political 
objectives.’28 Yet hadn’t the party espoused reformist rhetoric throughout the war 
years? Eden had very early in the conflict noted that ‘war presents an audit of the 
nation; it exposes weaknesses ruthlessly and brutally, and this war is going to do 
that too. These weaknesses will call for changes.’29 Quinton Hogg had also famously 
warned his leaders that ‘if you do not give the people social reform, they are going 
to give you social revolution.’30 Such calls, for all the later eulogising, it appears 
were unheeded. 
 Accounts praising the Tory Party during this period generally adopt three 
arguments. Firstly, they look to the pre 1939 legacy of Macmillan, Eden and the 
more “liberal conservatives.” Generally, in other words, the Phoenix Generation of 
this study are held up as harbingers of a less aloof, more caring form of post-war 
conservatism. Arthur Marwick pointed to ‘the very large groundwork of social and 
political agreement in the thirties’ giving rise to the ‘ideological structure which 
took Britain safely through the forties and brought her to rest in the fifties.’31 
Indeed, as Marwick argues, vehicles aiming for universal peace after the Great War 
provided common ground for men divided on other questions, the League of 
Nations Union most prominent in this regard.32 Certainly the veteran Harold 
Macmillan’s dabbling during this period with conscientious objectors, wealthy 
industrialists and the Stockton poor serves as an example of how varied interests 
were encompassed by progressive Toryism in the years immediately prior to the 
Second World War. Yet though Addison’s Road to 1945 essentially begins in such 
pre-conflict machinations, we should not be afraid to question such assumptions. 
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Daniel Ritschel for one, together with our fourth chapter, have shown that there 
could be limits to advanced right wing opinion before 1939.33 
 Secondly and thirdly come the impetus engendered by war years. Here, as 
we have seen, academics point to the Butler-Willink reforms as evidence 
conservatism could not only adapt to the times, but drive the nation forward 
during the conflict. This movement was, in part, helped along by the third leg of the 
new conservatism: the Tory Reform Committee (TRC). The TRC, like many of the 
‘One Nation’ groups of this time, enjoys much post-facto praise. Its endorsement of 
the Labour claim for the immediate implementation of Beveridge’s proposals, 
together with the stand it took in favour of equal pay for women teachers in the 
1944 Education Act, seem to indeed augur progressive politics.34 Certainly then, 
Conservatives recognised the world was changing. But the thorny question 
remains of whether they actually thought this was a positive trend. 
 Viscount Hinchingbrooke was one of the Butler cohort of Conservatives 
threatening to leapfrog the Phoenix Generation into high office. In 1943 he had 
become Chairman of the TRC and therein established quite the progressive power 
base. Thus throughout the early months of 1943 he set about trying to woo the 
masses with a propagandistic deluge outlining just how great the Tories believed 
progress to be. In the Evening Standard he opined of the virtues of ‘Modern 
Toryism’: 
 
Modern Toryism rejects Individualism as a philosophy in which the 
citizen has few duties in society…It is hopeful of planning which it 
regards as a grand design to bring the aims of man into a true relation 
with the aims of the community. 
 
Modern Toryism is exhilarated by the Beveridge Report and sanguine of 
passing into law at an early date measures to give effect to the bulk of its 
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recommendations.35 
 
This final reference to an ‘early date’ is very important. The Tories, throughout the 
Beveridge to Butskell period, gained much by being vague on detail - particularly, 
that is, in retrospect. Thus, whilst in February 1943 the TRC pamphlet Forward - By 
the Right! had claimed its raison d’etre to be ‘encourag[ing] the Government to take 
constructive actions on the lines of the Beveridge scheme,’ and lauded the TRC’s 
parliamentary amendment to call for the immediate creation of a Ministry of Social 
Security to give purpose to the report, there would be some later backtracking.36 
By October 1944, with Beveridge seemingly quietly shelved for the moment, the 
TRC claimed that ‘it was never suggested that there was a possibility of bringing 
these reforms into operation until the war was over.’37 As Ewen Green observed, 
something of a parallel existed in the 1950s - whilst Harold Macmillan would later 
claim his era of full employment stemmed directly from the 1944 White Paper, that 
very document had only spoken of in terms of ‘high and stable’ employment.38 
There were, it is true, wiggle room on the earlier declarations. Certainly however, 
the Conservatives were at least trying to exploit their own ambiguity.  
 Even more telling would be Hinchingbrooke’s reaction to the election loss in 
1945. This was a man, let us not forget, who in 1943 had claimed that ‘a complete 
volte face in our outlook is required and where private interests obstruct they must 
be ruthlessly cast aside.’39 A man who had denounced the ‘“individualist” business-
men, financiers, and speculators ranging freely in a laissez-faire economy and 
creeping unnoticed into the fold of Conservatism to insult the Party with their 
votes at elections.’40 It seems to follow he would react like Macmillan - 
disappointed to lose power, but recognising that maybe the country needed an 
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administration of the left, albeit temporarily. Yet in September 1945, come 
Labour’s “New Jerusalem,” he espoused the following: 
 
I have never accepted the doctrine that it is the duty of a minority 
opposition to give aid and comfort to a hostile Government any more in 
the constituencies than at Westminster. 
We are not obliged to make obeisance before those in the seats of 
power, to lick their boots, or minister to their daily needs. 
If the appeal to you, therefore, by the Socialist Government is national 
savings for the nationalisation of the mines, my counsel is to reject it. 
If the appeal is National Savings for a State-owned Merchant Marine, or 
inland transport system, or medical service, I would turn it down.41 
 
A progressive landslide then, was met not by grudging welcome or lukewarm 
praise but, in essence, a call for passive resistance. Electors were told to completely 
ignore the overwhelming instinct they shown for change, and resist the 
administration to almost all ends except violence. 
 
6.5 The Generational Shift 
Hinchingbrooke was an extreme case, but at the same time merely the tip of an 
iceberg. Though Tories patted themselves on the back for accepting the terms of 
the new Keynesian consensus, in reality the party was split down the middle.42 
Whilst the Phoenix Generation, as we have seen, flirted with Keynes in the 1930s, a 
new prophet was on the scene: Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom 
remains a classic, and very readable, study of the dangers of totalitarianism. It was 
however more reminiscent of Churchill’s prediction that a Labour victory in 1945 
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would augur a British Gestapo than the 1930s leanings of the Phoenix Generation. 
Churchill had of course read Hayek, and he was far from alone in this regard. To be 
sure, Die Hards like Waldron Smithers swallowed The Road to Serfdom whole: 
 
Socialism is assuming a new name, “State Control.” State control can 
only continue to function by compulsion and by force. It entails the 
regimentation of our daily lives, and forced labour, and its inevitable 
consequence, as Dr Hayek points out, is Nazism.43 
 
This again was an extreme point of view. Few Tories – Enoch Powell was an 
interesting exception - would have compared Bevin or Attlee to Hitler.44 Yet Hayek 
was more imbedded in Tory thought at this time than all the talk of a Keynesian 
consensus suggests. Whilst Phoenix Generation members like Henry Willink 
‘almost tremble[d] with uneasiness’ when listening to ‘rigid right-wing talk,’ this 
was not true of those but a few years younger.45 Though Harold Macmillan could 
lament the failure of Quintin Hogg’s 1963 leadership bid as a missed opportunity to 
continue what ‘Stanley & John Loder, & Boothby, & Noel Skelton & I had tried to 
represent from 1924 onwards,’ in reality he was ignoring the shift in nominally 
progressive Conservative thought that had occurred.46 
Beveridge, we have noted, was not welcomed with the open arms Tory 
retrospect seems to suggest. Indeed, it is worthwhile noting how relatively little 
contact there was between ‘the people’s William’ and Rab Butler when the two 
were supposedly pursuing mutual aims: extended welfare provision. When 
Beveridge wrote to Rab in October 1941 saying he would be ‘delighted to come 
over and have a talk over the question of social services’ one might expect the start 
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of years of back and forth.47 Yet scarcely was it the case. Whilst the two were not 
exactly strangers during the 1940s, Beveridge’s papers at the LSE reveal no epistles 
from Butler. Similarly, the only meaningful correspondence with the TRC is a note 
from Hinchingbrooke thanking Beveridge for inviting him to lunch, and Beveridge’s 
reply praising a TRC amendment in November 1943 arguing for more constructive 
measures in the direction of his report.48 Hardly scintillating stuff, and more 
suggestive of a Beveridge looking for cross-party support than the Tories looking 
outside their traditional box.49 Even if TRC members accepted the broad outlines of 
Beveridge’s scheme, let it be noted, they held massive reservations over the details: 
particularly the removal of the old Friendly Society schemes of insurance 
provision.50 Quintin Hogg’s diary seems to suggest that pragmatism rather than 
reformist verve characterised the Tory response: 
 
Although I did not accept the attack on the [present insurance 
companies or approved societies], I was convinced that one had to 
choose between the report and the present system (unless a new 
solution were proposed), and that if faced with the choice I should 
choose the report.51 
 
 Yet progressive Conservatism had indeed changed, just not in the manner 
often outlined. As Harmut Kopsch noted in his 1970 PhD thesis, what had gripped 
the Tory Party during the war was not a penchant for the interventionist state, but 
the exact opposite: neo-liberalism.52 In large part because of the comic regard in 
which the presidencies of George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan across the Atlantic 
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have sometimes been held in Britain, together with perceived notions that 
Thatcher “broke the mould,” neo-liberalism is rarely taken seriously as a coherent 
and long-term brand of conservative thought.53 Yet for all the adoption of 
Beveridgean clothing, it was Hayek rather than Keynes to whom the Phoenix 
Generation’s younger counterparts turned. On 11 August 1944 Rab Butler received 
a letter asking whether he had yet found time to read The Road to Serfdom. His 
reply three days later is certainly interesting: 
 
I am glad to know that “The Road of Serfdom” [sic] has come your way: I 
too thought it was well worth reading. I have recently resumed the 
Chairmanship of the Conservative Committee on Post-war Problems 
and am planning to put in some hard thinking in that direction during 
the coming Autumn.54 
 
Hayek was of course only one of presumably dozens and dozens of authors Butler 
must have been reading at the time. At the same time however, the link between 
The Road to Serfdom and post-war conservatism could already be detected. Thus, if 
Kopsch was cogent in identifying a neo-liberal trend in Conservative thought 
during this period, perhaps he was unwise to exclude the TRC generation from 
such conclusions.55  
6.6 Making Sense of the Times 
When all this was going on, the reader may well ask, where exactly were the 
Phoenix Generation? Why, if they had disagreed with the direction the party was 
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taking ideologically, did they not stand up and dissent? In part this can be 
answered geographically. Though nominally possessing more prestige – certainly 
more experience – than the Hinchingbrooke-Hogg generation, this was precisely 
the wrong position to be in should one’s aim be determining the post-war world. 
Instead of burning the midnight oil in Whitehall on some domestic scheme that 
would make the conflict worthwhile, Eden was traversing the world as Foreign 
Secretary. Instead of helping shape the Tory response to Beveridge, Halifax was 
aiding the war effort in Washington, Duff Cooper in Paris, John Loder in Australia, 
Macmillan in North Africa and so forth.56 The Phoenix Generation – also not helped 
by the early deaths of members like Euan Wallace and Victor Cazalet – was not yet 
important enough (Eden is a clear exception) to decisively influence the path of the 
war, yet too important to be kept at home where post-1945 Britain would be 
shaped. Meanwhile, those of the Phoenix Generation who did remain in Britain 
during the conflict were usually older men like Waldron Smithers and Ralph 
Assheton whose political careers had essentially already reached their zenith, and 
whose pre-1914 lives were as formative as the Great War itself. Such older 
veterans, as Assheton wrote to Beveridge, often felt that ‘I don’t suppose you and I 
will ever agree on the best way of getting the kind of world we want to live in.’57 
This was a bad start to any notion of a post-war Phoenix Generation shaped state, 
at least if defined in pre-1939 terms.  
 One cannot also ignore Adolf Hitler as a point of reference. Whilst Mosley 
was something of an exception in overtly aping him, he was by no means unique in 
looking abroad for lessons – something our fourth chapter outlined. Hitler and 
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Mussolini were men of the front generation who had attempted something 
profound with the notion of government. This, as Hayek pointed out, had led such 
countries on The Road to Serfdom. There was thus something of a necessity for the 
Phoenix Generation to cover their tracks. Mosley’s incarceration provided 
something of a neat coda, yet there was a concurrent need to repudiate their pre-
1939 attitudes towards government and the state.58 Whilst praising Schacht’s 
economic measures and Mussolini’s ordered society in the 1930s was seen as a 
little risqué, after 1939/40 it would be almost abhorrent. To make clear they 
recognized such abhorrence, given their previous leanings, the Phoenix Generation 
added a dash of Hayek to their previously Keynesian tonic. Eden’s 1946 comment 
that ‘we avoid both the extreme of individualism, and the folly of total State 
domination’ would thus become the norm in party preaching ‘freedom and 
order.’59  
 All this was very important, a revolutionary moment in Conservatism 
indeed. Whereas the Phoenix Generation had been rendered essentially pessimistic 
by years of failure and the continentally empirically proven danger of political 
activism however, men such as Richard Law were thinking a little differently. To be 
sure, a letter from the 1901 born Law to Paul Emrys-Evans at the start of the 
conflict told of a man at the end of his tether: 
 
When one thinks of it - all those who were killed last time, all those who 
are going to be killed now - everything wasted through the stubborness 
and lack of imagination of a few old men and the shamelessness of a lot 
of young ones. If ever I engage in politics again I shall leave the 
Conservative Party. You remember that man we were talking to after 
the division the other night, Quinlet or some such name - that’s the 
Conservative Party. And I don’t belong to it. This theory that it is 
possible to ‘educate’ the Conservative Party won’t hold water. But I 
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don’t suppose any of us will ever be in politics again.60 
 
Such assertions, patently, were proved false. The Second World War would provide 
a reinvigoration of such men who, lacking the chastening experience of the hopes 
of 1918 going to waste, would attempt to sculpt their own post-war Valhalla. 
Utopianism, the preserve of the Macmillan generation who believed government 
could cure – or at least provide the mechanisms to cure – all societal ills had, the 
claim went, ipso facto been proved wrong: ‘a perfect society,’ noted Law, ‘is no 
more to be realised than a perfect human being.’61 The cohort encompassing the 
TRC and Dick Law age bracket would have two aims. Some form of progress, to be 
sure. But also the limitation of activism within all parties and policies. In some 
sense this was a repeat of Baldwinism, only this time the Baldwin’s were almost 
identical in appearance (ideologically and in terms of age) to the activists. 
Moderation of ambition was the key, as Law outlined in 1945 concerning the 
regulation of world food supplies: 
 
It may not be very dramatic, and there may not be many headlines. But 
that’s the way we’re going to get the kind of world that we all want - by 
working for it, patiently and steadfastly, over a wide field and for a long 
time. We’re not going to wake up one fine morning and find it in our 
Christmas stocking. We’ll have to work for it - you and I, and millions of 
other ordinary, decent, humdrum people just like us.62 
 
If one wishes to seek a reason why, in part, austerity Britain seems so drab to 
modern audiences, this type of language is a reasonable place to start. To be sure, 
people bombed out of their homes were not always so amenable to the type of 
promised land talk peddled by Bevan and Attlee, but the message projected by the 
Tories occasionally appeared devoid of any hope – if defined collectively - 
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whatsoever. In 1950 Law crystallized this in his Return from Utopia. Hoping to 
capitalise on the perceived failures of Attlee’s 1945 administration, and citing 
Hayek as an inspiration, Law declared that 
 
to turn our backs on Utopia, to see it for the sham and the delusion that 
it is, is the beginning of hope. It is to hold out once again the prospect of 
a society in which man is free to be good because he is free to choose. 
Freedom is the first condition of human virtue and Utopia is 
incompatible with freedom. Come back from Utopia and hope is born 
again.63 
 
Rather than conversion to Keynes’s interventionist plans for the economy, post-
1945 conservatism would be defined by a distinct lack of ambition. ‘The problem 
for twentieth century man,’ wrote Law, ‘is how to control the consequences of his 
own actions….Having mastered the world, he has become his own slave.’64 Like 
Hayek, he argued that in both world wars ‘the ideas of the vanquished corrupted 
the victors.’65 ‘The planned economy, of its very nature, is incompatible with 
liberty,’ and Labour after 1945, however obliquely put, was taking Britain along 
The Road to Serfdom.66 
6.7 Reflecting on Churchill’s “Gestapo” Comment 
The tendency to see Churchill’s 1945 “Gestapo” comment as the ravings of a 
senile old man are, quite simply, misplaced. He may well have been wrong, but he 
was hardly out on a limb politically. In 1951 the victorious Conservative campaign 
would be littered with much the same type of rhetoric. As a pamphlet ahead of the 
1955 election put it, ‘the Conservative Government has a very definite idea of the 
proper relation between the State and the Individual. The aim of the new 
Government elected in 1951 was to restore freedom, to reduce the burden of 
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taxation and to give individual men and women a better chance to live a decent 
life.’67 A pledge to ‘restore freedom’ reads very strangely indeed: to be sure, the 
economy had been regulated by more levers than the Tories would themselves 
have used, but Attlee was hardly ruling a totalitarian state.  
Perhaps this helps answer a paradox posed by Paul Addison. That the 
national swing to the left during the war presaged the Conservative defeat in 1945 
and resumption of party strife seems reasonable. Yet this seemingly runs against 
the burgeoning consensual age of politics engendered by the spirit of wartime 
coalition.68 The answer may lie in attitudes to liberty. Whilst Labour essentially 
triumphed in their desire to implement far reaching reform after 1945, they in fact 
reached the edges of what the Conservatives had defined as acceptable in a free 
society. That the Labour Government faltered by 1949-50, essentially dying in 
office in a similar manner to Baldwin’s 1924-9 administration, was a profound 
step. Had a second generation of “New Jerusalem” inspired leaders taken office the 
parameters of political acceptability may well have been extended. As it was, 
Butler, Law and Macmillan rode back into office, and set up bricking up the 
boundaries of the state. Like Franco’s Falange, the revolutionaries were told they 
shall not pass, only this time it succeeded. If Labour’s “Gestapo” was prevented, its 
more socialistic elements were also quietened, only to resurface once Thatcher 
took Hayek to similar extremes. 
 If one wishes to see how subtly Conservative Party progressivism changed 
from the late 1930s to the 1950s, Harold Macmillan is a fascinating example. Whilst 
Macmillan himself, backed by the Sunday Express, labelled his post-1945 work as 
‘the second edition’ of his 1938 Middle Way, in reality his ideas had changed 
significantly.69 This, as he hinted at in The Tides of Fortune, was possibly the 
influence of conversations with leading TRC members like Hogg and Peter 
Thorneycroft.70 Put simply, the state had shrunk rapidly in his conception of an 
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ordered society. The language remained the same – a ‘mixed economy’ along ‘the 
line of progress’ – but even Macmillan had not managed to swim successfully 
against the Hayekian tide. In Truro in April 1947 he declared that ‘socialism leads 
inevitably to totalitarianism.’71 He followed this up with a declaration in 
Wandsworth that ‘we believe in real democracy, political and economic. In every 
country it is becoming more and more apparent that socialism and democracy 
cannot live together.’72 This, let it be noted, was the atmosphere in which that great 
bastion of Tory progressivism – The Industrial Charter – was published but a month 
later. Whilst the charter acknowledged that elements of the “New Jerusalem” – 
nationalisation of coal, the railways and the Bank of England - could not be 
overturned, its architects believed fundamentally that the instigators of such 
policies were dangerous, or were at least prepared to paint them in such terms. 
While later lauded as ‘the first landmark on the road to Conservative recovery in 
the field of ideas,’ and drafted by a committee including Macmillan, Stanley and 
Lyttelton, the document in fact represented the ideas of Baldwin, rather than the 
pre-1939 Phoenix Generation. 73 Like Baldwin, they needed to adopt the cloak of 
progress, or, as party papers put it, ‘to convince the people that it accepted the 
need for full employment, the welfare state and controls in time of scarcity.’74 At 
the same time, they needed to reverse Labour’s policies as far as post-1945 opinion 
would allow, whereby the Conservative Party would ‘sketch its own policy for 
dealing with the worst outrages of Socialist legislation without simply proposing 
the wholesale reversal of that legislation.’75 This then, was by no means the 
realisation of The Middle Way, but a reactive form of politics.  
6.8 The Hayekian Demographic Timebomb 
Positivity, as Ira Zweiniger-Bargielowska sagely illustrated, was manifestly 
missing from the Tory message after 1945.76 To be sure, there were examples of 
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modernisation and democratisation. David Maxwell Fyfe’s reforms removed the 
financial barrier to becoming a Conservative candidate – limiting subscription to 
election funds at £50 a candidate, and thus preventing the previous “buying” of 
seats by out of touch country bumpkins.77 Woolton’s drive to replace these lost 
funds with grass roots subscription was also remarkably successful: auguring a rise 
from 937,000 party members in April 1947 to 2.5 million by September 1948.78 
These however were rather cosmetic measures. Whilst Churchill’s dramatic 
language extolling ‘the forward upward road toward freedom and recovery’ may 
occasionally have resembled a vivid Delacroix painting, it was usually followed by a 
warning of ‘the downhill path of tightening controls…that make for domestic 
unhappiness and worry.’79 For in ‘a world where the state has come to stay,’ Butler 
declared, ‘we shall seek to find an enduring place for private initiative.’80 Such 
views, however well put, were rather pessimistically Orwellian for a society 
seeking a more constructive programme from the ashes of war. 
 The rejection of Butler’s ROBOT scheme (named after three of its civil 
servant advocates) in February 1952 to break with Bretton Woods and instigate a 
free-floating pound is sometimes seen as the moment the Tories accepted the 
Attlee consensus.81 Reducing spending on welfare provision was not countenanced 
to provide cheap money and a jolt to the economy through the stimulation of the 
export trade. Together with the 1958 resignations from Macmillan’s government 
however, one should pay a little more attention to the actors in the post 1945 Tory 
melees, rather than simply note the conclusions. In the first instance, Eden stepped 
in to foil Butler – a rare piece of domestic interference for a man, as we have seen, 
with relatively little knowledge in such areas. Six years later, Macmillan indeed 
survived the challenge of Thorneycroft, Powell and Birch. Thus Keynesianism 
seemed to emerge victorious. Yet who were its challengers? Not the stuffy old men 
the Phoenix Generation had faced between the wars, but a younger type whose 
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principal point of reference was the century’s second war.  
This could already be seen with the TRC during the conflict. With 1943 
forming a convenient twenty-five year long generational gap between the end of 
the first war and the point where the Phoenix Generation arguably should have 
been shaping Tory policy, in actual fact TRC membership was split down the 
middle. Comprising fourteen members of the Phoenix Generation and the same 
number of MPs who had donned uniform for the first time against Hitler, already 
the balance of power was shifting away from the Great War veteran.82 Indeed, with 
the chairman Hinchingbrooke and joint-secretaries Thorneycroft and Molson all 
falling into the latter camp, arguably even by 1943 post-war Conservatism could 
never be what Macmillan and his cohort had desired in 1939. Whilst the second 
war grouping would remain keen to ensure the kudos of their veteran 
predecessors – Amery wished them ‘more power to your young elbows’ in October 
1943 – the ideological breach was clear.83 For all Labour were hoping for a postwar 
consensus built on the promise of a New Jerusalem, it would be the mission of the 
Thorneycroft cohort to limit the scale of this. This was not merely the repetition of 
the age old pattern of anti-socialism, but a revolutionary creed which derived from 
Hitler and Hayek. 
The classic statement of the post-Hitler age remains Isaiah Berlin’s 1958 
Inaugural Oxford lecture on the ‘Two Concepts of Liberty.’ Pointing to 1789, and 
with first-hand experience of fleeing Soviet Russia, Berlin warned of the nature of 
self-mastery (positive liberty): 
 
The French Revolution, like all great revolutions, was, at least in its 
Jacobin form, just an eruption of the desire for “positive” freedom of 
collective self-direction on the part of a large body of Frenchmen who 
felt liberated as a nation, even though the result was, for a good many of 
them, a severe restriction of individual freedoms. 
                                                           
82 Advance Copy of Forward – By the Right sent to Leo Amery, October 1943, CAC, AMEL 
2/1/36. 
83 Amery to Hinchingbrooke, 13 October 1943, Ibid. 
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Though we have seen that in 1940 some form of raison d’etre had to be found for 
the war beyond crushing Nazism, once this had been achieved the organ that 
instigated such progressive measures – the state – had to be watched with an eagle 
eye. The following was again from Berlin’s lecture, but could equally have come 
from Richard Law, Peter Thorneycroft, or a host of twentieth century born 
Conservatives: 
 
It seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in principle 
be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously 
realised is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, 
and not all of them are compatible with each other, then the possibility 
of conflict - and of tragedy - can never wholly be eliminated from human 
life. 
 
The fear of catastrophe reigned in the hopes of man. The Conservative Party was 
particularly sensitive to such trends, given its historical role as the party of order 
and stability. Like George Orwell’s Animal Farm, if they denounced the cruelty of 
Mr Jones, they were forever afraid of unleashing a Napoleon. 
 Perhaps then, it is time to view May 1940 a little differently. The 
substitution of Chamberlain for Churchill, rather than Chamberlain for Halifax may 
indeed have led to a more vigorous prosecution of the war against Nazi Germany. It 
may indeed have given hope to the occupied peoples of Europe, and given 
Roosevelt something to think about. Yet it also resolutely shaped Britain’s domestic 
future. Beveridge assumed some prominence to be sure, but was always 
hammering against a Prime Minister whose belief in progress had been shattered 
by the First World War, who saw the market rather than the state as the 
instrument of control over the destiny of the nation, and would impose a neo-
liberal form of leadership that, though temporarily abated in the party under Eden 
and Macmillan, was always ready to resurface. Correlli Barnett may paint an image 
of 1940s Conservatism as riddled by paternal, interventionist Tories foolishly help 
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Labour tinker with Britain’s governmental structure, but the reality was decidedly 
more ambiguous.84 Thatcher did not so much build anew as dust off the cobwebs. 
That Hogg and Thorneycroft returned to political prominence under her, and the 
aged Macmillan lambasted the selling of the family silver, remains indicative. 
                                                           
84 C. Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-1950, (Basingstoke, 
1995), passim. 
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Conclusion 
 
C.1 Retrospect 
The Phoenix Generation never forgot the First World War. Almost seventy 
years after its start, Harold Macmillan replied to a letter from his former comrade 
in arms, Harold Balfour: 
 
Dear Harold. Your letter touched me deeply. It was very kind of you to 
send it. How well I remember those days at the beginning of the war. It 
is sad to see now so much division in our country for then, at least, we 
had a sense of all being on the same side. Yours HM1 
 
Perhaps Macmillan is a bad example: he, after all, is well known for his death bed 
sorrow that the unemployment levels in the Stockton of the 1980s were the same 
as they had been sixty years earlier. This was clearly was not his Britain. Yet he was 
far from alone in being ravaged by memory – James Stuart, for example, retaining a 
lifelong anti-Germanism.2  
Edward Louis Spears may be better known for his staunch support of 
Churchill’s views on appeasement, but an equally concrete expression of his 
personality exists in the Belgian town of Mons. Following initial correspondence 
with Mayor Victor Maistriau in 1937, he would spend the next fifteen years trying 
to get a monument erected memorialising the 1914 battle that took place there, 
and in which he was a combatant.  Recognising that Spears would be 
particulierement sympathique to the cause, Maistriau entrusted him with raising 
                                                           
1 Macmillan to Balfour, 20 November 1984, CAC, BLFR 1/1. 
2 J. Stuart, Within the Fringe, (London, 1967), 87: ‘Let those who live to follow after me 
remember that the Germans cannot be trusted – nor can the Japs, after Pearl Harbour. 
They are both to be feared. People today buy Mercedes motor cars and Volkswagens 
because they have a reputation for good workmanship, but I for one will never knowingly 
buy anything made in Germany or Japan, and I hope others will on reflection take a similar 
view.’ At the same time, Stuart was proud to take the salute from his former regiment, the 
Scots Guards, on their return from Suez (178). 
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funds in Britain and her Empire.3 Having reached £850 of the £1000 target by the 
outbreak of war in 1939, the project was put on hold for years with Spears 
depositing the money into War Bonds on 3 May 1940.4 Yet after the war he wrote 
to prominent figures in the town trying to locate Maistriau. ‘It is,’ he stated having 
tracked down the Mayor, ‘desirable never to forget the association of the British 
Army with Mons.’5 By 1952 the arrangements were in place and, having 
unsuccessfully attempted to have Churchill attend, Lord Alexander travelled to 
Belgium to preside over its unveiling.6 Spears, having worked so hard for its 
construction, was also persuaded to say a few words. His oration was both 
indicative of his generation, and undeniably moving: 
 
There are things which can never be forgotten, glories which cannot be 
tarnished, sufferings which last all one’s life. The survivors of these 
battles feel deeply that it was the best of us who never came back to the 
country. We who have seen another war have become old. Time has 
been hard on us, the years which have passed since 1914 weigh heavily 
on our shoulders. But our comrades at Mons will always be young, they 
smile in our memory with the brilliance of their twenty five years at 
they smiled at the death here, nearly forty years ago. All our Ex-
Servicemen, the whole Empire, is grateful to you.7 
C.2 Promise 
The crucial point of this thesis is that such feelings were articulated beyond 
autobiographies and poems however. To be sure, the Phoenix Generation were 
prone to artistic flourish: Duff Cooper’s love letters to his future wife attest to that.8 
                                                           
3 Maistriau to Spears, 28 October 1937, KCL, ELSKC 7/1. 
4 Spears War Bond Form, 3 May 1940, Ibid. 
5 Spears to Mme. Maistriau and, subsequently, Maistriau himself, 7 October 1946 and 1 July 
1947, Ibid, ELSKC 7/2. 
6 Churchill to Spears, 16 July 1952, Ibid, ELSKC 7/3. 
7 Spears Speech, 11 October 1952, Ibid. 
8 A. Cooper (ed), A Durable Fire: The Letters of Duff and Diana Cooper 1913-1950, (London, 
1983), passim. 
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Yet – unlike the Graves and Sassoons - this was not their sole, or even main, outlet 
of grief. It is important not to view all ex-servicemen as almost wandering zombies 
in interwar Britain – overcome by emotion, and only able to articulate their views 
in the narrow form of soldierly concerns like war pensions and compensation for 
wounds sustained under fire. To be sure, these are legitimate and important areas 
of interest, and ones ably examined previously, but this analysis has contended that 
the spectrum needs to be widened a little. Great War veterans entered the 
Westminster bloodstream in numbers in no way commensurate merely with that 
of a pressure group, or political flash in the pan. They were also not mere replicas 
of the authors. These were men who parlayed their radicalisation into directions 
that arguably could not have been foreseen in 1918. Oxford and the trenches did 
not always augur a road to literary contemplation, but, as illustrated here, could 
influence one in a number of ways. 
 The trenches of the Great War were not only a bloodier Toynbee Hall – 
where the upper class, in small numbers, dipped their toe in the lives of the 
average worker – but a revolutionary experience for many. It took lives which had 
been meandering along and provided them with a purpose they had lacked. One 
does not wish to be over dramatic, but the lives of the Phoenix Generation do 
almost reverse von Clausewitz’s doctrine: politics, to the Edens, Mosleys and 
Loders, was almost a continuation of war. What they had failed to achieve on the 
battlefield – the safety of their comrades, the crushing military defeat of Germany 
(the speed of whose defeat and Allied inability to penetrate their hinterland must 
have been equally puzzling to the victors) and, in some cases, the rather unfulfilled 
nature of the combat (achieving neither the killing of the enemy nor military 
medals they had sought) – begat a fervour to achieve something after 1918. Thus 
the rhetoric of 1918 was doubly important. Certainly they believed in Lloyd 
George’s words – building “homes fit for heroes” was indeed desirable. Yet it also 
represented the plugging of a gap opened up by the conflict. These men needed to 
make their mark in life. This, crucially, would be determined by how far they could 
move England beyond 1914 – not how far they could bring it back it into being. 
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C.3 Averting Danger as Baldwin’s Great Victory 
 The other critical dichotomy concerns how far these men were masters of 
the forces the war had unleashed. At election time, particularly in the years 
immediately following the conflict, veterans exhibited little inhibition about 
flouting their war service. The acclaim this brought them presumably was a real 
shot in the arm to their confidence. It also, given the scant political knowledge the 
young men could have at this time, did them no harm at the ballot box. When it 
came to appeasement too, ex-servicemen like Duff Cooper would attempt to imbue 
their arguments with a tacit moral authority the war had provided, though this 
indeed was a two-way street – Chamberlain’s foreign policy, contrary to the myths, 
was supported to an even larger degree by former soldiers. At any rate, war service 
was a useful piece of political currency for any candidate, and, as we saw, helped 
buttress the Conservative Party’s national appeal. Disraelism was back, and had the 
kudos of an important set of people. This was clearly one dimension. 
 Yet did either the veterans themselves, or the Conservative leadership, 
really understand what they were unleashing? One only need view the figures of 
ex-servicemen admitted to public asylums to see what the conflict could unleash 
long term.9 The Phoenix Generation had of course been more lucky, but they had 
seen the same sights as those more viscerally affected. Baldwin acted to quell such 
forces. Aside from taming the socialistic tendencies the conflict had produced, he 
dangled the carrot of office in front of the young Tory veterans, but rarely within 
reach. His political agenda similarly gave hope to the Macmillans, but its leftist 
rhetoric was not the launching pad to progressive activism. Baldwin then, as 
Conservatives tend to do, erred on the side of caution. Hitler abroad, and a 
pervasively shell shocked culture at home, augured an arms-length strategy with 
the ex-serviceman. The world needed to change, but this was the time for 
evolution, rather than revolution.10 The penchant the Phoenix Generation had 
                                                           
9 F. Reid, “Have You Forgotten Yet” Shell Shock, Trauma, and the Memory of the Great War in 
Great Britain, 1914-1930, University of West England PhD Thesis, 2006, 164. 2,500 
admissions by 1919, 4,673 by 1920 and 6,435 by 1921. 
10  As K. Mannheim put it, Essays on Sociology and Social Pyschology: Vol 6, (London, 1997), 
103 ‘Conservative reformism consists in the substitution of individual factors by other 
270 
 
shown for the latter was worrying.   Better though, to keep them within established 
circles and perpetually frustrated, than to turn them away. Arguably, Baldwin may 
have thought, they did not know their own minds. Certainly, even when they 
outlined so readily how the war had changed them, perhaps indeed they did not. 
Government policy, as Reid has perceptively noted, was tailored to make people 
forget.11 Any examples of shell-shock, however tacit, were to be kept out of sight. 
Thus the hyper-masculine portrayal of war veterans come election time, military 
uniforms, medals and all. 1914-18 was to be about glory, not anguish. Veterans 
were to be considered part of the Conservative tradition, rather than something 
new. The stakes were high – as Weimar showed, when veterans felt betrayed (and 
even when they were almost slavishly appeased by the state) the democratic polity 
was in trouble. By keeping ex-soldiers in house, Baldwin accorded them avenues 
for their various causes, and political space to vent, but never lost sight of the 
importance of retaining them within the fold.12  
C.4 A Study in Failure? 
Ultimately then, is this a study in failure? The mere repetition of the age old tale of 
youth burning brightly, only to be outwitted by age? It also, one might contend, 
contains elements of a generation merely “growing up.” The reason Macmillan did 
not enact his Middle Way agenda across the board was simply that he had matured 
past such ideas, and realised, as Rab Butler noted, that politics is only The Art of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
individual factors (‘improvements’)...The Conservative only thinks in terms of a system as 
a reaction, either when he is forced to develop a system of his own to counter that of the 
progressives, or when the march of events deprives him of all influence upon the 
immediate present.’ 
11 Reid, Have You Forgotten, 110. 
12 Deborah Cohen sees the British spirit of voluntarism as constituting a key explanation 
for the loyalty of ex-servicemen to the democratic state, despite its faults. Organisations 
such as the British Legion, she posits, formed space for servicemen to contact non-
combatants (donors) and thus to re-enter normal life. In Germany veterans, despite being 
comparatively well rewarded, rejected the state’s overtures whilst Weimar left little room 
for charitable endeavour – an important source of communication shut down. Was, one 
might ask, the Tory Party another vessel for veteran-non-combatant dialogue? D. Cohen, 
The War Came Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany 1914-1939, (London, 
2001), 8. 
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Possible.13 These points may be taken in turn. 
 Firstly, by most concrete measures the Phoenix Generation was an 
outstanding success. Including Attlee, every Prime Minister from 10 May 1940 to 
18 October 1963 had seen active service in the First World War. Every 
Conservative Foreign Secretary from June 1935 to December 1955 likewise.14 
Given their economic views, it is perhaps significant that the Phoenix Generation 
rarely occupied 11 Downing Street – the Chancellor of the Exchequer being 
reserved for men like Snowden and Chamberlain between the wars, and, besides 
Macmillan’s brief tenure, Butler and Thorneycroft after 1945. Nevertheless, their 
presence was felt in most issues of the day. From the General Strike to revolts over 
economic lethargy through to appeasement, the Westminster in the decades 
following 1918 may well have had a decisively different character had veterans not 
occupied it in such numbers. The state that emerged after 1945, if inaugurated by 
Labour, received the Phoenix Generation’s seal of approval in its overall form. This, 
given the occasionally virulent Hayekian opposition from the Tory backbenches, 
was important in ensuring that historians could talk of a post-war consensus. Even 
though not of their direct making, the planned nature of post-1945 society was 
perhaps their enduring legacy.15 
 By their own standards however, they failed. The Macmillan of the 1980s 
was not simply an out of touch anachronism, but a testament to such failure. 
Thatcher was possible because Keynesianism had been seen to fail – it was no 
longer, as Charmley noted, the philosopher’s stone it had appeared in the 1950s.16 
Yet even the manifestations of such failure – principally “stop-go” and stagflation – 
                                                           
13 Perhaps tellingly Macmillan recorded in his diary that ‘Disraelis and Churchills are not 
liked by Parliaments or People. The prefer (in our system)…Baldwins, Neville 
Chamberlains.’ P. Catterall (ed), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957, 
(Basingstoke, 2003), 95 [11 August 1951]. 
14 Counting John Simon’s RFC service and his position as “National” Foreign Secretary this 
could arguably be extended back to 1931. 
15 One example of planning was the various satellite towns and garden cities that emerged 
after 1945. Writing to Frederic Osborn in 1942 Francis Fremantle suggested eleven Tory 
MPs might be open for Osborn’s ‘indoctrination’ on the subject, compared to seven from 
the other parties. Fremantle to Osborn, 18 May 1942, HALS, FJO/B66. 
16 J. Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996, (London, 1996), 94-5. 
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could have been hypothesised by 1945. It was not so much that the post-1945 state 
was predicated on contradictions, but that it was built upon too much compromise. 
Aside from Labour’s woes – its New Jerusalem leaders dying in office and an 
incoherent nuclear policy threatening to engulf the party – the Tories were 
similarly dogged by indecision. The issue that emerged from the early 1940s was 
essentially what Mosley had been articulating in the early 1930s, did political 
liberty and economic prosperity necessarily go hand in hand? Before 1939 the 
Phoenix Generation had, to some degree, bought Mosley’s argument. The state 
needed to intervene to correct market failures to a significant degree. Yet Hitler, 
and the onset of a new group of Tory radicals inspired by another world war, threw 
such conclusions into doubt. Hayek and Thornerycroft seized the initiative: basic 
provision for the people would have to be raised, but the market was, by and large, 
the tool to do this. It is quite convenient to consider 1945 as something of a pivot. 
Thirteen years earlier, Mosley had formed the British Union of Fascists and would 
take extreme Keynesianism into the abyss. Thirteen years later, Enoch Powell 
resigned from Macmillan’s government in a free market fit of pique, and would 
later crash and burn himself. Two clever men, radicalised by two wars, tossed their 
careers aside for opposing economic ideologies. That both faded into disgrace 
serves as evidence that if Hayek’s dream would have to wait, the Phoenix 
Generation could hardly claim the knock out ideological victory Macmillan’s talk of 
‘having it so good’ suggested either. The generation had not filled the historic role 
they had allotted themselves – evidence both of Mannheim’s ‘Problems of 
Generations,’ and the limitations inherent within the Conservative Party structure. 
 Aside from Baldwin’s skillful handling of them, two events threw the 
Phoenix Generation off course. By not supporting Mosley at the time of his 
resignation, the war generation missed the boat. 1930-1 was the time to redraw 
the political map. That a “National Government” of the old men came into being in 
August 1931 should not blind us to its more youthful alternatives. Some form of 
coalition between Lloyd George, and the Labour and Conservative types who flirted 
with Mosley’s New Party – Stanley, Macmillan and Bevan – would have provided a 
real electoral alternative, not only to the Labour left, but the National Government 
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centre. That it did not emerge – due its main player’s arrogance, and minor figures 
political pragmatism – was a key moment. To be sure, the National Government 
would have to begin to correct unemployment, but orthodox finance did not 
appreciate the sense of urgency the young men did.17 
 As the 1930s went on, foreign policy began to supersede employment 
concerns. Here again the Phoenix Generation were found wanting, though in this 
instance one must be more sympathetic. There was no right way to handle Hitler, 
for all the later lambasting of Chamberlain and Halifax. He led a nation with the 
combination of economic strength and genuine territorial grievance arguably 
unseen in European history. Fears (accurate as they indeed were) concerning 
another holocaust of, due to technological developments, a much worse kind even 
than 1914-18 abounded in Great Britain – not least amongst veterans. Jubilant 
public scenes at the conclusion of the Munich Agreement were replicated amongst 
Tory former soldiers who, even if a few dissented like Duff Cooper, had no coherent 
alternative to appeasement. Few, it must be said, rallied to Churchill. This then, was 
not age outwitting youth, but youth not fighting for its beliefs in the first instance 
and having no better answer to age in the second. 
 To the accusation that they simply matured past early radicalism and what 
emerged after 1945 was the logical outcome of such a process, one may offer a 
qualified endorsement. Certainly the Phoenix Generation showed signs of adapting 
to circumstance. Acknowledging the hold both Hayek and legacy of the war had 
had, they too espoused the post-1945 Tory message of freedom in all things. Pre-
1939 words praising Mussolini or Stalinism would clearly have to go. That they 
evolved one cannot question. Yet this should not blind us to what they had said 
before. British politics was not heading in the direction it arrived at in 1945 in the 
years before the conflict. For example, an Eden administration of 1938 or even a 
Halifax government of 1940 would probably have pursued entirely different 
objectives – with an entirely different structure of government - to what in fact 
                                                           
17 Though Appendix D shows, one must be wary of the gap between rhetoric and how the 
Phoenix Generation actually vote. Sympathy towards labour yes, sympathy towards 
Labour more debateable. Tories were still Tories.  
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emerged. The experience of coalition government during the Second World War is 
often held in high regard by the Tories. Begrudgingly they confess their previous 
sins – conveniently hiding much under the Guilty Men foreign policy critiques – and 
make clear that the party had changed for the better: Butler, Eden and Macmillan 
auguring a better age. This is debatable. What emerged after 1945 was a Tory party 
committed to freedom from state interference and, after the debacle of 1945, 
winning elections. In the early 1930s, in the eyes of men who would come to lead 
later on, government had been a tool for good. By 1943, the Tory Party was already 
beginning to see it in rather more Orwellian terms. The legacy of one war had been 
replaced by another. Labour alone marched forth, whilst the Conservatives 
returned to their old, negative, dialogue peddled albeit by an even more youthful 
cohort.18 Perhaps this has merely created some kind of Hegelian political synthesis, 
arguably however it has limited the nation’s progress. Either way, we still live with 
the consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
18 Only 13% of the Phoenix Generation, as mentioned in the introduction, served in the 
Commons after 1945, and only 8 (less than 2%) of them in Cabinet. For all that Macmillan 
and Eden were in 10 Downing Street this seems a generational shift indeed. Whilst 
veterans such as Lytellton augmented the ex-servicemen number, they had not served in 
parliament between the wars. It was this twin experience, I argue in the Mannheimian 
model, that was transitive. 
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Appendix A 
Duff Cooper’s Acrostic, Undated 1930 
Steadfast of purpose have you proved - and the  
Twice tried custodian of your country’s fate 
And neither sought the many to placate, 
Nor feared the private malice of the few. 
Lately, when civil turmoil fires grew - 
Engendered out of misery by hate - 
You were the statesmen that preserved the state 
Because the English people trusted you 
And when your task is ended - and the cheers 
Loud echoing round you shall have died away - 
Down the long corridor of crowded years 
Welcome awaits you where you longed to stay 
In fields and lanes, in books and quiet spheres 
Not unnumbered in your noiscent [?] day. 
CUL, BALD 240/8/2. 
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Appendix D 
 
Conservative Voting for Labour Policy / Votes of Confidence 
Lord’s Amendment Desiring to Reimpose the ‘Genuinely Seeking Work’ Clause to the 
1930 Unemployment Act 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 30 January 1930, vol. 251, col. 1307-1312 
 Phoenix 
Generation 
Control Actual 
Vote 
Back 
Labour 
0 0 273 
Back the 
Tories 
68 
(49.5%) 
16 (62%) 124 
Abstain 69 
(50.5%) 
10 (38%) 217 
 
The PG therefore made up 55% of the total opposition, whilst constituting 52% of the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party. 
Vote of Confidence  Regarding the 1929-31 Government 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 16 April 1931, vol. 251, col. 363-489 
 Phoenix 
Generation 
Control Actual 
Vote 
Back 
Labour 
0 0 305 
Back the 
Tories 
102 (74%) 26 (87%) 251 
Abstain 35 (26%) 4 (13%) 58 
 
The PG therefore made up 40% of the total opposition, whilst constituting 52% of the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party. 
Labour Amendment to 1934 Unemployment Act to Keep 14-16 year olds from 
paying National Insurance 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 3 December 1934, vol. 295, col. 1375-1378. 
 Phoenix 
Generation 
Control Actual 
Vote 
Back 0 0 41 
317 
 
Labour 
Back the 
Tories 
117 (53%) 41 (50%) 303 
Abstain 102 (47%) 41 (50%) 270 
 
The PG therefore made up ~39% of the total Tory vote, whilst constituting ~46% of the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party.
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Appendix E 
Old Etonian Phoenix Generation Members – see E.L. Vaughan (ed), List of Etonians Who 
Fought in the Great War 1914-1919, (Windsor, 1921) passim. 
NAME YEAR OF BIRTH YEAR LEFT ETON ETON HOUSE 
COLVIN, Richard 1856 1874 RD, RAHM 
STARKEY, John 1859 1876 HEL 
BECKETT, William 1866 1882 GEM 
WARD-JACKSON, Charles 1869 1883 AC 
CECIL, Hugh 1869 1884 GEM 
FRASER, Keith 1867 1884 JME 
HILLS, John 1867 1885 HEL 
WILSON, Arthur 1868 1885 CHE 
FITZROY, Edward 1869 1886 ACJ 
BRASSEY, Henry 1870 1887 RAHM 
CAVENDISH-BENTINCK, Henry 1863 1887 ECAL 
FOXCROFT, Charles 1868 1887 ECAL 
GREENE, Walter 1869 1887 FHR 
HOPE, John 1869 1887 ACJ 
CAMPION, William 1870 1888 RAHM 
MORRISON-BELL, Clive 1871 1888 FT 
GUEST, Charles Henry 1874 1889 HEL 
LANE-FOX, George 1870 1889 ACA 
PEEL, Sidney 1870 1889 KS 
TRYON, George 1871 1889 RAHM, HGW 
FREMANTLE, Francis 1872 1890 KSE 
HURST, Gerald Berkeley 1877 1890 KS 
SCOTT, Samuel 1873 1890 ECAL 
BAIRD, John 1874 1891 RCR 
WHELER, Granville 1872 1891 ECAL 
GIBBS, George 1873 1892 JME 
SHEFFIELD, Berkeley 1876 1892 ACA 
SPENDER-CLAY, Herbert 1875 1892 RAHM 
HENNESSY, George 1877 1893 PHC, CHA 
LEIGHTON, Bertie 1875 1893 ECAL 
BIRCHALL, John Dearman 1875 1894 TD 
CHILD, Smith 1880 1894 RAHM 
LOCKER-LAMPSON, Godfrey 1875 1894 SAD 
ACLAND-TROYTE, Gilbert 1876 1895 SAD 
WINDSOR-CLIVE, George 1878 1895 SAD 
COURTHOPE, George  1877 1896 RAHM 
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CROFT, Henry Page 1881 1896 EH, TCP 
RAMSDEN, George 1879 1896 HD 
TINNE, John 1877 1896 CHE, CL 
McDONNELL, Angus 1881 1897 SRJ 
PETO, Geoffrey 1878 1897 KS 
PONSONBY, Charles 1879 1897 CHA 
HERBERT, Aubrey 1880 1898 ACB 
LLOYD, George 1879 1898 FT, SAD 
CADOGAN, Edward 1880 1899 ACB 
DENISON-PENDER, John 1882 1899 HWM, HM 
GUINNESS, Walter 1890 1899 ECAL 
HENEAGE, Arthur 1881 1899 ELV 
LOCKER-LAMPSON, Oliver 1880 1899 SAD 
STEEL, Samuel 1882 1899 ACJ 
WOOD, Edward 1881 1899 WD 
HAMBRO, Angus 1883 1900 ACA 
POWELL, Evelyn 1883 1900 PW 
WINTERTON, Edward 1883 1901 WD, HM 
HOWARD-BURY, Charles 1883 1902 PW 
CURZON, Francis 1884 1903 EI 
KEELING, Edward 1888 1903 KS 
ORMSBY-GORE, William 1885 1903 ECAL 
PAGET, Thomas 1886 1903 RWW-T 
WILLEY, Vernon 1884 1903 PW 
BOWYER, George E 1886 1904 AAS 
BRASS, William 1886 1904 JME 
HELY-HUTCHINSON, Maurice 1887 1904 KS 
HORLICK, James 1886 1904 JHMH 
LOWTHER, Christopher 1887 1904 ELV 
MASON, Glyn 1887 1904 ECAL, JMD 
MEYER, Frank 1886 1904 R S de H 
ASTOR, John 1886 1905 ACA, RS de H 
DUNCANNON, Vere 1880 1905 CHA 
LUCAS, Jocelyn 1889 1905 RCR 
WILLIAMS, Charles 1886 1905 RCR 
COLFOX, Philip 1888 1906 TCP, EIC 
EASTWOOD, John 1887 1906 RPLB 
BARCLAY-HARVEY, Charles 1890 1907 HB 
SASSOON, Philip 1888 1907 HFWT 
CROWDER, John E 1890 1908 SAD, PVB 
FISON, Guy 1892 1909 RS de H 
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MACMILLAN, Harold 1894 1909 KS 
MUIRHEAD, Anthony 1890 1909 RPLB 
CLARKE, Ralph 1892 1910 RSK 
HALL, Walter 1891 1910 JMD, VIeNF 
HOWARD, Donald 1891 1910 HBr 
BRISCOE, Richard 1893 1911 RSK 
CRANBORNE, Robert 1893 1911 HTB, SGL 
JAMES, Archibald 1893 1911 PVB 
RAMSAY, Archibald 1894 1911 EWS 
TITCHFIELD, William 1893 1911 HTB, SGL 
CROOKSHANK, Harry 1893 1912 KS 
EDNAM, William 1894 1912 CHKM 
LLEWELLIN, John 1893 1912 ABR 
McEWEN, John 1894 1912 RPLB 
MELLOR, John 1893 1912 FHR, H de H 
PATRICK, Colin Mark 1893 1912 PVB 
CROSS, Ronald 1896 1913 RPLB 
APSLEY, Lord Allen 1895 1914 EI, TFC 
DREWE, Cedric 1896 1914 CHKM 
HUDSON, Austin 1897 1914 AEC 
LODER, John 1895 1914 RPLB 
STANLEY, Oliver 1896 1914 OEC 
STUART, James 1897 1914 LSRB 
CAZALET, Victor 1896 1915 RPLB 
DUGDALE, Thomas 1897 1915 AEC 
EDEN, Anthony 1897 1915 ELC 
LUMLEY, Roger 1896 1915 CMW 
PEAKE, Osbert 1897 1916 HM 
BAILLIE, Adrian 1898 1916 HM 
WARRENDER, Victor 1899 1916 RPLB 
HARMSWORTH, Esmond 1898 1917 HBr 
LANCASTER, Claude 1899 1917 RPLB 
 
Decade Number left Eton in this decade 
1870s 2 
1880s 17 
1890s 30 
1900s 27 
1910s 29 
Total 105 
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